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The History of Human Rights Formation  
(Or How to Study a Concept that Does Not Yet Exist) 
 
 
  As long as there have been laws that purport to shield humans from violence, 
danger, and deprivation, there have been rights holders that lay exposed and bare. The 
chasm in which dispossessed populations falter—between the comforting assurances of 
universal human rights and the devastating particularity of their application—is a 
troubling reality.  For those who in recent years have been subjected to the most 
disastrous situations—in Rwanda, Darfur, and New Orleans, for example—are apparently 
already protected by a robust system of human rights.  But even more troubling is the 
realization that the governments presiding over such tragedies typically sign the treaties, 
attend the conferences, and otherwise present themselves as strong supporters of human 
rights.  But for those who falter and lack a robust network of social attachments, the law 
becomes distant, politics ever-more exclusive, and human rights a mere idea.  How has it 
come to be that the modern international system of human rights allows states to offer 
such inspiring rhetoric in support of human rights in the international sphere, while 
socially dislocated populations so often have their rights violated with impunity?   
The social consequence of this tragic incongruity is one of the most well-known 
problems surrounding modern international human rights.  Scholars of human rights have 
addressed this puzzle from a variety of perspectives–enforcement, treaty ratification, 




geopolitics, and implementation, for example.  In this project, however, I look at the 
historical formation of the modern international human rights concept to gain an 
understanding of how its own constitution affects its application.   In this regard, I follow 
the lead of others who have studied important moments of rights formation—e.g. the 
French, English and American Revolutions, the Civil Rights Movement or Roe v. 
Wade—to uncover the buried struggles, hidden conflicts, and otherwise forgotten 
histories that make the law what it is today.1   
The focus of this empirical study is the creation of what is now considered to be 
the foundation of the modern human rights regime—the International Bill of Human 
Rights.  The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  This analysis focuses on the period from 1947-1954 when 
virtually all of the drafting of all three texts took place.2    Though human rights today 
might seem like the only appropriate response to the Holocaust and World War II, during 
this time period, the concept was anything but self-evident. This empirical analysis 
reveals a multitude of serious reservations that are often overlooked by human rights 
scholars.  The apparent unity and support for the non-binding UDHR (passed in 1948 by 
a vote of 48-0-8), for instance, quickly gave way when attention turned towards drafting a 
binding Covenant.  Deadlocks split the text into two documents, and stalled its entry into 
                                                 
1  Depending on the particular question, locating the pertinent “moment” of rights formation may take a 
researcher back to the latest court case or through the past several centuries.  After locating the institutional 
origins of rights formation in medieval England, Somers (1994:112) is correctly unapologetic: “If [the] 
search for causal contingencies takes me to the 12th through 14th centuries—so be it.”   
2 The phrase, “the drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights” is used throughout to refer 
collectively to all three texts during this important eight year period. See Appendix for an overview of the 
entire drafting process. 




force for more than a generation.3  Because the human rights concept promised (or 
threatened) to create new categories of right holders, imperial powers such as Great 
Britain and influential political groups in the United States resisted this universal and 
inclusive discourse.  Interestingly, during the same period, prominent professional 
organizations such as the American Bar Association and the American Medical 
Association, as well as progressive thinkers like Hannah Arendt and Gandhi—each for 
their own reasons—also rejected key aspects of the new human rights concept. 
In this project, I show that these strands of resistance had a significant impact on 
the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights.  I argue that the modern human 
rights concept has been shaped by both positive support and (paradoxically) its 
opposition.  Following World War II, the human rights concept fostered a vital 
consensus-building process by absorbing oppositional elements into its unitary frame.  
Thus from its inception, the concept has been encumbered by a series of “internal 
contradictions” that have created enduring structures that today enable rhetorical praise 
for human rights, while constraining their enforcement. 
Many others have studied this history of human rights formation through 
approaches that tend to highlight human rights as a subject of politics, law, or philosophy 
(either alone or in conjunction with one another). Doing so has provided a wealth of 
indispensable knowledge about particular aspects of this history.  However, for reasons 
outlined below, it has also shielded from view many other important facets of the human 
rights formation process in what has become the “standard account” of the development 
of the modern system of international human rights.  Most importantly for the present 
                                                 
3 The Covenant was split into the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1952.  They were completed in 1966 and 
entered into force in 1976.  




research question, the standard accounts often conceive of human rights in a way that 
dislocates them from their social moorings.4   
Ironically, it is precisely the social aspect of modern international human rights 
that makes it so innovative and such a clear departure from previous eras of international 
law.  In the modern era, non-state actors regularly take part in human rights creation, 
individuals have gained recognition within international law, and one concept apparently 
links all.  It is therefore important to a closer look at the social foundations upon which 
human rights rest—not just because human rights are created by social actors, but 
because human rights create social actors.  By partitioning the social terrain into fields of 
recognition where actions matter and opinions count, where the plight of one represents 
the destiny of all, human rights define the social connections that allow people to live out 
the concept’s lofty ideals.  To do so entails moving the analytic field of view from its 
conventional sites, to focus in on the social elements that are commonly relegated to the 
penumbra of the other more common approaches to human rights.  And once this social 
reality is met with an analytic counterpart—one that views human rights as basic 
statements of social relations—a different side of the history suddenly emerges.  
This history has less to do with stories of moral progress, the realization of 
freedoms, or the triumph of human rights than do the standard narratives that have 
emerged over the past decade.  This, however, is not a revisionist’s excursion; this 
approach addresses a side of the history that is typically overlooked.  It points towards 
contention and debate, it uncovers bitter social eruptions over how to organize the post-
World War II world, and gives name to the silent, subterranean struggles for ownership 
                                                 
4 In this regard, Anthony Woodiwiss underscores the importance of an approach that “refuses to separate 
rights from social life.”  See Woodiwiss, Anthony. 2003. Making Human Rights Work Globally, at 7.   




of the human rights concept, itself.  In doing so, it exposes the social conflicts at the root 
of mid-twentieth century battles over human rights:  Whether African Americans should 
exist side by side with whites; whether colonial inhabitants were equal or subservient to 
citizens of the metropole; whether the market or the government should mediate relations 
between individuals; and whether those individuals should be citizens of the state, or 
citizens of the world.  
The answers to these questions were recorded in the International Bill of Human 
Rights for all to see, but only to view through lenses that highlight the grandeur of the 
law, the infallibility of what is natural and fundamental, and the prerogatives of state 
power.  They have yet to be decoded by an approach that translates its dicta into the basic 
language of the social and the words of the dispossessed.  Perhaps this was never meant 
to be.  But once a glimpse is caught of the hue and cry that was raised over human rights 
during their most formative moments of development, it becomes difficult to retreat.  
Examining the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights might seem like 
a relatively straightforward proposition.  But when a researcher endeavors to uncover a 
“buried” history, an account of why the story has been forgotten in the first place is a 
helpful, if not crucial, justification for the research.  After all, there may be very good 
reasons for why it was put to rest.  So why has the influence of such opposition not been 
studied and accounted for by human rights scholars?  Why has it been overlooked?  For 
now, en route to examination of the actual resistance and by way of literature review, I 
suggest that the answer is related to the various difficulties associated with studying 
rights, as well as the various blind spots associated with the most common approaches for 
doing so. 




 What is a Human Right? …and Where do They Come From? 
The multitude of distinct forms that rights manifest makes them an extremely 
complicated topic of inquiry—particularly in the context of a social scientific analysis 
where specificity and precision is essential.  The great difficulty is that the same term 
invokes a multiplicity of guises—an incredible array of disparate definitions and an 
intractable range of conflicting foundational sources.  For instance, a right can be a 
concept that has no legal bearing—a moral or normative statement about something that 
ought to be.  Conversely, it can refer to positive law as it is written in constitutions and 
treaties.  Codified rights can be unenforceable (as in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights), or they can be deemed enforceable (as in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights).  Categorically, a right can be civil, political, cultural, socioeconomic, or 
human. Rights can be conceived as belonging to an individual, a group, a ruler, a 
corporate entity, or an animal. They can be associated with tangible private and public 
property or intangible intellectual property.  As conceived, rights also have numerous 
sources.  They can be considered God-given, or arise in the state of nature.  Rights can 
accrue by virtue of one’s humanity, through one’s citizenship, via common law, statutory 
law, custom, treaty, birth, race, gender, religion, sovereign edict, an act of parliament, a 
UN General Assembly resolution, or a social revolution…the list goes on and on.5   
The term “rights” can be thought of as a “free-floating” or “empty” signifier—a 
concept that is constantly deployed, yet vague, highly variable, and stripped of context 
and specified meaning (Derrida 1978).  But even when flanked by additional signifiers it 
                                                 
5 For similar discussions see Goodale, M. 2007. "Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global 
and the Local (Introduction) " In The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the 
Local, ed. M. Goodale and S. E. Merry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Somers, Margaret R., and 
Christopher N.J. Roberts. 2008. "Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of ‘Buried Bodies’ of 
Citizenship and Human Rights." Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 4:385–425. 




can remain just as nebulous.  For example, when the phrase “human rights” is invoked, it 
is entirely unclear whether it refers to the natural rights associated with medieval 
ecclesiasticism, the eighteenth century French “rights of man and citizen,” the 
fundamental right of citizenship Hannah Arendt discusses in the context of European 
statelessness, or the rights that exist within the modern post-war international human 
rights regime.  Indeed, the “multiplicity” problem is not necessarily solved by adding 
descriptors to the base term.  Since rights can stand for so many things, as Bobbio warns, 
great care should be taken to demarcate the parameters of their usage.6   
At this point then—as brief placeholder until more concrete definitions can be 
offered—it is necessary to present a few preliminary definitions.  In this project, the term 
“human rights” is used to refer to modern international, post World War II, human rights.  
In this sense it is not limited to positive or enforceable human rights laws, but is used to 
reference a broad historical phenomenon that includes ideas, concepts, institutions, laws 
and treaties, for instance.  Unless otherwise indicated, the word “right” is used in its 
broad, most abstract (and admittedly, potentially confusing) sense.  In the present study, 
rights are taken to be at their most basic level statements about relations.  Rights place 
individuals in particular social positions vis-à-vis the rest of society.  These relations as 
translated into legal structures take the form of juridical categories of correlative rights 
and duties.  Naming an entity as duty-holder is necessary to guarantee the social 
relationship implied by the former.  This relational nature of rights is spelled out in much 
greater detail below.           
In addition to the vagueness, multiplicity, uncertainty, tensions and 
contradictions, there is a final obstacle confronting the rights researcher: rights are not 
                                                 
6 Bobbio, Norberto. 1996. The Age of Rights. 




real. That is, rights are non-empirical, conceptual entities.  No one has ever seen a right, 
heard a right, or smelled a right.  This does not in any way reduce their causal strength, 
downgrade their normative standing, or limit their reach, for they are very real at the 
conceptual level.  Their existence, however, can be inferred at the empirical level through 
various indicators.  So from a research perspective, it is extremely important at the outset 
to define not only the particular form of rights under investigation, but to identify where 
to look for the visible indicators of their existence.  For example, does one find evidence 
of rights formation in the text of judicial opinions, the backrooms of the UN drafting 
conferences, or dissidents in Eastern European cafes? 
In this regard, much of the heavy-lifting associated with defining such terms is 
accomplished through the use of an analytic frame—a shortcut for defining the operative 
concepts and relevant empirics.  In doing so, it provides structure and establishes the 
parameters of a particular research endeavor.  Importantly, in studies of rights, it is a way 
of specifying the particular conceptual guise of rights that is under investigation and the 
relevant empirical phenomena to be investigated.  All analytic frames must at some level 
identify at least two things:  The definition and source of the right(s) under investigation.  
In most basic terms, it answers the questions: What is a right? and Where do rights come 
from?  In this way the rights universe can be partitioned and narrowed into various 
spheres of relevance so that specific (and therefore comparable) guises of rights can be 
isolated and studied from particular angles.  In short, it provides a basic orientation for 
studying rights that instills a degree of analytic clarity to an inherently nebulous subject.   
 
 




The Literature/Three Approaches 
The most commonly used orientations or analytic frameworks for approaching 
human rights are the disciplinary approaches of political science and international 
relations, philosophy, and law.7  It is along the parameters of one (or more) of these three 
distinct “paths” that most researchers examine the post-War development of modern 
international human rights.8  Importantly, the manner in which the human rights concept 
is typically defined in each orientation leads to a distinct type of engagement with the 
historical record, which in turn, highlights certain elements while downplaying (or 
entirely shielding from view) others. 
In addition to outlining the human rights scholarship relevant to the present study, 
the following literature review is also meant to illustrate the consequences of relying 
upon different analytic lenses as a starting point for the study of rights in general and the 
present study of human rights formation in particular.  In this latter capacity, it is 
important to note that the disciplinary categorizations below are ideal types, and not 
meant to operate as a rigid classification scheme.  Invariably, work in the field of human 




                                                 
7 Evans, Tony. 1996. US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights; Waltz, S. 2002. 
"Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Third World 
Quarterly 23 (3):437-48. 
8 Waltz (2002:438). 
9 Evans (1996). In offering his own categorization of two distinct intellectual approaches, Isaiah Berlin 
(2000:437) offers a similar caveat: “…like all over-simple classifications of this type, the dichotomy 
becomes, if pressed, artificial, scholastic and ultimately absurd. But… like all distinctions which embody 
any degree of truth, it offers a point of view from which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine 
investigation.”  




Political Science/International Relations Approaches 
One of the most common ways to approach the history of human rights formation 
is to focus on the international political process leading to (and including) the drafting of 
the International Bill of Human Rights.  Because the development of the international 
system of human rights is inseparable from the broader political backdrop of world war, 
decolonization and the beginning of the Cold War, the way states acted and reacted to the 
complex  geopolitical reality during and immediately after the War tends to be a major 
part of any such historical analysis (the present analysis included).  While there are no 
concrete definitions of human rights that are commonly shared amongst political 
scientists and scholars of international relations, human rights tend to be viewed as a 
function of state action in the international arena, and take form in international treaties, 
declarations, charters and so forth.  In this regard, the political deliberations in which 
leaders and representatives act in their official capacities to create and define human 
rights instruments is often the focus.  There are many detailed accounts, for instance, of 
the 1941 signing of the Atlantic Charter, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the 1945 
Great Powers meetings at Yalta and Potsdam, the 1945 founding of the United Nations is 
in San Francisco, as well as the actual drafting of the UDHR.  In these meetings—which 
were instrumental in the structuring of post-war international institutions and inter-state 
relationships—the accrual and preservation of state power tends to be highlighted.10  
                                                 
10 Glendon, Mary Ann. 2001. A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; Borgwardt, Elizabeth. 2005. A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human 
Rights; Morsink, Johannes. 1999. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and 
Intent; Waltz, S. 2001. "Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly 23 (1):44-72; Forsythe, David P. 1985. 
"The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1985." Political Science Quarterly 100 (2):249-69. 




Political science and international relations approaches to human rights typically 
seek to better understand state behavior.11  Within the parameters of this orientation, a 
good amount of the relevant human rights history can be explored.  But there are limits.  
The human rights formation process was not confined to FDR and Churchill’s Atlantic 
rendezvous off the coast of Newfoundland or the meetings held at the palatial Dumbarton 
Oaks mansion in Washington DC.  As extremely important and consequential as these 
meetings were, these are the political waypoints along a complex historical path that is 
not limited to the analysis of states and the stories of their leaders.  So if the focus or 
intent of the research question is not simply the narrow topic of state action and decision 
making (and here it is not), to subsume the analysis within the prerogatives of state 
power, interests, or ideas, limits engagement with the broader range of relevant empirics 
that relate to the rights formation process as a whole. 
 
Philosophical Approach 
The philosophical “path” into the study of rights often highlights non-empirical 
matters relating to the moral justification for human rights or their fundamental source(s). 
Human rights, for example, are typically understood to be natural or positive.  A natural 
understanding is one in which human rights emerge from an apolitical source such as 
nature, God, or humanity itself, and exist as moral entities regardless of whether they are 
codified in actual law or not.  A strong natural rights perspective might assert that even if 
codified, an unjust law does not constitute actual law.  On the other hand, a positive 
                                                 
11 This is true across the various theoretical perspectives within the international relations field—e.g. 
realism (see Morgenthau, Hans J. 1970. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970.), neorealism 
(see Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics), neoliberalism (see e.g. Robert O. Keohane. 
1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy). 




understanding focuses on rights as they are outlined in law—by a sovereign power, for 
example.  Under this approach, there is no necessary connection between morality or 
ethics and the validity of the law.12 
If any one of the above philosophical orientations for understanding rights is 
employed in an historical analysis, important (and perhaps essential) parts of the history 
will either enter or recede from view.  For example, if a natural rights perspective is 
taken—i.e. an understanding that human rights are natural and fundamental to the 
human—human rights becomes not so much a social or historical phenomenon, but 
something that at certain key moments when good prevails over bad, is realized and 
enshrined into law.  The focus then turns to those individuals, such as Eleanor Roosevelt 
and John Humphrey who helped make it so, or towards further identifying the 
foundations of the human rights under consideration.13  On the other hand, when a 
positive approach is taken, the focus tends to reside with the actual codification of the law 
and the nature of the written law. Hart, for instance, identifies two distinct categories of 
rules: primary rules and secondary rules.  He defines them respectively as rules of 
“obligation,” and “rules about rules.”  In the present context, primary rules refer to the 
actual human rights (freedom of speech, religion, etc), and the secondary rules refer to 
the manner in which the primary rules are applied and enforced.14  When the empirical 
object of inquiry is the individual, on the one hand, or the law, on the other, crucial 
aspects of the history are neglected.  Of particular relevance to this study is the fact that 
both perspectives, while certainly valuable to the study of human rights, shift focus away 
                                                 
12 E.g. Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law; Raz, Joseph. 1994. Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in 
the Morality of Law and Politics. 
13 E.g. see Morsink, Johannes. 2009. Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal 
Declaration. 
14 Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. 




from interactions across social actors – interactions that are critical to understanding the 
emergence and shape of the contemporary human rights regime. 
 
Legal/Doctrinal Approach 
The traditional mode of legal analysis is the doctrinal approach which views law 
as an autonomous subject, separate and removed from other social phenomena.  Within 
this perspective, rights are creatures of positive or “black-letter” law.  Rights, then, 
emerge from formal legal institutions and can be studied through the analysis of judicial 
opinions, case law, treaties, codes, statutes and other forms of positive law. This approach 
is useful for approaching a narrow set of legal questions: e.g. determining the status of 
prevailing law at a given time, locating inconsistencies, tensions, areas of legal 
uncertainty, and identifying important changes in law over time.  However, as in the 
aforementioned example, this perspective focuses attention away from relationships 
across individuals and social groups.  
The legal approach is also circumscribed by a legal orthodoxy that divides law 
into domestic and international spheres.15 The sourcing of the human rights under 
examination (i.e. whether they originate in domestic constitutions or international 
treaties, for example), is an important consideration; as the jurisdiction, relevant 
institutions, and possible remedies for their violation all turn on their sourcing. If the 
human rights, for instance, are understood to flow from the provisions of a state’s 
constitution, they are entirely distinct from the human rights outlined in an international 
treaty such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.    
                                                 
15 While this is changing rapidly—particularly in places like the EU where international law has been 
incorporated extensively into the domestic regimes of its members—in the US this bifurcation is as strong 
as ever. 




Furthermore, a history of human rights formation from an international 
perspective looks quite different than it does from a domestic perspective.  For example, 
while the 1945 United Nations Charter makes clear that one of the purposes of the 
organization is to promote human rights, significant state-level questions remain. Does 
this establish a legally enforceable duty for its member states, or can states only be bound 
by enforceable human rights treaties such as the Covenants?16  How do the escape 
clauses within the UN Charter (e.g. Article 2[7]) or the reservations, understandin
declarations (RUDs) in the Covenants affect the force of these treaties?
gs and 
                                                
17  On the other 
hand, a domestic analysis of human rights law might be concerned with locating the 
domestic laws that permit or deny the implementation of international human rights 
treaties.   
As the province of the research exceeds these bounds of the prevailing state of 
law, difficulties quickly emerge.  For example, what actually counts as “law” is much 
narrower in a doctrinal perspective than what is required for the type of historical 
narrative sought in the present study.  The UDHR, because it was not drafted as binding 
law, largely escapes view.18  The Covenants, on the other hand, were created as 
enforceable law, but they were not actually completed until 1966 and entered force in 
1976.  Under a strict legal approach, they only come into view as legal entities as of 1976 
(and this only includes those states that have signed and ratified).  Historically, though, 
virtually all of the formative work on the Covenants occurred between 1947 and 1954.  
However, what happened before the Covenants became binding law is not of as much 
 
16 See Article 55 of the Charter.  
17 Upon signing and ratifying treaties, states often include legal footnotes called reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs).  These are statements that range from merely voicing opinion to 
completely negating entire portions of the treaty.  
18 The UDHR’s status as customary international law, however, is a topic of inquiry.  




concern in a legal analysis.  Consequently, much of the essential social and political 
history that led up to their formation would escape the gaze of this doctrinal approach. 
 
A Complimentary System? 
Each analytic framework incorporates a particular definition and sourcing of 
human rights that in turn dictates the nature of the empirical engagement, and therefore 
produces a distinct history of human rights formation.  When the resulting narratives are 
taken together these approaches do not necessarily operate in competition with one 
another as much as they represent a complimentary framework that hones in on disparate, 
yet core representations of rights, thereby together covering an expansive swath of the 
historical human rights terrain. When the study of rights moves beyond the narrow 
parameters and logics of one approach, there is another analytic frame waiting to pick it 
up.19   
So for example, within a philosophical or jurisprudential approach, human rights 
might be considered to be natural, fundamental, and inherent within the person. But on 
the other hand, when rights are conceived not in any moral or ethical capacity, but solely 
as a form of positive law, questions surrounding what the law actually is become more 
important.  These questions then move from the philosophical terrain to the legal field of 
analysis which focuses directly on understanding the prevailing state of the law.  This 
approach is strongest when the source of rights is narrowly defined in terms of domestic 
constitutions or judicial decisions, for example.  But when the law is deemed to emerge 
from external sources—such as international politics, for instance—strict legal analyses 
only hold up so well.  Here theories of international relations, the analysis of political 
                                                 
19 This is not at all to say that bitter debates over rights do not occur at the margins of these approaches.  




institutions, and state decision making begin to hold more explanatory weight.  The study 
of human rights is then passed on to political scientists and international relations 
specialists who tend to debate whether human rights are simply features of state power or 
exert their own influential ideational and normative forces.  At the latter end of this 
continuum the analytic torch can return to the philosophical terrain to examine the 
normative and moral features inherent within the concept.20  In this way, each approach 
can rely upon its core competencies, maintain the power of a narrow field of view, and 
pass what exceeds their own mandate and competencies on to others.  As a result of the 
singular vantage point(s) associated with each approach, there emerge several distinct—
yet equally indispensable—histories of human rights formation.   
There are, however, problems with relying on such “complimentarity.”  For 
example, this division of labor operates most fluidly at the disciplinary level.  A lone 
researcher who wishes to gain a comprehensive understanding of human rights formation 
by employing multiple analytic lenses in a single study is right back at the initial 
“multiplicity of rights” problem, and is forced to grapple with disparate and 
incommensurable notions of rights—a complicating factor that Tony Evans suggests is 
actually quite common amongst researchers studying human rights; “It is rare, to find any 
distinction between these three [approaches] such that authors often move 
unselfconsciously from one to the other.”21   
There also exists a common “blind spot” each approach shares.  While these 
various approaches to human rights have provided incredible insight and knowledge 
about the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights, the “social” components that 
                                                 
20 These are “ideal types.”  Actual research often bridges categories to some extent.   
21 Evans, Tony. 1996. US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights, at 4. 




are so fundamental to the history of human rights under consideration are typically black-
boxed (or if they are considered, are relegated to the margins of the analysis).22  
One way that scholars are now attempting to revise the standard narrative of 
human rights formation (discussed below) that often neglects the social aspects of rights 
formation is through historical work in which the aforementioned analytic frameworks 
are less important to the overall structuring of the research program.  This type of “follow 
the action” approach allows the relaxation of strict frames for studying human rights and 
therefore permits the relevant histories to appear without prior constraints.  If, for 
example, international politics appears to be the most important element of a certain 
history, then the researcher has free license to trace those currents.  If, on the other hand, 
non-governmental organizations and other social actors appear to be most influential, 
then the historical narrative can flow in that direction, thereby cross-cutting legal, 
philosophical and political approaches to recount the salient histories through the history 
itself, rather than focusing on any one manifestation of human rights through an explicit 
analytic frame.   
For example, historians have shown that the rights formation process was 
certainly not limited to the legal system and international geopolitics—social actors and 
civic groups had a major role.23  During the 1940s and 1950s individuals, grass roots 
movements, professional organizations, the media, and intellectuals for example, in 
various capacities all took part in the process.  Importantly, they often worked to 
                                                 
22 The “missing social” has also been noted in studies of citizenship.  See generally, Somers, Margaret R. 
2004. "Citizenship Troubles: Genealogies of Struggle for the Soul of the Social." In The Making and 
Unmaking of Modernity. 
23 See generally, Anderson, Carol. 2003. Eyes off the Prize; Dudziak, Mary L. 2000. Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy; Korey, William. 1998. NGOs and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 




influence human rights creation through protests, circulation of petitions, domestic 
lobbying efforts and so forth—all very salient to the overall history (but very easy to 
overlook, if only focusing on international geopolitics, for example).  Looking towards 
the influence of non-state actors and civil society groups is an important aspect of this 
buried history.   
But even if not explicitly acknowledged, an analytic framework is always doing 
its work in the background.  As argued throughout this chapter, the “price of admission” 
for accessing a concept such as human rights is to define what it is and where it comes 
from.  Particularly with respect to social scientific work where a systematic analysis of 
commensurate categories is imperative, an explicitly stated framework is essential.  
While such precision is not as essential for all tasks, the confusion caused by slipping 
between conflicting or incommensurate manifestations of rights is not just a matter of 
language.  So to fully engage with the social elements, the starting point must be a 
conception of rights that permits—or demands—such engagement.   
In addition to building upon such historical work, this project is also situated 
within a growing body of scholarship within the social sciences that is beginning to study 
human rights in a way that permits active engagement with their social elements. Though 
the work in the area is wide-ranging and not bound by a particular disciplinary 
orientation, a major part of this trend relates to the desire to better understand the social 
and cultural dynamics upon which the theory and practice of human rights rests.  In this 
regard, sociologists and anthropologists have in recent years developed better 
understandings of how human rights operate at these levels.24 
                                                 
24 For sociological work in this area see, Woodiwiss, A. 2003. Making Human Rights Work Globally; 
Woodiwiss, A. 2005. Human Rights; Turner, Brian. 1993. "Outline of a Theory of Human Rights." 




The Crux of the Problem 
Taking stock: The most commonly used analytic frames (whether explicit or 
unstated, and whether used in conjunction with others or in isolation) obscure important 
aspects of the history of human rights formation that is under consideration here (and 
what gets shielded is not just the aforementioned “social” element).  Each analytic frame 
enables engagement with specific aspects of the historical record that conform to its own 
definition of human rights.  But on the other hand, each shields from view competing 
conceptions and empirics that challenge or sit outside of the lens’ own a priori 
conceptualization of human rights.  For a history of rights formation, it is precisely those 
ideas that do not conform to prevailing understandings, those conceptualizations of rights 
that were lost to dominant perspectives (but may have nevertheless been extremely 
influential) that is of interest.25   
So for example, viewing human rights solely as a phenomenon of international 
law or international politics (rather than as a domestic matter) is a common starting point 
for studying human rights (particularly in the United States).  The domestic absence of 
human rights, however, does not at all mean that the historical processes through which 
they emerged only occurred at the international level.  In the US, for example, it takes 
great work, continuous domestic struggles, and an active judiciary to keep human rights 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sociology 27:489-512; Turner, BS. 2006. Vulnerability and Human Rights; Blau, Judith R., and Alberto 
Moncada. 2005. Human Rights; Sjoberg, G, EA Gill, and N Williams. 2001. "A Sociology of Human 
Rights." Soc Prob 48:11-47; Morris, L. 2006. Rights: Sociological Perspectives; Somers, Margaret R., and 
Christopher N.J. Roberts. 2008. "Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of ‘Buried Bodies’ of 
Citizenship and Human Rights." Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 4:385–425; Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru 
Tsutsui. 2005. “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises.” American 
Journal of Sociology, 110:1373-1411.  For anthropological work see, Merry, SE. 2006. Human Rights and 
Gender Violence; Goodale, Mark. 2009. Surrendering to Utopia: An Anthropology of Human Rights; 
Goodale, Mark and SE Merry (Eds.). 2007. The Practice of Human Rights; Wilson, R, and JP Mitchell. 
2003. Human Rights in Global Perspective. 
25 For a similar argument, though in the context of the study of constitutions see, Scheppele, Kim Lane. 
2003. "Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross National Influence 
Through Negative Models." International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2):296-324.  




out of domestic affairs.  Over the past sixty years it has required all types of legal and 
political maneuvering, strategic treaty drafting, and institutional structuring to give 
human rights their present place (or lack of it) in the domestic realm.26  US lawyers, 
judges, senators and citizens, for example, waged contentious battles over whether human 
rights should gain entry or not when they arrived upon the domestic frontier in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  But if it is assumed at the outset that human rights are only a 
form of international law and politics, the very social struggles that gave rise to this 
understanding of human rights—particularly the bitter struggles which took place on 
American soil—remain out of view.  This certainly is not in any way to say that it is 
incorrect to focus on the international aspects of human rights.  It merely suggests the 
need for an approach that can account for the fact that even in their domestic absence, 
there is a complex (yet underappreciated) story to tell.27 
The same is true for any of the aforementioned starting points.  From a 
philosophical orientation, taking as Truth the natural foundations on which the human 
rights under examination purport to rest, effaces the historical and deeply political 
processes through which such understandings actually emerged.  And this, in struggles 
over rights, is exactly the point of a natural understanding—it roots the rights in a 
universal, unassailable, natural, apolitical realm.28  After World War II, anti-colonial 
activists, for instance, began to embrace a natural understanding of human rights.  Its 
antithesis—legal positivism—does just the opposite.  In denying the existence of natural 
                                                 
26 In the field of economics Polanyi (1949) similarly shows that it requires an active and involved 
government to create a “free-market” environment. 
27 The historical work associated with Dudziak (2000) and Anderson (2003), deserves mention here.  Their 
path-breaking work challenges the common assumption of a sharp demarcation between the domestic and 
international spheres during moments of rights formation in the twentieth century.  
28 Somers, Margaret R. 2004. "Citizenship Troubles: Genealogies of Struggle For The Soul Of The Social." 
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rights, it gives priority and power to the maker of the law—be it sovereign ruler, state, or 
judge—at the expense of inherent moral concerns.  It is not surprising then, that in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s Great Britain adopted such a perspective with respect to 
human rights when fighting against a universal conception that would extend to its 
colonies.  
The international relations debates over the primacy of power versus norms and 
institutions also play this out.  While neoliberal analyses typically accept the ability of 
normative entities such as human rights to influence state action, it is actually no surprise 
that the realist framework downgrades them.  This was in fact the original intention of its 
early founders—realism after all was an historical response to the failures of global 
organizations (e.g. the League of Nations), international law and “utopian idealism” to 
prevent global war.29  So for an empirical study of human rights, relying on either 
perspective ultimately shields from view that which does not conform to its a priori 
understanding of human rights—thereby limiting historical engagement with the various 
notions of human rights that were actually at stake. 
 
The Theory is Actually Political/Part of Struggles   
By identifying such blind-spots and historicizing these frameworks—that is 
treating empirically what is typically used conceptually and/or theoretically—it becomes 
clear that they were important aspects of the struggles under examination. 
Methodologically, one way to proceed is to use these analytic lenses, not for defining the 
concept of rights, but for accessing the empirical and historical terrain in which the 
                                                 
29 For the history of realism, see e.g.  Burchill, Scott, and Andrew Linklater. 1996. Theories of 
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struggles over human rights transpired.  Without getting too deep into the history that will 
be uncovered in subsequent chapters, each of these three perspectives (and the sub-
debates within) represented important strategies of action—and indeed, a certain form of 
collective action—in the struggle over human rights.  Proponents and opponents alike 
latched onto one or more of these orientations to frame their positions. 
 
A Socio-Historical Reality in Search of an Analytic Counterpart 
So what would an appropriate starting point be for such a study?  It would be one 
in which a priori conceptions of human rights did not obscure or prevent empirical 
engagement with any of the conceptions of rights that were at stake.  It would be able to 
focus on the nature of the competing conceptions of human rights, the associated 
struggles, and their influence on human rights creation.  And finally it would be able to 
acknowledge—at both an empirical and theoretical level—the social aspects of human 
rights.  As shown above, different perspectives lead to different historical narratives 
about the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights.  But so too do they 
determine the nature of the research questions posed at the outset. So for example, 
international relations perspectives often question the relationship between state action 
and human rights.30 A legal approach might focus on legal consistency and 
                                                 
30 E.g. see Koh, Harold Hongju. 1997. "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" The Yale Law Journal 
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implementation mechanisms.31  And a philosophical approach might begin with 
questions about the “organic unity” of the various categories of human rights.32 
                                                
On the other hand, a social approach to human rights formation would pose the 
questions in terms that relate to the social predicates and consequences of human rights 
formation; that is, directing the focus of the research to (1) the social forces responsible 
for their creation, and (2) how human rights demarcate particular ways of organizing 
social relationships.  Implicit within such an approach is the acknowledgement that 
human rights, if implemented, have the potential to reshape (or solidify) existing social 
configurations.  As such, human rights treaties, like those that comprise the International 
Bill of Human Rights, can be agents of sweeping change by extending recognition to new 
categories of social actors.  Conversely, they can also be the servants of the status quo, by 
transferring older social hierarchies into the language and structures of human rights.33  
So the resulting research questions for this social approach to the historical examination 
of the creation of the modern international human rights concept might take the following 
forms:  
 At a moment in which a large percentage of the world was in a colonial 
relationship—either as colony or metropole—the prospect of human rights was 
not inconsequential.  How did the hope (or fear) of severing the colonial 
relationship of dependence and replacing it with one of autonomy, international 
recognition, and equality affect the drafting of the International Bill of Human 
Rights? 
 
 In a world in which racial difference was a permissible (yet certainly contested) 
parameter for arranging social hierarchies, how did the hope (or fear) of 
enshrining into law principles of racial equality and non-discrimination influence 
the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights? 
 
31 E.g. see, Vázquez, Carlos M. 2008. "Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties." Harv. L. Rev. 122:599-695. 
32 E.g. see Morsink, Johannes. 2009. Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal 
Declaration. 
33 This is already a dramatic departure from a natural, universal, fundamental notion of human rights.  





 How did those who prospered from a system in which social relations were 
mediated by market forces respond to the prospect of the state taking a more 
prominent role in the distribution of goods and resources (as would be required by 
socioeconomic rights)? 
 
 Finally, how was the International Bill of Human Rights influenced by the 
struggles over whether the high walls of sovereign statehood were to be replaced 
with a model in which citizens of the state became citizens of the world? 
 
 In short, how did the struggles over organizing social relations influence the 
human rights that appear in the International Bill of Human Rights?34      
 
After the devastation of the depression and two global wars, there emerged in the 
mid 1940s a strong impetus for the type of systemic change that would lead to peace and 
prosperity.  Reshaping political, legal, and economic systems was imperative.  But when 
the question is posed from a social perspective, it highlights what was also at stake during 
the creation of the UDHR and its two Covenants: the potential reordering of social 
relationships of hundreds of millions of people around the world.  Each of the 
aforementioned alternatives for organizing social relations enjoyed undying support from 
certain quarters and suffered eternal opposition from others.  At the center of the social 
struggles that soon erupted was the fight for the heart of the human rights concept.  
Would it consist of only civil and political rights, or socioeconomic rights as well?  
Would lynching be considered a violation of the human rights of African Americans?  
Would they only apply automatically to those living in nation states (as opposed to 
colonial territories)?  While human rights might seem obvious today, as something of an 
                                                 
34 The development of implementation mechanisms is an important aspect of the human rights formation 
process.  During the drafting of the Covenants, for example, there were numerous debates surrounding the 
question of implementation.  While it is not a focus in this project, the opposition against creating a robust 
set of laws and institutions to see to it that the principles within the Covenants were actually enforced 
represents a distinct strand of resistance.   




empty vessel, it is a concept devoid of meaning until filled.  All of these matters were 
very much open questions in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Human Rights, Social Relationships, and Social Struggles: Defining the Terms 
Before proceeding, a few clarifying definitions are necessary.  First, a social 
orientation approaches issues surrounding human rights from a conceptual starting point 
that understands that rights are statements of social relationships.  Numerous scholars 
have suggested that rights are most fundamentally about social relationships.35  
Typically, however, this observation is not elevated to the level of an analytic fram
for studying rights as it is here.  A notable exception is Wesley Hohfeld, the legal scho
who almost a century ago devised a correlative framework for understanding and 
studying rights.  His typology though, does not incorporate the social elements that are a 
centerpiece of the present study.
ework 
lar 
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Taking rights as social relationships is a top-level ontological statement about the 
nature of rights.  It provides an understanding and a definition of rights that does not just 
permit engagement with their social foundations, it demands it.  Rights, for example, can 
reveal much about the nature of social relations within a given society.  Property rights 
are often associated with capitalism; a strong system of socioeconomic rights with social 
 
35 Lefort, Claude. 1986. "Politics and Human Rights." In The Political Forms of Modern Society; Ginsburg, 
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:i-xxvi; Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of 
Difference; Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. 1913. "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning." Yale Law Journal 23 (1):16-59; Carr, E.H. 1948. "The Rights of Man." In Human 
Rights: Comments and Interpretations; Lien, Arnold J. 1948. "A Fragment of Thoughts Concerning the 
Nature and the Fulfillment of Human Rights"; Wright, Quincy. 1948. "Relationship Between Different 
Categories of Human Right". 
36 Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. 1913. "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning." Yale Law Journal 23 (1):16-59.  Though immensely insightful, the complexity of his typology 
as well as the abstract character of its legal formalism has prompted two admiring legal scholars to lament 
that his typology of rights, “like a sack of dried beans” survives, but is “unesteemed by those who have lost 
the recipe for its use.” Kennedy, Duncan, and Frank Michelman. 1980. "Are Property and Contract 
Efficient?" Hofstra Law Review, 8:711-770, at 751. 




democracy, socialism, or communism; the absolute right of a sovereign, with 
authoritarianism, fascism, and so forth.   
What is essential in this approach is to connect the articulation of rights, not with 
a system that exists on its own (e.g. capitalism, socialism, or imperialism), but with the 
type of social relationships that define that particular system and exist within it. So rights 
of property, capital, and the recognition of corporate personhood, for instance, might be 
indicative of a set of social relationships in which the market is significantly responsible 
for mediating social interactions (e.g. through business transactions, production and 
distribution of goods, capital transfers, and so forth).  So in this context, when the term 
“capitalism” is invoked, for example, it is not viewed on its own as a master-category that 
somehow has agency, a fundamental nature, or its own teleology.  It is referring 
specifically to the set of social relationships that are emblematic of capitalist society.37  
These defining sets of relationships, in turn, can be read through the language of the law 
in general and rights in particular.  
Viewing rights as statements of social relations is a top-level ontological 
orientation.  To understand the history of human rights formation that is of interest in this 
project (or for that matter, any history of rights formation), it is necessary to bring the 
ontological framework down to an analytic level that can account for the social 
relationships of the individual units within the social whole (individual units in this sense 
can be states, groups, or individuals, for example).  At this level, the notion of 
positionality comes to the fore.  Rights can be seen as “subject positions”—a location in a  
“…complex configuration of relationships and institutional arrangements. 
Rights—whether human or citizenship rights or other kinds—are the label 
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we use to characterize certain kinds of social arrangements. To move the 
focus of rights away from what the individual possesses to the individual’s 
position in a fluid network of social relations is to begin to construct the 
social foundations of rights.”38 
 
So within this (re)orientation, a right is to be understood less in terms of being a 
“thing” an individual possesses (as implied by the commonly used phrase “an 
individual’s bundle of rights”), and more in terms of how it defines that individual’s 
position in a complex network of social relationships and institutional configurations.39  
Here, the most basic unit of analysis is an interaction (Somers 2009:224).  It is at this 
level that the researcher is able to locate meaning, identify power differentials, and access 
social identities; all of which are a function of positionality.  
So for example, when the UDHR was adopted on December 10, 1948, under its 
terms those who lived in colonial dependencies suddenly had a new subject position.  
Under Article 2, they were now members of the international community and recognized 
by the UN and its member states as occupying a social position independent from their 
status as colonial subjects.  As discussed at length in Chapter 3, because this new subject 
position was a great threat to colonial society, the colonial powers fought bitterly to 
prevent the explicit mention of their dependencies within the UDHR.  But they also 
fought to prevent the structuring of political intuitions that reflected this new subject 
position.  Similarly, the colonial powers fought philosophical battles over the nature of 
rights, eschewing conceptions that permitted their acquisition by colonial inhabitants.  In 
the field of law, they also fought against legal provisions that would reflect this new 
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subject positioning.  Because social structures are buttressed by political, legal, and 
ideational structures, the battles over such social positioning necessarily take place at all 
of these levels.   In this project, these battles are referred to as “social struggles.”  
What is under investigation in this study is the influence that social struggles have 
had on the formation of human rights.  In this sense, the phrase “social struggles” has a 
very specific meaning.  It is not a statement about who engages in the struggles; it is a 
statement about what is at stake in the struggles.  A social struggle is a struggle over who 
to include (and who to exclude) within the invisible boundaries that human rights draw 
through the terrain of the social. They are struggles over social positioning—over 
charting the appropriate relationships between groups and individuals; between the social 
collectivity and the state; the individual and state, but most fundamentally, the individual 
and the rest of society.40 Again, there are many who share a similar orientation, 
supporting the idea that rights emerge from struggle—though it is generally stated in 
passing discussions of rights or as an empirical observation.41  In this project, however, 
the observation is elevated to a general orientation for approaching rights formation and a 
tentative methodological approach for accessing the relevant historical data.   
 
Consequences of Social Orientation  
There are several consequences of adopting a social approach for the standard 
narrative.  First, the role of opposition comes to the fore.  Any struggle, debate, or 
controversy requires at least two sides.  Indeed when the historical focus shifts towards 
                                                 
40 Within the methodological approach taken here, these relationships are approached as empirical rather 
than normative matters.  
41 Bobbio, Norberto. 1996. The Age of Rights; Tilly, Charles. 1998. "Where Do Rights Come From?" In 
Democracy, Revolution and History, ed. T. Skocpol; Moore, B. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. 




the struggles over competing notions of human rights, there is no shortage of serious 
objections to the concept.  As mentioned above, researchers have often documented the 
work of the supporters without fully identifying the impact of the substantial resistance 
and opposition against various aspects of the emerging human rights discourse.  So in 
this project, the focus will lean more towards understanding the nature and impact of the 
often overlooked social resistance, opposition, and the serious reservations that states, 
leaders, groups, and organizations had against various aspects of the emerging human 
rights concept.  This line of inquiry is ultimately concerned with what has propelled the 
human rights movement forward.  It is because the literature on human rights typically 
views resistance as a destructive force (and therefore overlooks its productive role) that 
opposition is the focus here. 
Second, in this social approach, the Covenants gain much greater recognition.  
The UDHR is undeniably the foundational text that opened the door for the hundreds of 
human rights treaties, charters, governmental bodies, public and private organizations, 
groups and individuals that now make up what is known as the modern international 
human rights regime.  The other two-thirds of the foundation—the two Covenants—
however receive much less attention in the historical literature.  They are in no way less 
important, however, since as binding treaties they are meant to actualize what the UDHR 
only expresses. Because the UDHR was non-binding, achieving political consensus on 
many matters came more easily than during the drafting of the enforceable Covenants.42  
In many instances, states that accepted certain provisions in the UDHR, for example, 
quickly balked when similar content was proposed for the binding Covenants.  Focusing 
on resistance then, highlights the important host of contentious issues that were absent 
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during the creation of the UDHR and that emerged with great force during the drafting of 
the Covenants.  The international unity, success, and support for human rights that 
emerges in the standard story of the adoption of the UDHR, is quickly overshadowed by 
the animosity, hostility, and fundamental disagreements that emerged during the major 
drafting period of the Covenants (from 1947-1954).  As a result, they were not officially 
completed until 1966 and did not enter force until 1976.43   
Third, whether human rights actually “triumphed” over inequality, war, economic 
crises, and oppressive forms of political rule becomes an open question.  The answer to 
this question will turn upon the underexplored social axis that relates to how the struggles 
over human rights actually shifted the parameters of existing social relationships.  Did 
they move towards greater recognition and inclusion for all?  Or did older forms of 
inequality and social hierarchy appropriate the concept to do their own bidding? 
 
Conclusion 
If it is true that the modern human rights concept has been shaped by both 
positive support and opposition—that is, if the history shows that the foundations of the 
modern human rights regime were in fact born from social struggles—the greatest threats 
may not arise from external sources.  It is quite likely that they reside within the human 
rights concept itself.   Looking within the concept of rights, the researcher can identify 
areas of weakness and decay that from the inception of the concept have encumbered it 
with a series of “internal contradictions” that have created an enduring system of 
structural ambivalence that today enables rhetorical praise for human rights while 
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constraining their enforcement. This is accomplished by reorienting the focus of the 
analytic lens to zero-in on the social aspects of human rights formation, to reverse-
engineer the composition of the concept by identifying the constituent social elements 
that through debate and struggle, have given it its shape.  The outline for the rest of the 
study is as follows:  
 
Chapter 2: From War and Politics to Human Rights: The Cold War and Colonial 
Recession 
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is ground zero of the modern 
human rights regime, it does not represent the appropriate beginning or end of the present 
narrative. Human rights did not simply appear ex nihilo in December of 1948.  Towards 
the end of World War II, two separate global transformations were already in motion: 
first, there was the growing rivalry between the East and the West, and second, there was 
the ongoing struggle over decolonization. Even before the War was over, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the colonial powers (led by Great Britain), had begun to 
carve out political, legal, and ideological spheres in which their own social systems could 
flourish despite strong external challenges.  Perhaps the most explicit and direct empirical 
expression of this process took place within the emergent field of human rights creation, 
when in 1947 a handful of nations sat down at the United Nations to figure out what 
international human rights would be.44 
 
 
                                                 
44 This chapter represents an historical overview, while the other substantive chapters are arranged as 
parallel narratives of resistance against various aspects of the human rights concept. 




Chapter 3: Protecting State Sovereignty from the “Dangers” of Human Rights 
Despite the role that states played in the actual drafting of human rights treaties, much 
of the human rights formation process (perhaps the majority of it) took place far a field 
from the halls and backrooms of the United Nations where ink and parchment met.  
Fearful of “atomic war” and frustrated by the inability to end the US’s systemic racial 
injustice, there were many members of the US Congress, as well as various state 
assemblies, legal scholars, and advocacy groups that supported greater intervention by 
international institutions in domestic matters.  Just as quickly as this movement surfaced 
though, it succeeded in inflaming the passions of those who feared that international 
human rights treaties would irrevocably alter domestic law and, in turn, destroy a unique 
set of American traditions.  One California court’s historic (though ill-conceived) use of 
the United Nations Charter as a controlling source of human rights law provided 
opponents with more ammunition against international human rights treaties than they 
could have possibly conjured on their own.  
 
Chapter 4: Saving Empire: The Attempt to Create (non)-Universal Human Rights  
After World War II, human rights offered much to be hopeful for—and much that 
threatened the status quo.  While human rights held great promise for the hundreds of 
millions of people who then lived in colonial dependencies, the colonial powers were 
much less sanguine about the universal extension of this empowering concept.  During 
the drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights, Great Britain launched a campaign 
to prevent its colonial territories and their inhabitants from automatically being covered 
by the International Bill of Human Rights.  The centerpiece of this campaign (and this 




chapter’s focus) was Great Britain’s attempt to incorporate within the International Bill of 
Human Rights a restrictive colonial-era legal mechanism called the Colonial Clause. 
 
Chapter 5: A Version of Human Rights that Permits Racial Discrimination? 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s human rights ideas such as non-
discrimination and racial equality collided dramatically with longstanding and widely-
accepted practices of racial exclusion. States such as South Africa and the United States 
became increasingly concerned about the impact that human rights would have on their 
respective systems of apartheid.  To placate domestic human rights opponents, the US 
attempted to insert a Federal State Clause into the Covenant which would have relieved 
the US government of the responsibility to enforce its human rights provisions on matters 
that were then left to the states (e.g. Jim Crow laws).   
 
Chapter 6: Unequivocal Ambivalence: The US’s Hostility towards Socioeconomic Rights  
The prospect of incorporating socioeconomic rights into the Covenant aroused 
strong opposition amongst interest groups, powerful legislative blocs, and professional 
organizations (most notably the American Medical Association). Because an enforceable 
human rights treaty that contained such rights was sure to be rejected by the Senate, 
during the drafting of the Covenant the US became a dedicated opponent of 
socioeconomic rights. On the international stage, however, the US’s dismissal of 
socioeconomic rights put it at a significant geopolitical disadvantage—many of the 
smaller and non-western states that were potential Cold War allies for the US were 
amongst the strongest supporters of these rights. To manage these competing forces, the 




US developed a strategy to appear accommodating of socioeconomic rights in the 
international setting while simultaneously excluding them from domestic soil. 
 
Chapter 7: From Social Struggles to Human Rights 
In the search for causal relationships, causal mechanisms, and crucial historical 
contingencies in the human rights formation process, the overall approach taken in this 
project is one that focuses on the process through which competing forces (e.g. 
supporters and opponents of human rights) engage in “social struggles” over human 
rights. This chapter sets forth a theory of human rights formation in which social 
struggles transcend their existence as social action, and become a structural entity known 
as “human rights.”  The latter term refers to human rights not merely in the sense of 
written law, politics, or philosophical ideas (though these are all key), but as a lived 
reality in which a sphere of human inviolability can first emerge.







From War and Politics to Human Rights: The Cold War and Colonial Recession 
 
 
In 1945 when the war was in its final stages, the international community of states 
descended upon San Francisco to institutionalize the wartime alliance of the United 
Nations.  The fifty or so states at the UN’s founding conference represented a range of 
competing systems—capitalism, communism, socialism, and imperialism, to name a few.  
Although each of these systems incurred differing degrees of damage during the war, 
they all remained significant forces during the UN’s most formative moments.  As a 
result, there existed many competing visions about what kind of post-war world would 
best foster international peace and security.  Would it be one in which capitalism 
triumphed over communism?  Or perhaps peace would prevail in a world in which the 
colonial powers could reestablish the boundaries and dictates of their global dominions.  
Would racial difference continue to be a permissible parameter for arranging social 
hierarchy?  Each of these alternatives for organizing social relations enjoyed great 
support from certain quarters while suffering opposition from others. 
Despite their differences, in the mid 1940s one of the clearest imperatives for the 
members of the new United Nations was the need to achieve some degree of unity 
amongst a vastly diverse set of political actors and social systems.  If the nations of the 
 
world were to move forward from the tumult of total war, they would have to agree upon 
a set of basic principles to govern the scope of their responsibilities and the limits of their 
powers. While there was widespread agreement about the need for lasting international 
peace and security, what the necessary preconditions were (or in what social setting they 
could be attained) became a matter of intense debate.  Though researchers typically view 
this history through the lenses of power and politics, this project seeks to focus explicitly 
on the underlying social struggles that transpired during this period. 
The struggle over how to (re)order the social world appeared in countless arenas: 
It hung heavily over the fields of power and war as the allies fought to supplant the 
totalitarianism that had proven itself so destructive.  It was also waged—only through 
other means—by some of the world’s most influential thinkers as they sparred over their 
own competing visions of how best to organize the post-war world.45 It appeared in the 
realms of politics and diplomacy as post-war institutions and new policy regimes helped 
carve the world into its Cold War “spheres of influence.”  But perhaps the most explicit 
and direct empirical expression of the struggle over this question took place within the 
emergent field of human rights. 
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is “ground zero” of 
the modern human rights regime, it does not represent the appropriate beginning or end 
                                                 
45 In just a decade, writers from virtually every genre sounded-off in turn (many of these intellectual 
debates will be discussed in subsequent chapters).  See for example, H.G. Wells, The New World Order: 
Whether it is Attainable, How it can be Attained, and what sort of World a World at Peace Will Have to Be 
(1940); H.G. Wells, The Rights of Man: Or What Are We Fighting For? (1940); Joseph Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942); F.L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of 
National Socialism (1942); F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944); H. Lauterpacht, An International Bill 
of the Rights of Man (1945); Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace (1945); Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (1944); George Orwell, Animal Farm (1946), George Orwell, 1984 (1949); American 
Anthropological Association, "Statement on Human Rights" (1947); NAACP (with W.E.B. DuBois), An 
Appeal to the World (1947); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1949); H. Lauterpacht, 




of the present narrative. Human rights did not simply appear ex nihilo in December of 
1948.  Their social precursors took form within all of the diverse realms mentioned 
above.  The nature and outcomes of each of these expressions of struggle set the terms, 
parameters, constraints, and opportunities for the subsequent battles over human rights.  
It is therefore necessary to provide in this chapter a very brief overview of the history 
preceding the creation of the International Bill of Human Rights, before focusing on the 
resistance and opposition in subsequent chapters.46  By outlining the historical context, 
this chapter serves as the empirical departure point for the rest of this study.47  The 
purpose of this chapter is not to provide new ideas or new historical information—tasks 
that have already been accomplished by many others.48  Rather, the intention is to 
organize the historical data in a manner that will permit the full deployment of the 
sociological framework for studying rights as outlined in the preceding chapter. In doing 
so, I outline the key players, their unique backgrounds, and most importantly, two large-
scale social transformations—decolonization and the beginning of the Cold War—that 
were already well underway when a handful of state representatives sat down in 1947 to 




                                                 
46 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  Note: The ICCPR and the ICESCR were originally 
intended to exist as a single covenant.  In 1952 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that divided 
the Covenant into two separate documents. 
47 The present chapter represents an historical overview, while the other substantive chapters are arranged 
as parallel narratives of resistance against various aspects of the human rights concept. 
48 E.g. Gaddis, John Lewis. 2000. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947; Offner, 




Institutionalizing Social Structures and Global Transformations 
Towards the end of World War II, two separate global transformations were in 
motion.  The first was the growing rivalry between the East and the West, led by the 
Soviet Union and the United States.  The second was a more gradual transformation 
(though accelerated by the war) that had been underway for decades between the colonial 
powers and those pressing for an end to the colonial era.  Each pole of these struggles 
represented a competing framework for organizing social relations. Even before the war 
was over, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the colonial powers (led by Great 
Britain), had begun to carve out real-world spheres in which their own systems could 
flourish despite strong external challenges.  These underlying political dynamics were 
central to the social struggles over human rights that would soon develop. 
 
The Potsdam Decision – Divided Unity 
Just a few weeks after the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, 
and a few weeks before the surrender of Japan in the Second World War, the “Big Three” 
allied powers met in Potsdam, Germany to negotiate the terms of Germany’s 
unconditional surrender.49  From July 17 to August 2, 1945 the leaders of Great Britain, 
the United States and the Soviet Union met to devise a plan for the future occupation of 
defeated Germany.  One of the chief tasks was to establish a German state that would 
best foster future peace and a swift European recovery.  Agreement between the three 
about economic and political structuring, however, was in short supply. The divided 
                                                 
49 The Teheran Conference (November 20 - December 2, 1943), the London Conference (September 1944) 
and the Yalta Conference in the Crimea (February 2 – 11, 1945) were a few of the major wartime meetings 
that preceded Potsdam.   
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outcome of this conference revealed the growing fractures in the emerging East-West 
rivalry. 
At the time, one of the most critical issues for Joseph Stalin was Soviet security.  
Having just experienced two major wars at the hand of an invading German army, Stalin 
believed that the future of his nation depended on nullifying any future German threats by 
keeping the defeated nation weak and unarmed.  This entailed closing off the direct land-
routes into Russia the German army had taken in both wars, and creating a buffer zone of 
friendly (or subservient) nation states along Russia’s western border. Though 
unsuccessful in his attempt to install governments in Bulgaria and Romania, Stalin 
successfully negotiated the annexation and transfer of German territory to neighboring 
Poland.  To ensure Poland would not become a threat, under the terms of the agreement, 
he installed a Soviet-backed Polish government.  While Truman and Churchill (and later 
Clement Atlee) were wary of Stalin’s expansionist agenda, because the Red Army still 
occupied much of Eastern Europe, their bargaining power on many issues was somewhat 
limited.50  
Contrary to Stalin’s aims, the Western leaders believed that the revitalization of 
war-torn Europe required prosperous economies (including Germany’s) and political 
unity.  For Truman in particular, Stalin’s proposal to saddle Germany with $10 billion in 
war reparations as a way to keep the nation weak and economically deprived would 
hamper the recovery effort—not to mention economic opportunities for the United 
                                                 
50 The Potsdam meeting was also attended by Clement Atlee who replaced Churchill at the meeting who 
suffered defeat in the general elections of July 26.  For overviews of this historical episode, see McMahon, 
Robert J. 2003. The Cold War; Gaddis, John Lewis. 2000. The United States and the Origins of the Cold 
War, 1941-1947; Offner, Arnold A. 2002. Another Such Victory; Offner, Arnold A., and Theodore A. 
Wilson. 2000. Victory in Europe, 1945. 
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States.51 Importantly, establishing a democratic and capitalist foothold in Europe could 
curb Soviet expansion into Western Europe without the need to resort to military force.52  
These aims translated into a vision of Germany that was quite different from Stalin’s.   
In Potsdam, the key differences proved too great to bridge and the country was 
divided into four military zones controlled by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and France.  At the time, the need for a unified solution was great—the war, after 
all, was not yet over. But surrounded by mutual suspicion of the others’ post-war 
expansionist plans, the best solution for what Churchill referred to as the “big question” 
at Potsdam, was divided unity.53  The division of Germany represented fundamental 
tensions between systems of governance, economics, ideology and social life. The new 
borders that parceled Germany into separate spheres institutionalized the growing 
fractures between the East and the West, thereby cementing them into the foundations of 
post-war relations.  It also allowed the Big Three to pursue mutually exclusive solutions 
within their respective spheres.  For example, Western interests would now promote free 
markets and democratic political institutions, while just a few miles away the 
groundwork for central planning and communist leadership was being established.   
Many of the same issues, concerns, and constraints that influenced the solution for 
divided unity at Potsdam reappeared during the drafting of the International Bill of 
Human Rights.  When such major difference was forced to coexist, the chosen solution 
for human rights was also quite similar: to build protective walls around conflicting 
                                                 
51 McMahon, Robert J. 2003. The Cold War, at 23; Schwartz, Richard. 1997. The Cold War Reference 
Guide, at 151. 
52 While at Potsdam, Truman was notified about the first successful atomic bomb test on July 15—a piece 
of news he chose to keep to himself rather than share with Stalin. It is not clear how (if at all) this crucial 
development played into the negotiations (see, Schwartz, Richard Alan. 1997. The Cold War Reference 
Guide, at 80). 
53 Offner, Arnold A. 2002. Another Such Victory, at 82. 
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systems so they could each flourish side by side within their own spheres—thereby 
amplifying the differences and solidifying the divergent paths that would be taken by the 
East and the West.   
 
Great Britain’s Path – Warding off Colonial Recession 
As a beleaguered Great Britain limped to Potsdam to engage in the East-West 
struggle that in a few years would blossom into the Cold War, it was already part of 
another large-scale historical transformation—colonial recession.  Like Great Britain, the 
strength of other colonial powers such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands had been 
greatly depleted during the war.  For these nations, post-war uncertainty extended well 
beyond their own European borders.  Riots in dependencies such as Algeria, Madagascar, 
India, Vietnam and Indonesia, made the future of their respective empires all the more 
uncertain.54  But as the largest imperial power, it was Great Britain that had the most at 
stake in absolute terms. Great Britain’s power (and therefore its post-war political 
interests) continued to be a function of its imperial assets, which in 1945 remained vast.  
As a way of potentially heading-off the developing trend towards decolonization, it was 
therefore in Great Britain’s interest to shape the still-malleable framework of the United 
Nations to be most accommodating of its existing imperial institutions, ideologies, and 
social relationships. 
  Great Britain’s empire had been attained over the past several centuries through 
its naval superiority and military strength, at the insistence of its rapacious appetite for 
land, labor and resources.  Equally important as its ability to protect its overseas interests 
                                                 
54 The decline of the European powers European NAvigator. Etienne Deschamps. Translated by the CVCE. 
http://www.ena.lu/decline_european_powers-2-247. Last Accessed 05.2010.  
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through power and force was the need to manage its empire.  Organizationally, it was 
comprised of an immense network of legal, political, and commercial institutions, at the 
center of which presided the British Colonial Office.  Accompanying its well-developed 
administrative capacity was a set of ideas that provided the moral and practical 
justification for its existence (as well as its maintenance).  These ideas were framed in a 
variety of self-legitimizing guises such as the civilizing mission, the white man’s burden, 
the sacred trust, and Lugard’s influential dual mandate.55  These imperial motifs 
amounted to something of a moral imprimatur; the metropole’s ownership of colonial 
land and labor was sanctioned by the recognized (though never enforced) duty to promote 
the welfare and development of the colonial inhabitants.56  As these imperial narratives 
went, this duty was to be administered until the colonies could be brought along an 
upward path of development.  At a certain point they would be sufficiently developed to 
“be able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” and 
independence finally would be granted.57  The time horizon on this built-in goal of 
independence, however, was extended indefinitely by essentialist narratives of 
fundamental cultural and racial inferiority.58   
                                                 
55 Lugard, F. J. D. (1926). The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Edinburgh, London, W. 
Blackwood and sons.  Lugard’s Dual Mandate is considered a seminal text on the practices and ideological 
justifications underlying British colonialism (Rist 2002:62).  As Callahan (2004:21) writes, “By the 1920s, 
Lugard’s name had become synonymous with the political doctrine of colonial administration called 
‘indirect rule,’ the idea of preserving African culture and protecting Africans from exploitation by 
governing through ‘traditional’ African leaders and institutions.”  In addition to his most influential 
writings, he cultivated a strong following amongst a large network of supporters throughout the British 
Government and its dependencies, academia, international and domestic civil society organizations, foreign 
governments, and businesses. Callahan, Michael D. 2004. A Sacred Trust, at 21.  
56 Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The History of Development, at 62; Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler. 1997. 
Tensions of Empire. 
57 Quote from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919).  Presently, I will discuss how 
colonial ideas were similarly imported into the UN’s framework.   
58 Simpson, Brain A.W. 2001. Human Rights and the End of Empire. 
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The nature of this relationship was one in which colonial inhabitants were subject 
to the rules and laws imposed by the colonial power.  It was predicated on the internal 
inequality between colonial power and colonial inhabitant.  As property, colonial 
territories and their inhabitants were separated from the rights and freedoms enjoyed by 
people in other countries and in the metropole, itself.  If there were any rights to be 
claimed by the colonial inhabitants, they were to be claimed and granted within the 
closed legal and political framework of the colonial relationship.59 Great Britain’s 
continued preeminence as a colonial power was in many ways dependent upon this 
relationship.  For the moment colonial inhabitants gained political recognition in the 
international sphere—by acquiring human rights or territorial independence, for 
instance—the relationship of inequality and dependency that sustained the imperial 
venture was in serious jeopardy.  It was well-known that in due-course the social, 
political, and ideational structures that separated metropole from colony and citizen from 
subject would begin to crumble, eventually surrendering to a new social paradigm.  How 
soon though, was anyone’s guess.60 
It was thus in the colonial powers’ interests to create durable institutional 
structures that mirrored existing colonial practices, institutions, and ideologies during 
these early years at the UN when the opportunity to influence its structure and design still 
existed.  Reestablishing its imperial structures within the framework of the United 
Nations was a stated goal for Great Britain at the UN’s founding conference in San 
                                                 
59 This analysis is based on British colonial law which had its own unique system of colonial law.  
Nevertheless the practices and ideologies of French colonialism, for example are incredibly similar (for 
such histories see Conklin 1998; Rist 1997); see Simpson (2003) for detailed discussions of the British 
colonial system.  
60 This use of the word “paradigm” roughly corresponds to the Kuhnian notion (only here it is deployed in 
the field of social organization, transformation, and change, rather than in the realm of scientific 
revolution).     
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Francisco.  Lord Cranborne of the United Kingdom, for instance, argued that empire was 
not a choice, but a necessity for the world.  Were it not for empire, he argued, liberty 
would not have prevailed.61  Indeed, by 1946 large portions of the imperial framework 
had already been integrated into the organizational structure.  For example, the colonial 
trusteeship system that appears in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the UN Charter was 
derived from the language of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which in turn was 
largely based on existing British colonial policy.62  Article 73 of the UN Charter gives 
explicit mention of the colonial idea of the “sacred trust” (discussed above).  The Fourth 
Committee of the General Assembly—the organizational body responsible for colonial 
matters—also recognized the relationship as a legitimate one. As described below, Great 
Britain would soon be poised to mold the human rights concept in its own imperial image 
as well.  Interestingly, the drive to solidify the colonial relationship within the new UN 
framework, gave the UN and its member states the authority discuss colonial matters.  
This amounted to an early form of political recognition for the trust and non-self 
governing territories that would soon have far-reaching consequences.63  
What Great Britain could not have completely foreseen at the time, was that the 
ideological justifications which had been an asset in the previous era of colonial 
management, now had the potential to become one if its greatest liabilities.  The 
burgeoning discourse of freedoms and rights that had emerged during the Great 
                                                 
61 Cited by Jacobson, Harold K. 1962. "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal." 
International Organization 16 (1):37-56, at 56; See UNCIO Documents, Vol. 8:143-146. 
62 See generally, El-Ayouty, Yassin. 1971. The United Nations and Decolonization, at 17; Rist, Gilbert. 
1997. The History of Development, at 58-62. The League outlined a formal system for overseeing 
dependencies, thereby granting the colonial relationship institutional legitimacy.  The moral justification 
for the relationship (as seen by colonial powers) was written into Article 22 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations:  “…[those territories] which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization” (Italics mine).  
63 This also occurred under the Mandate System of the League of Nations.  
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Depression and gathered strength during the war, were potentially at odds with colonial 
society.  Moreover, the notion that a nation could wield absolute and unmediated 
authority over a people was all the more suspect now that the horrific carnage of Hitler’s 
totalitarianism had been exposed.  It would be some time, however, before it became 
entirely clear that its ideological assets—those imperial creeds and social tropes that had 
in the past been leveraged for economic and political gain—were best suited for a world 
that had already shone its brightest.  For while in 1946, anti-colonial dissent had not yet 
established a firm root within the United Nations, member states such as India, Panama, 
and the Philippines were becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition against colonial 
practices.64 
 
The Soviet Union’s Path 
The Soviet Union, along with much of Europe, incurred devastating losses during 
the war, with the Soviet Army losing millions of soldiers.  The civilian population was 
not spared either.  Adding to these problems in 1946 was the start of a two year famine 
resulting from Stalin’s centralized agricultural policies.   In the attempt to recover from 
these losses (as well as mitigate future loss), Stalin was fixed upon elevating domestic 
morale, productivity, and creating the neighboring network of subservient Eastern 
European communist states that would insulate Moscow from future incursions.65 
If Great Britain’s future rested with its colonial relationship, the Soviet Union’s 
domestic and international future was wedded with the social and political ordering 
defined by communism. For Stalin, communism provided much potential for a robust, 
                                                 
64 A major UN debate emerged in 1946, for example, that revolved around colonial issues and the treatment 
of Indian workers in South Africa (see chapter on race).  
65 McMahon, Robert J. 2003. The Cold War, at 23. 
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productive domestic social order once the system recovered from the war and gained its 
own momentum.  Domestic productivity and internal stability would be a natural 
outcome of the centralized planning process if external stability were established as well.  
And to this end, communism—as a political philosophy and an organizing frame for 
social and political relations—was central to his aims.66 
For many in 1946, communism provided a hopeful alternative to the three biggest 
threats in recent memory: economic depression, fascism, and war.  In this respect, 
communism allowed Stalin to leverage an important asset that possessed strength, 
resonance, and widespread appeal both at home and throughout Europe.  The appeal of 
communism was not just an Eastern European phenomenon at the time, however. In 
Western Europe, though not uncontested, the communist parties were significant forces 
in national politics.  The communist parties held large constituencies in Italy and France 
and in 1946 took 18% and 28% of the votes in their respective parliamentary elections.67  
Socialism also drew support from smaller nations around the world—particularly in Latin 
America where many states already had socialist principles written into their 
constitutions.68 Even in the United States, the Communist and Socialist parties—though 
never serious forces in electoral politics—had their members and supporters.  This was a 
reality that in the US produced strong anti-communist backlashes.  McCarthyism 
                                                 
66 At various moments during the drafting of the UDHR explicit discussion of the parameters of Soviet 
communism emerged in debate.  As Professor Koeetset, representing the Soviet delegation, warned at the 
very start of the drafting process, “the members of the Committee must not forget that one cannot oppose 
the individual to society and to government.”  (UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, P.6).  This outlook would put 
the Soviet Union at odds with the Western capitalist nations, and underlie the six communist nations’ 
abstentions in the final vote on the UDHR in December of 1948.  Providing an ex post justification for 
these abstentions, Andrei Vyshinsky argued that under communism there ultimately would be no classes, 
and none of the contradictions between the individual and the state that rights implied.  It would be a place 
where the “state and the individual were in harmony with each other, [and] their interests coincided” (cited 
in Morsink, Johannes. 1999. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  at 22). 
67 See http://www.ena.lu/importance_communist_parties-2-248. Last accessed 04.2010. 
68 Humphrey, John P. 1983. "The Memoirs of John P. Humphrey, the First Director of the United Nations 
Division of Human Rights " Human Rights Quarterly 5 (4):387-439.  
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developed alongside popular movements against the US’s involvement in the United 
Nations as well as its role in creating international human rights treaties—both of which 
were seen by some as bastions of socialism.69   
The need to strengthen the Communist Party’s domestic footing, as well as 
project it beyond Russia’s  borders, translated into a new post-war policy approach that 
Stalin revealed to voters in Moscow on February 9, 1946—the eve of Soviet elections.  
This speech, which provided the West with the most direct exhibition of Stalin’s post-war 
agenda to date, became an extremely important event in the developing Cold War.70 In 
addition to defending communism as a viable system and providing his own 
interpretation of the cause of the war, he sought to gather domestic support for the 
communist party’s political agenda.71  He was also speaking to the war-ravaged Eastern 
European states that stood to benefit greatly from the US’s desire to provide economic 
support (and access to foreign markets), and in the process subvert Soviet influence.72  
Guarding against US influence in Europe, Stalin explained that the US was not the 
answer for their economic problems—it was in fact, their cause. World War II, he 
argued, was a result of the inequities and imbalances that were a fundamental aspect of 
the system of capitalism.  In their relentless pursuit of capturing new markets and 
acquiring raw materials by force, capitalist nations were directly to blame.  In his speech, 
Stalin noted that a world dominated by the intrinsically destructive capitalist system 
                                                 
69 See Chapter 3 (Sovereignty) and see Chapter 6 (Socioeconomic Rights).  
70 Lee, Stephen J. 2008. European Dictatorships, 1918-1945, 3rd Ed., at 91. 
71 Having consolidated political power though, Stalin was not in any danger of being voted out of power.  
State Department records closely track these election events, concluding the election was a sham in which 
the communist party “cannot lose.”  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI, pg. 646-709.  
72 Wettig, Gerhard. 2008. Stalin and the Cold War in Europe; Gaddis, John Lewis. 2000. The United States 
and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.  
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precluded the redistribution of wealth and resources—a central aspect of communism—
and ultimately guaranteed war. 
“…the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world  
economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism. 
…the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly 
and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars.”73 
 
The Soviet election was an opportunity for the Communist Party in Russia to 
outline its agenda and post-war policies.  It also permitted the US Department of State the 
opportunity to better understand its motivations and aims.  Stalin’s speech, the most 
pointed (and potentially worrying) official statement of the Soviet Union’s foreign 
outlook aroused much concern and interest within the State Department.  Soon after 
Stalin’s speech, the State Department requested George Kennan, the Moscow-based 
chargé d’affaires to the Secretary of State, to provide an interpretive analysis of the 
speech.74  Kennan responded with one of the most significant communiqués of the early 
Cold War years.   
 
The US’s Path  
The ideological tenor of the emerging conflict was not entirely appreciated at this 
early stage.  The US was certainly wary of the Soviet Union’s advancements, but tended 
to view them in diplomatic, military and political terms.  Outlining the importance of 
Soviet ideology in his “long telegram,” George Kennan provided a new perspective for 
those in Washington. In this February 22, 1946 missive, which was later reprinted in 
Foreign Affairs under the enigmatic pseudonym “X,” Kennan outlined an intellectual 
position that ultimately would be translated into a policy approach for managing US-
                                                 
73 Stalin, Joseph. “Election Speech to Voters,” Moscow, February 9, 1946. 
74 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI, pg. 696. 
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Soviet relations.75  Kennan argued that the Soviet Union was not a state like other states 
that could be dealt with diplomatically.  Soviet actions were based on a theory in which 
they believed that communism and capitalism were inevitably bound to clash.  The 
Soviets were too weak to attack the US directly, he reasoned, so they would surround 
themselves with client states and fight an ideological battle with the US by trying to 
subvert these smaller states. Importantly, he urged the US not to capitulate to the 
increasingly menacing Soviet force that was bent on expansion and spreading its anti-
capitalism ideology.  Kennan argued against Truman’s previous assumptions that the 
Soviets could be bargained with diplomatically and suggested the need to fight 
ideologically as well and retain an “American way” of doing things.  Kennan’s argument 
became the intellectual basis of the US’s foreign policy approach to human rights.   
Less than two weeks after Kennan’s telegram was placed on Secretary of State 
James Byrnes’ desk, Winston Churchill—with Truman at his side—spoke at Westminster 
College in Fulton, Missouri.  In this March 5, 1946 speech, Churchill, sounded his 
famously ominous warning that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe.76 By 
February of 1947, the “iron curtain” threatened to draw-in additional nations after the 
British government informed the US that it was no longer able to offer military and 
economic assistance to Greece and Turkey.  This news was of particular concern to the 
United States.  Given the nations’ proximity to communist states of Eastern Europe, as 
well as the ongoing communist insurrection in Greece, absent a strong countervailing 
                                                 
75 X. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs 25:566-82.  
76 Id. at 261, 291.  In a subsequent press conference, Truman distanced himself from Churchill’s rhetoric, 
saying that he had no prior knowledge of the contents of the speech.  In a not so thinly veiled swipe at the 
Soviets, Truman smugly closed by telling a reporter that in America, Churchill (who was then Opposition 




force, the Soviets were sure to fill this emerging power vacuum.  The United States was 
now forced to take decisive action; this entailed the stern articulation of a new foreign 
policy agenda.  With the goals of helping allies recover from the war, expanding US 
political and economic influence abroad, creating new capital markets, and finally, 
keeping the Soviet threat at bay, the US agreed to take over Great Britain’s former role.77 
Shortly thereafter, on March 12, 1947, Truman addressed a joint session of 
congress to ask for $400 million to support Greece and Turkey.  Echoing Stalin’s 
Manichean imagery and invoking Kennan as his Muse, Truman outlined a massive 
foreign policy initiative that deepened the growing fractures between the East and the 
West.   
“One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by  
free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression.  The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly 
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press 
and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”78  
 
He drew out the humanitarian responsibilities of the United States in the international 
sphere, with a return on this investment that came in the form of economic stability, 
political freedom, and global security. 
“I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid  
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes… The 
seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and 
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the 
hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free 
peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we 
falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall 
surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.”79  
 
                                                 
77 Schwartz, Richard Alan. 1997. The Cold War Reference Guide, at 18; McMahon, Robert J. 2003. The 
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The centerpiece of this initiative was the reconstruction of Europe through the 
Marshall Plan.80  In a speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State, George 
Marshall, echoed Truman’s exhortations but broadened the argument for the allocation of 
aid to the countries of Europe that had been devastated by the war. He also emphasized 
certain elements of the humanist tone that were undercurrents in Truman’s address, while 
focusing on the ability of US economic contributions as the answer. 
“Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social 
conditions in which free institutions can exist.”    
 
Importantly, the US’s aims in Europe—in particular, Soviet containment and 
economic recovery—were most likely to be achieved within the narrow parameters of a 
specific economic, political, and social environment.  Capital for the redevelopment of 
European industry, for example, could flow copiously from the United States to target-
areas in Western and Eastern Europe.  But future returns on such outlays would be much 
greater for the United States if they were directed towards relatively free-market 
environments.  Similarly, the desire to mitigate the growing influence of the Soviet Union 
was best supported by establishing strong democratic political regimes in Europe.  In this 
sense, the projection of its own economic liberalism and representative government into 
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Thus in the years immediately preceding and following the end of the Second 
World War, two historical transformations were being merged in the political arena.  
First, the colonial powers’ grip on their empires was slipping because of the war and the 
new power of the smaller and non-western states—especially in the context of the United 
Nations.  The second transformation was related to the rise in power of the US and the 
Soviet Union.  Each of the Big Three’s prospects in their respective struggles depended 
upon the extension of their own system abroad as well as its institutionalization.  Since 
Great Britain’s imperial system (and the social relationships upon which it was based), 
was already mature (if not suffering from age by the 1940s), amongst the Big Three, it 
was quite ready to mold UN institutions accordingly.81  The Soviet Union and the United 
States were very much in the process of sorting out their post-war aims, but as of 1947 
were reaching out beyond their own domestic borders to achieve them.  Finally, there was 
the emerging anti-colonial bloc of smaller and non-Western states that had not yet 
become a significant force in the debate, but was at this point certainly a presence.    
These divisions placed each of the Big Three (as well as the emerging bloc of 
anti-colonial states) on very different trajectories.  As the task turned towards drafting a 
declaration on human rights in 1947, the threat was that each would hurtle away from one 
another towards their own visions of human rights, stability and appropriate social 
relations, before any substantive and lasting decisions could be made.82  But for the 
                                                 
81 The colonial powers also had learned through experience, doing the same with respect to the League of 
Nations (see footnote 32 for example).   
82  Whether this happened or not is still very much an open question sixty years later.  This question is 
addressed in the conclusion.  
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moment their unity hung tenuously on the hope of solving a single dilemma: creating the 
social and political preconditions for international peace and security. 
 
Taking Stock: Analytic Lens and Empirics 
From the analytic perspective taken in this project, these events are not as George 
Kennan suggested, fundamentally about ideology.  Nor are they fundamentally about 
war, politics, diplomacy, or even human rights.  These diverse phenomena are the 
empirical indicators of social struggle over the appropriate way to organize society.  
Again, it is the impact of such social struggle in the particularized field of human rights 
that is of interest in this project.  Before the “human rights field of struggle” can be 
entered, however, it is essential, to gain at least a cursory understanding of how the 
struggle played out immediately before in other fields.  The notion of path dependence is 
useful here since the nature and outcomes of each of these expressions of struggle set the 
terms, parameters, constraints and opportunities of subsequent struggles.83  
Historically, these precursor battles over the appropriate way to organize society 
manifested themselves at the precipice of war and peace.  In war, the lines that carved up 
the map at Potsdam, for instance, institutionalized the outcome by drawing the 
geographic boundaries in which certain opposing modes of organizing social relations 
could exist unimpeded by it competitors.  In politics and diplomacy, the same was 
accomplished by creating institutions and foreign policies that supported the social 
arrangements unique to colonialism, capitalism, political liberalism, and/or communism.  
Ideologically, these battles drew normative boundaries of good and evil around 
                                                 
83 See, Somers, Margaret R. 1998. ""We're No Angels": Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in 
Social Science." American Journal of Sociology 104:722-84. 
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competing social frameworks.  In peace—if the early Cold War years count as such—the 
same basic struggle also emerged in the field of human rights.  The analysis of the human 
rights struggle is of the greatest importance in this research project, for nothing stated the 
differing (and fundamentally contested) relationships between individuals, governments, 
and the society at large more explicitly and with greater clarity than did the contentious 
debates that emerged over human rights.  
 
An Inauspicious Moment for Human Rights? 
From the moment the Charter was signed in 1945, UN member states had agreed 
to create commissions “for the promotion of human rights.”84  But two years later, given 
the tensions and the mutual exclusivity of the parties’ interests (as well as the 
fundamentally different social logics their future successes were based upon), it would 
seem to be a very inauspicious moment to begin such a collaborative endeavor.  Not blind 
to these differences, the Human Rights Commission decided that drafting a declaration 
from scratch in the full eighteen-member Commission (or even within a smaller drafting 
body) would be virtually impossible—particularly when each delegation would 
inevitably bring along its own set of political aims, constraints, personalities (and 
outsized egos).  As Hodgson, the Australian representative put it, “No concrete results 
could be achieved by a drafting committee composed of government representatives 
expressing different points of view.”85   
An early meeting in February 1947 at Eleanor Roosevelt’s Washington Square 
flat, quickly revealed the vast philosophical divides between Charles Malik of Lebanon, 
                                                 
84 Article 68.  The Commission on Human Rights was dissolved in 2006 and was replaced by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council—a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. 
85 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.10.  
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Peng-Chun Chang of China, and John Humphrey of Canada.86  John Humphrey, a 
professor of law at McGill University, was chosen to create the initial draft based on his 
knowledge of international law, as well as his official role as a representative of the 
Secretariat.  Not bound by domestic politics or the exigencies of state office, Humphrey 
was free to incorporate a broad range of human rights that represented the interests of the 
members of the United Nations at large, rather than any particular government.  His draft, 
which included civil, political, socioeconomic, and cultural rights, became the foundation 
of the Human Rights Commission’s drafting work.  It is quite unlikely that an initial draft 
could have been produced quickly (if at all), if the process were started as a more 
collaborative endeavor.  Interestingly, as soon the Commission made this decision, its 
own members (e.g. Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States), raised a host of objections and sought to gain a 
greater role in the initial process.87 
While the decision to initially rely upon a lone draftsman solved the “taking off” 
problem, a much deeper challenge overshadowed the entire process.  The rights that 
Humphrey had included in the initial draft were in large part, drawn from the 
constitutions of nations from around the world, and therefore derived from a variety of 
unique (if not competing) political, economic, and social systems.  Property rights didn’t 
rest with a communist system just as socioeconomic rights were in many ways 
incompatible with a free-market society.  In this sense, certain conceptions of human 
rights seemed to inevitably clash with others. This represented more than just a simple 
                                                 
86 This gathering was held pursuant to the earlier decision of the Human Rights Commission to allow a 
small, four-person executive group to commence the official drafting process.  The Chair (Roosevelt), 
Vice-Chair (Chang), Rapporteur (Malik), and the UN Secretariat (represented by John Humphrey who was 
the Director of the Secretariat’s Division on Human Rights).  (UN Doc E/259; also E/CN.4/AC 1/2). 
87 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/2. 
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difference in law.  As articulations of social relationships, they represented the basic 
pattering of social life.88  How would a state that restricted rights to a certain segment of 
society deal with a mandate to extend them?  How would colonialism fair amidst a push 
for universal political rights? Free market capitalism amidst socioeconomic rights?  
Communism amidst property rights?  The Committee members reasoned that if a 
declaration of human rights were to come to fruition (and in 1947 it seemed extremely 
likely), they would each have to take leadership lest an unfavorable outcome be reached.  
For the US and the Soviet Union, this form of leadership came at the outset in their push 
to create the UDHR as non-binding document, rather than an enforceable treaty—one of 
the few issues for which there was unanimity between the two nations.  
Great Britain also immediately realized that such a broad set of rights would raise 
issues with respect to its colonies.  In May of 1947, the British Colonial Office informed 
its colonial governments of the ongoing process, warning them of the dangers associated 
with the “certain specific and sophisticated” rights—e.g. political rights—that were by 
then a part of Humphrey’s draft.89  The British delegation decided it was better to denude 
the initial draft declaration of its broad array of human rights at the outset, rather than 
confront them once they became law.  So British officials hastily assembled their own 
version to be considered as an alternative to Humphrey’s draft.  The British version 
articulated a narrow set of human rights that corresponded to its existing domestic and 
colonial practices.90  It did not include political, social, cultural, or economic rights.91 
                                                 
88 See Chapter 1 for definitions and related discussion.  
89 CO936/5/6, cited by Simpson (2003:386).  
90 Though it is beyond the scope of this analysis, the British government successfully pursued a very similar 
strategy with respect to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.  For a detailed version of these 
events see Simpson 2003, Chapters 6 and 7).   
91 See the UK Draft International Bill of Human Rights, in the Yearbook of Human Rights 1947, 487-92. 
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Members of the Commission on Human Rights’ Drafting Committee, however, 
ultimately decided to use Humphrey’s more expansive version as the basis of the 
declaration.92  
Though it was not successful with its own draft, Great Britain still maintained 
significant amounts of power at the UN, and enjoyed the support of strong allies such as 
the United States, France and Belgium.  On the colonial question (as it came to be 
known), these states tended to vote as a bloc, for they were all aware that the power and 
rights gained by their dependencies inevitably decreased their own.  In subsequent 
meetings, the British delegation was careful to not even bring up the issue of its colonial 
territories, let alone grant specific rights to them.93  This type of strategy, however, would 
only work as long as the other delegations were willing to remain silent about the 
colonial question.  
What complicated matters for Great Britain were the states such as India and 
Pakistan that now took seats at the UN next to their former overlord as equal and 
sovereign members of the organization.  As these states, along with other smaller and 
non-western nations, grew increasingly vocal about ending colonial rule, the political 
dynamic at the UN changed significantly. Thus while the UN deliberations were certainly 
not free from friction, considering the increasingly suspicion-spiked extramural relations 
of many parties involved in the drafting, the overall process actually moved along 
extremely well.  Working on the drafters’ behalves were several important factors.  First, 
the Commission was entirely clear on its mandate: the schedule of human rights was to 
contain both basic categories of rights—civil and political on the one hand, and 
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socioeconomic on the other.  As Eleanor Roosevelt in her official capacity as Chair, made 
clear, to omit either category was not an option.94  Second, in these early days of the UN, 
there still remained a need for unity; no state wished to be responsible for repeating the 
mistakes of the ill-fated League of Nations, or descend back into war.   
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was the decision to create the UDHR as a 
non-binding statement of principles.  One way to maintain the support for the human 
rights project was to create it as a non-binding General Assembly resolution, rather than 
an enforceable treaty.  In this regard, because the rights that occupied space within the 
UDHR would have no legal power whatsoever, UN member states would in no way be 
obligated to alter their domestic behavior.  As a result, states were much more willing to 
support the UDHR in toto than the enforceable human rights treaties that were to follow 
the UDHR.  Nevertheless, given its potential normative power, (as well as the fact that 
future enforceable human rights treaties would be based on it) the stakes remained high 
even if drafted as an unenforceable declaration.  
 
The Cold War and Decolonization Contests Merge 
Whether by design or historical accident, Great Britain now had a prominent role 
in these two historical transformations.  As a close ally of the US, it stood opposite the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War, and as the largest colonial power it was the main target of 
the anti-colonial forces, which now included the Soviet Union.  During the drafting of the 
UDHR, the Soviet Union sought to draw the colonial powers (but Great Britain, in 
particular) into terrain that would weaken their positions and relative standing within the 
                                                 
94 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.9, p. 11. First Session of the Commission on Human Rights Drafting 
Committee, Ninth Meeting, Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, l8 June 1947, at 10:30 a.m. 
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UN while winning the favor of other smaller nations.  Towards the end of 1947, as the 
draft UDHR was making its way through committee and commission, the Soviet Union 
continued its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy strategy.  In September, Andrei 
Zhdanov, a key Soviet official, showcased this approach in his, Report on the 
International Situation to the Cominform.95  In this report, he divided the world into two 
camps: “the non-democratic, imperialists which were led by the US, and the democratic, 
anti-imperialists, led by the Soviet Union.96  Here Zhdanov outlined one the strongest 
articulations of Soviet foreign policy to date.   
Fractures now became rifts.  As the Soviet Union sought to consolidate an 
international communist alliance, Zhadonov’s report positioned the Eastern nation against 
the “imperialist camp.” According to the report, the goals of this camp (which included, 
most notably, the US and Great Britain) were to “strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new 
imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-
democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.”  The Soviet Union, “a 
staunch champion of liberty and independence of all nations, and a foe of national and 
racial oppression and colonial exploitation in any shape or form,” he declared, was 
dedicated to “securing a lasting democratic peace.”97  Never mind that in practice the 
Soviet version of democracy did not include free elections and its relationship with the 
other members of the communist bloc could be considered imperialist in its own right; as 
it is so often in politics, facts are not as important as their consequences.  The 
                                                 
95 In September of 1947 Stalin established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).  The stated 
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97 Schwartz, Richard Alan. 1997. The Cold War Reference Guide, at 292. 
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consequences here were not insignificant: the two global transformations (decolonization 
and the East-West rivalry) were now merging with one another, and an already weak 
Great Britain was being forced to fight simultaneously on two fronts.     
As the UDHR was nearing completion in 1948, what began as two distinct, large-
scale transformations—the trend towards decolonization and the rise of the 
superpowers—were now becoming increasingly intertwined.  Success for any of the 
parties involved in these respective struggles increasingly began to impact the chances of 
the others.  This new dynamic complicated politics at the United Nations immensely and 
encumbered the effort to create a single schedule of international human rights that would 
enjoy widespread normative legitimacy and possess actual force.     
 
The UDHR is a Success but Difficulties Lie Ahead 
 Passed in December of 1948 with a vote of 48 in favor, no states opposing, and 
eight abstaining, the UN representative from Paraguay called it “the most harmonious 
and comprehensive structure yet erected in this field…a flaming force which will lead all 
mankind towards felicity.”  Eleanor Roosevelt even suggested that the UDHR could one 
day be akin to the Magna Carta or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.  Under 
the terms of the UDHR African Americans possessed the same political rights as colonial 
inhabitants and the “voters” in Moscow.  Domestic practices were now bound by a 
higher, moral law, and all humans regardless of whether they were in the shanties of 
Johannesburg or the backwoods of Georgia had the right to adequate medical care, 
necessary social services, and to be free from discrimination… 
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 Apart from overcoming such wild inversions of the status quo, another 
extraordinary challenged lingered. While the range of social ideals had successfully been 
reined-in and incorporated into the UDHR, the human rights that represented these 
competing systems were now just corralled together within the unitary framework of the 
emergent human rights concept.  The UDHR may have been a “flaming force,” but it was 
also replete with internal contradictions.  Like the earlier Potsdam solution for “divided 
unity,” the human rights terrain was divided and parceled out to the victors of the war.  
So for instance, socioeconomic rights which were associated with socialism and 
communism, sat alongside civil and political rights which were associated with liberalism 
and capitalism; universal political rights which were championed by proponents of 
decolonization now lay together with statements about the existence of colonial 
dependencies.98  These contradictions, however, were not necessarily a bad thing.  
Paradoxically, the lasting strength of the UDHR perhaps lies most with its legal weakness 
(as opposed to it embodying any notion of enforceability).  It was its normative strength 
that made its external contradictions—that is, the disconnect between its text and the 
social realities of the day—a collective call to action, rather than a scathing indictment.  
Moreover, placing opposing rights together with one another was viewed as less of an 
“internal contradiction,” than a statement about the “organic unity” and indivisibility of 
all of these rights.    
Regardless of whether these issues were viewed as contradiction or opportunity, 
they were not too much of an issue—as long as the instrument in which they resided 
remained non-binding. The Human Rights Commission, however, had already decided 
                                                 




that the UDHR would be followed by a binding human rights covenant.  This changed 
everything. For when the prospect of enforceability entered the equation, like a high-
voltage circuit breaker, it activated the functional exclusivity of the internal 
contradictions while enlivening all of the external contradictions.  
For those who had been excluded from areas of social and political life, or 
otherwise had been denied the basic resources necessary to enjoy such existence, 
contradictions or not, an enforceable human rights covenant held great promise.  If 
enforced, human rights had the power to redraw the lines on the social map to incorporate 
the socially dispossessed into the realms from which they were excluded.  This proposed 
remapping of the social terrain, however, set ablaze the social fears and anxieties of many 
others who believed that the status quo would irrevocably be lost.  As of December 1948 
the Covenant, which was already partially complete, could perhaps be finished in just a 
year or two.  With the enforcement switch flipped to the “on” position, for supporters and 





                                                
Chapter 3 
Protecting State Sovereignty from the “Dangers” of Human Rights 
 
 
In 1945 as World War II was in its final stages and the United Nations was about 
to become a reality, the US Senate was a divided body.  There remained a sizeable 
conservative, isolationist bloc. There was also a significant faction—informed by recent 
world events—that believed that lasting peace and security required international 
engagement with other nations.  As plans for the United Nations unfurled, members of 
Congress were apprehensive about the US’s ability to participate freely in future 
international institutions due to the relatively high Senate hurdle required to ratify 
international treaties.  Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which requires two-thirds 
of the Senate’s approval on international treaties before they are ratified, was designed 
both to foster bipartisan support and to provide the individual states an equal voice in 
such matters through their elected representatives.  It also takes into account the great 
weight given to binding international agreements (or treaties) which under the 
Constitution become the “supreme law of the land.”99  
Under these procedural safeguards, the obstructionist potential of the minority 
became a major concern for those who supported greater involvement for the US in 
international affairs, and were mindful of President Woodrow Wilson’s failure to garner 
the necessary two-thirds majority support of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of 
 
99 US Constitution, Article VI (2).  This is qualified by the different types of treaties—self-executing and 
non-self executing.  This was a major issue that was not entirely settled.  
 
Versailles—and thereby join the League of Nations.  To repeat the same mistake after the 
Second World War could be catastrophic.  As a work-around to this problem—as well as 
a means of ensuring the President’s continued ability to enjoin the nation in the many 
treaties that would inevitably follow—many US lawmakers supported amending the US 
Constitution to lower the hurdle to presidential treaty making. 
Whether this plan to amend the Constitution was just a warning shot, meant to 
send a message to the Senate’s isolationist faction—a mix of Southern Democrats and 
conservative Republicans—to cooperate with the UN or endure substantive limitations on 
their legislative power, it enjoyed significant support.  In 1944 and 1945 there were at 
least eight resolutions created to in various ways lower the two-thirds hurdle to 
international treaty making.100  In 1945, for instance, House Joint Resolution 60 (which 
proposed to amend the Constitution to require only the advice of both Houses of 
Congress—rather than the advice and consent of the Senate—actually garnered the 
necessary support to pass in the House.101   
There is great significance in these pre-United Nations efforts to amend the US 
Constitution. Amending the Constitution is neither an easy process nor one to be taken 
lightly—in 1945, this feat had only been accomplished eleven times.  The stakes in this 
                                                 
100 For detailed discussions of these resolutions see Dean, Arthur H. 1953. "Amending the Treaty Power." 
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case, however, were extremely high.  The need to reach out to allies and create a lasting 
institution with the power and authority to direct the actions of member states by force of 
law was of great importance at the time.  But it also illustrated the presence of a sharp 
division about whether the United States should become more (or less) involved in 
international affairs.102 Both sides realized quite correctly that joining an international 
organization that would have any effect at all would require the cession of a certain 
amount of sovereignty.103 
In the end, however, a Constitutional Amendment proved unnecessary.  Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman, having learned from Wilson’s political error in not 
including the Senate (or at least Senate representatives) in the actual negotiations of the 
Treaty of Versailles, invited Senators to take part in the negotiations surrounding the 
Charter—most notably the Democratic Chair and the ranking Republican of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally (D-TX) and Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI).  
The latter Senator—a long-time isolationist—after the war experienced something of a 
conversion, embracing internationalism and urging his Republican colleagues to do 
                                                 
102 Amending the Constitution as described above would also represent a sweeping shift in the balance of 
governmental powers—decreasing the power of minority blocs in the Senate and dramatically increasing 
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process as well.  As always in debates of this magnitude, there were many undercurrents at play that related 
to matters of power and policy far removed. See Moore, John Robert. 1967. “The Conservative Coalition in 
the United States Senate, 1942-1945,” The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 368-376. 
103 In this chapter, the term “sovereignty” refers to a state’s ability to exercise unlimited authority within its 
territorial boundaries (see generally, Hinsley, Francis Harry. 1986. Sovereignty). 
The term “sovereignty” has multiple meanings and a multitude of different usages.  For various 
explications of this concept, also see Donnelly, Jack. 2005. “State Sovereignty and Human Rights,” Paper 
read at Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, at Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Henkin, L. 1999. "That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human rights, et cetera." 
Fordham Law Review 68 (1):1-14; Reisman, Michael. 1990. "Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law." The American Journal of International Law 84 (4):866-76; Held, David. 
1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Held, 
David. 2002. "Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty." Legal Theory 8:1-44. 
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similarly.104  Interestingly, these tensions between internationalism and sovereignty were 
not settled by a showdown over amending the Constitution.  As the next section will 
show, this ambivalence was institutionalized and integrated into the text of the UN 
Charter—the very foundations of the United Nations.  
 
1945: The United Nations Charter 
As the founding document, the United Nations Charter outlined the UN’s 
organizational structure and legal framework, the duties and responsibilities of its 
member states, as well as the purposes of the organization.105  But even a cursory reading 
of the Charter reveals important tensions between human rights and sovereignty.  While 
the Charter explicitly respects the sovereign right of states to autonomy within their own 
domestic jurisdictions, it also limits “absolute sovereignty” in significant ways.  On the 
one hand, the manner in which a state treats its inhabitants is articulated as a matter of 
international concern.  Article 55, for instance, outlines a broad spectrum of basic human 
rights principles.  In particular, UN member states “shall promote:  
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational co- operation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
Under its companion article (Article 56), member states “pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement 
of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”  Together, these articles—which would become 
                                                 
104 He voiced his transformation in a rousing Senate speech on January 10, 1945. 
105 The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and entered into force on October 24, 1945, after the five 
permanent members (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and a 
majority of the other signatory states, had ratified it. 
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focal points in the subsequent struggles over US sovereignty—illustrate the idea that the 
treatment of populations existing within a state’s boundaries was not entirely a private 
matter.  In addition to such limitations of sovereignty based on human rights principles, 
Chapter 7 of the Charter permits the Security Council to use force against threats to 
international peace and security—even if those threats emerge from within the territorial 
boundaries of a particular state.  Though left vague and nameless—and perhaps legally 
powerless—human rights stood for a crucially important idea that sovereign states could 
not do whatever they pleased.   
The perceived importance of human rights at the time to the Great Powers, 
however, should not be overestimated.  Various advocacy groups as well as many smaller 
UN member states were the most dedicated supporters of incorporating the idea of human 
rights into the Charter.  As support for the inclusion of references to human rights grew, 
however, so too did the desire for a sharply worded escape clause.106  So while Article 
55, 56, and Chapter 7 all provide clear evidence that after 1945 state sovereignty could no 
longer be considered “absolute,” a seemingly contradictory provision guaranteeing state 
sovereignty was also incorporated into the Charter.  Article 2(7) was drafted to highlight 
the primacy of state sovereignty and the untrammeled power of a state to conduct affairs 
without interference within its domestic jurisdiction.  In unequivocal terms it reads:  
                                                 
106 See Samnøy, Åshild. 1993. "Human Rights as International Consensus: The Making of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1945-1948." Bergen Norway: Report: Chr. Michelsen Institute.  Also see, 
“Statement by Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General for the United Nations Department of Social 
Affairs on the Covenant of Human Rights,” April 13, 1950, International Organization, Vol. 4, No. 3 
(Aug., 1950), pp. 553-559, at 554)-- Laugier shows that while human rights is mentioned in the Charter, the 
Great Powers initially overlooked it. 
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“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”107   
Perhaps it was this escape clause, or perhaps the US Senate had learned from its 
earlier refusal to join the League.  Either way, the US Senate was not, as some had 
feared, held prisoner to the whims of the isolationist minority, and approved the Charter 
overwhelmingly by a vote of 89 to 2.108   Ambivalence regarding the limits of 
sovereignty thus became institutionalized in the UN Charter, providing ammunition for 
both future supporters and opponents of US sovereignty.   
                                                
While the Charter is not a part of the International Bill of Human Rights, it is the 
foundational text from which the UDHR and the Covenants derive their authority.  
Importantly, the UN’s first public articulation of broad human rights principles emerges 
within the Charter.  At the time, though, the precise nature of human rights—i.e. what 
they were, how they would be enforced, and who would be the beneficiaries and duty-
holders—was unknown.   
The fact that “human rights” is mentioned seven times in the Charter is often used 
by human rights scholars to illustrate the newfound legitimacy and importance of the 
human rights concept.109  While this is quite true, the relative importance of human rights 
in context is perhaps more salient—the phrase “international peace and security” appears 
in the Charter no less than thirty times. The unbearably agonizing “proof” that ending 
 
107 For analyses on domestic jurisdiction, see generally, Kelsen, Hans. 1946. "Limitations on the Functions 
of the United Nations Symposium on World Organization." Yale Law Journal 55 (5):997-1015; Goodrich, 
Leland M. 1949. "The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction." International Organization 3 (1):14-28; 
Davies, D. J. Llewelyn 1946. Domestic Jurisdiction: A Limitation on International Law. Paper read at 
Transactions of the Grotius Society. 
108 Opposing the Charter in the vote on July 28, 1945, were William Langer (R-ND) and Henrik Shipstead 
(R-MN).  Jim Crow is just one example of many US laws that contradicted the Charter’s call for equality; 
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/united_nations_0997_bgn.html; last accessed July 13, 2010. 
109 E.g. Henkin, Louis, ed. 1981. The International Bill of Rights, at 4-5; Morsink, Johannes. 1999. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 3. 
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World War II and achieving the latter was a more pressing concern came two days before 
President Harry Truman signed the UN Charter, and then again one day after, when in 
two brilliant flashes tens of thousands of citizen-enemies evaporated and scores more 
were left to slowly fester away. 
  At 7:03pm on August 14, 1945 hundreds of thousands of Americans roared with 
joy as the “magic words” lit up the electric sign high atop the Times Tower in New York 
City: “Official—Truman announces Japanese surrender.”110  The president called a two-
day national holiday, crowds filled the streets, and four million US troops were promised 
home within a year.111  International peace and security was at hand. 
 
World Federalism Movement: A Higher Authority? 
In October of 1945, a group of fifty or so influential writers, lawyers, professors, 
and politicians withdrew to the small town of Dublin, New Hampshire to take the initial 
steps to rectify what they perceived as the most disturbing weakness of the United 
Nations—its inability to curb state power.  The conference was convened by several 
members of the legal and political elite, such as former Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, Owen J. Roberts, and Robert. P. Bass, former Governor of New 
Hampshire.112  Though the United Nations was already more representative and powerful 
than the ill-fated League of Nations, they believed that it was not a strong enough 
counterbalance for controlling state power (nor, as far as they were concerned, were the 
                                                 
110 “All City Let’s Go.” New York Times.  August 15, 1945, pg. 1. 
111 “4,000,000 Troops Home By June 30.” New York Times, August 17, 1945, pg. 1.  
112 Some of the notable figures included Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee; Beardsley Ruml, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Louis B. 
Sohn, Professor of Law at Harvard, and Sgt. Alan Cranston, who would later become a California Senator 
and run for president of the United States; Charles W. Ferguson, the editor of Readers Digest; John K. 
Jessup, editor of Life and Fortune; Donovan Richardson, managing editor of the Christian Science Monitor.  
See, “Declaration of the Dublin, N.H. Conference,” The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1945, pg. 4. 
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handful of references to human rights that were included in the Charter).  In this sense, 
human rights were extremely important goals, but they were not the appropriate means 
for controlling (and successfully mitigating) the unbridled power of the state—which 
from Nagasaki and Hiroshima, seemed to still enjoy free reign.  This goal, they believed, 
could only be attainted through a much stronger international organization than the one 
just created—which was designed by and for state interests.  The term they used for such 
a supranational entity with power over the state was “world federal government.”113 
The attendees produced a statement that argued the United Nations was a weak 
institution that was “wholly inadequate to prevent war.”114  The only way to prevent 
another war was through the creation of a stronger system of “world government” in 
which nations would vest a much greater portion of their sovereignty.  This world federal 
government would come about by amending the Charter of the United Nations (or 
perhaps through the creation of an entirely new entity altogether).  Either way it would be 
granted “limited but definite and adequate powers to prevent war, including power to 
control the atomic bomb and other major weapons and to maintain world inspection and 
police forces.”115  Because atomic weaponry was deployed after the Charter was drafted, 
one of their main concerns was that the United Nations had not been structured to contain 
this new threat. To effect these changes, they put out a call for the “prompt” amendment 
of the US constitution to make possible the formation of such a “world federal 
government.”116  
                                                 
113 Also referred to as “world government.” 
114 They later submitted this statement to the United Nations.  “Declaration of the Dublin, N.H. 
Conference,” The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1945, pg. 4; Louis B. Sohn. Letters to The Times, New York 
Times, Oct 24, 1945, pg. 20. 




For today’s sensibilities the hope for “world federalism” no doubt seems absurd—
the quixotic work of hopeless utopians or the province of leftist fringe groups and 
conspiracy theorists.  Amazingly, the call for world federalism, and the desire to amend 
the US Constitution actually began to gather significant interest and mainstream support.  
In late 1945, for instance, even the American Bar Association—an organization that 
would soon become one of the most strident opponents of internationalism—passed a 
resolution urging not only “United American support” for the United Nations, but called 
for the consideration of strengthening the Charter to put further curbs on state power 
“because of the many momentous events since the adjournment of the San Francisco 
Conference”—i.e. the use of the atomic bomb.117  Interestingly, a significant minority of 
those voting opposed this ABA House of Delegates resolution because it was not worded 
strongly enough in favor of a “world federation.” Accordingly, the House of Delegates 
formally decided to address whether the ABA should support a world federation proposal 
at subsequent meetings.118  
As discussed below, the amount of support the idea of world federalism quickly 
gained is remarkable considering how entirely unacceptable it would be in contemporary 
policy circles.  As a result this very brief excursion into internationalism is rarely studied 
seriously by human rights scholars.  But when looked at as a force in a social struggle 
between internationalism and state sovereignty, this short-lived movement had great 
bearing on the emergence of the powerful strands of opposition that developed against 
various aspects of the human rights concept.  A major part of the reason world federalism 
(at least from the US perspective) now might seem absurd, is a direct outcome of this 
                                                 
117 See 32 A.B.A.J. 203. 
118 Holman, Frank E. 1946. “’World Government’ No Answer to America’s Desire for Peace.” 32 ABAJ 
642-45; 718-21.  
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very social struggle.  What was envisioned at Dublin was not entirely impractical.  It was 
actually very similar to the legal, political, and social principles of today’s European 
Union, and shared ideas in common with the intergovernmental International Atomic 
Energy Agency.119  In this early incarnation, the movement was confined largely to 
international security matters and the threat of nuclear warfare, rather than being about 
human rights specifically.   
The actual implementation of this idea was not something the state could achieve 
this on its own—it needed a counterweight.  For when the state is threatened, if given the 
untrammeled right to preserve itself it often does so at great cost to anything in its way.  
Exactly one year prior to the commencement of the world federalism conference, 
Roberts, as a Justice of the US Supreme Court, had listened from the bench to opening 
arguments in the notorious Korematsu v. United States case, which upheld the 
constitutionality of Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 relegating American citizens to 
internment camps.120  Roberts was one of three dissenting justices who refused—albeit in 
vain—to honor the precedent of state power at the expense of human life.  Because 
individual states had proven to be inadequate protectors of human life, a supranational 
government with the authority to protect the individual over the state, the Dublin 




                                                 
119 The latter institution—a consequence of Eisenhower’s “Atom’s for Peace” initiative—however, was not 
endowed with nearly the powers they were arguing for.   
120 323 U.S. 214. 
121 See “Declaration of the Dublin, N.H. Conference,” The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1945, pg. 4. 
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1946-1949: The United Nations Charter as an Early Human Rights Document 
Because the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry was not the 
only injustice sanctioned by the force of law and perpetrated on American soil, another 
strand of the nascent support for supranational authority began to look at the possibility 
of using the Charter as an early human rights text of binding legal authority.  Though the 
UN Charter is today not considered a proper “human rights treaty,” in the late 1940s it 
was the only binding international agreement that mentioned human rights that the US 
had ratified.  Not content to wait for subsequent human rights treaties, progressives in the 
United States began to wonder whether the Charter could invalidate the countless racially 
discriminatory laws that were standard elements of American law.122   
So when the Charter entered into force in October of 1945, the potential impact of 
its human rights provisions (which were rather vague and articulated at the level of basic 
principles) was not altogether clear.  For some legal scholars, Article VI, Section 2 of the 
US Constitution, which apparently made the Charter the “supreme law of the land,” 
opened up the possibility of addressing social problems that the federal government had 
proven too weak or unwilling to tackle.  For instance in 1946, a report prepared for a civil 
rights conference convened at the behest of the National Bar Association, the National 
Legal Committee, the NAACP and the National Lawyers Guild, suggested that Articles 
55 and 56 of the UN Charter could be used to force the creation of an anti-lynching 
bill.123   
Soon after, the NAACP produced “An Appeal to the World” (1947), a petition to 
the UN that drew a comparison between racism in America and the treatment of people 
                                                 
122 In addition to Jim Crow in the South, anti-miscegenation laws and racially restrictive covenants that 
prevented minorities from owning, renting, or otherwise occupying restricted property, were very common.   
123 “Constitutional Basis for federal Anti-Lynching Legislation,” Lawyers Guild Review, 6:643-47. 
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of color under colonialism.  In this document, the NAACP attempted to leverage the 
United Nations Charter’s support for human rights to draw attention to the racial 
injustices blacks were experiencing in the United States (see Race Chapter).124  
Supporting the use of the Charter to compel the US to transform its discriminatory laws, 
however, was not limited to such private organizations.  Both the Truman 
Administration, federal, and state courts actively drew upon the Charter as a touchstone 
for domestic human rights matters in the years following its adoption.125 
Given the deplorable racial treatment of blacks in the US, Truman asked his 
newly created President’s Committee on Civil Rights to prepare a report outlining 
recommendations for the adoption of legislation or “more adequate and effective means 
and procedures” for ensuring the protection of civil rights in the US.126  The resulting 178 
page report, released at the end of 1947 raised the distinct possibility that the Charter 
could be used as a source of law for ameliorating the US’s internal racial problems.  
Though the report acknowledged that such a path was not free from controversy, the 
Charter (Articles 55 and 56 in particular) was nevertheless viewed as a possible basis for 
a federal civil rights program.  Additionally, the report cited the ongoing drafting of the 
UDHR as a document, that when completed would “give more specific meaning to the 
general principle announced in Article 55 of the Charter,” and could provide “an even 
stronger basis for congressional action” with respect to the creation of civil rights 
                                                 
124 See e.g. Logan, Rayford W. “The Charter of the United Nations and its Provisions for Human Rights 
and the Rights of Minorities and Decisions Already Taken Under This Charter,” in Appeal to the World, at 
85. 
125 While this chapter focuses more on the legal elements of this strategy, the political elements of this 
project are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (on Race).   
126 President’s Committee on Civil Rights. 1947. To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s 
Committee on Civil Rights” Washington, D.C.: United States government Printing Office, at viii. The 
Committee was created pursuant to Executive Order 9808. 
 74
 
legislation.127  The strength of the Committee’s report (and Truman’s will to implement 
its findings) should not be overstated.  The point of this example is to illustrate the 
willingness to actually consider the possibility that international human rights laws might 
be used to invalidate controversial domestic laws.  This was a very unique moment in US 
history.  In contemporary politics, the mere mention that international human rights 
treaties might require every state in the US to honor gay marriage or permit all prisoners 
to vote (from the President, no less), for example, is almost unthinkable.  
By 1948, as the UDHR was just about completed and the Commission on Human 
Rights was in the early stages of the drafting of the Covenant, two Supreme Court 
decisions on racial discrimination—one at the Federal level and the other at the state—
invoked the Charter and its human rights provisions.  The first was a 1948 US Supreme 
Court in which Justice Black (joined by Justice Douglas) invoked provisions of the UN 
Charter to denounce a racially restrictive policy.  Though Justice Black did not cite the 
Charter as a controlling source of law, he used it for guidance as an important moral 
touchstone.  He wrote:  
“…we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to 
‘promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.’ How can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws 
which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are 
permitted to be enforced?”128  
 
                                                 
127 Id. at 112. 
128 Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U. S. 633, at 649-650. 
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Similarly, in the same year, a 1948 California Supreme Court case also invoked Article 
55 of the UN Charter as an important, but non-controlling source of authority to 
invalidate California’s law banning interracial marriage.129     
During this time, academics began to focus on the specific legal mechanisms that 
would actually enable the UN Charter to be binding human rights law within the United 
States. Because judges often consult such academic expertise in crafting their decisions, 
the positions taken by law professors in their writing is not inconsequential.  One Yale 
Law Journal article found a possible way for the United Nations Charter—through the 
US Constitution—to protect minorities in the US.  The logic was this: the US had ratified 
the Charter, pledging to “promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.”130  Under Article VI of the US Constitution, treaties (such 
as the Charter) are the “supreme law of the land.”  Because Congress has the power to 
define and punish “offenses against the law of nations,”131 it “may” have the power to 
protect minorities that are “not vested in the US Constitution itself.”132  This argument 
was in no way definitive and only went so far as to suggest that the Charter “may” be 
used to prosecute things such as lynching.  The legal logic—when considering 
precedent—was actually relatively sound.  Socially, it could be revolutionary.  
Politically, it was a fool’s errand.  For if lynching fell under this hypothetical doctrine, so 
                                                 
129 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17.  In at least two other 1948 US Supreme Court cases 
[Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)], petitioners bringing suit 
against racially restrictive covenants that prevented African Americans from owning land, argued that such 
laws were contrary to the treaty obligations assumed by the United States under the United Nations Charter. 
In these cases, the Supreme Court did not consider the authority of the Charter and decided the case purely 
on Constitutional grounds.  In yet another instance, the authority of UN Charter was unsuccessfully 
invoked by plaintiff in a 1947 New York Supreme Court case, Kemp v. Rubin (69 NYS 2d. 680). 
130 UN Charter, Art. 55(c).  
131 US Constitution, Article I §8.  
132 The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Mar. 1948), pp. 855-873, at 868; also citing Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).  
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too did anti-miscegenation laws, Jim Crow, school segregation, land ownership laws, the 
universal right to healthcare, social welfare, and so forth—all of which were hot-button 
social struggles that had the nation divided.   
At the end of 1948 supporters of the UDHR and the United Nations were 
enlivened by its successful adoption.  Several years since the Dublin Conference, some of 
the strongest support for the UN, the UDHR and the future Covenant came from the 
growing number of “world government” supporters.133  At this point, the precise meaning 
of “world government” varied considerably.  In all cases, however, the term was intended 
to increase the power of an international body (United Nations or other) while individual 
nation states would relinquish a certain amount of sovereignty for the greater good of 
peace and human rights.134   
By the end of 1948, the largest world federalist group, the United World 
Federalists, had established over 650 local chapters, and claimed around 40,000 
members, and had successfully introduced a world government resolution (HCR 64) to 
Congress that enjoyed  the support of over 120 members of the House.135  By October 12, 
                                                 
133 At the strong end of the spectrum were groups like the United World Federalists (NGO) and The Rollins 
College Conference on World Government.  Davenport, John H. 1949. "Approach to World Government 
through the Technique of the World Constitutional Convention: American Experience." Miami Law 
Quarterly 3:500-63, at 508.  Also see generally, Eagleton, Clyde. 1946. "The Individual and International 
Law." Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 40:22; Parker, John J. 1944. "World Organization." American Society of 
International Law Proc. 38:20. 
134 E.g. Davenport, John H. 1949. "Approach to World Government through the Technique of the World 
Constitutional Convention: American Experience." Miami Law Quarterly 3:500-63; Cohen, George H. 
1950. "Human Rights and the Treaty Power." Phylon 11 (2):137-50; McDougal. 1949. "Rights of Man in 
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action." Law and Contemporary Problems 
14:490-536; Williams, Wayne. 1949. "World Government." Dicta 26:79-86; Allen, Florence E. 1949. 
"Human Rights and the International Court: The Need for a Juridical World Order." A.B.A. J. 35:713-6; 88-
89. 
135 Hennessy, Bernard. 1954. "A Case Study of Intra--Pressure Group Conflicts: The United World 
Federalists." The Journal of Politics 16 (1):76-95, at 88.  At the time, this was the largest number to ever 
support a foreign policy resolution.  To put this membership in perspective, the American Medical 
Association had approximately 140,000 members in 1950. See Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1957. "Federation 




1949 when the Congressional hearings on this resolution began, no fewer than twenty 
five US state legislatures had passed their own resolutions in favor of a world federation 
of governments.  Though an important step in the legislative process, such resolutions are 
far from becoming actual federal law.  More so, they are political statements showing 
unity of state support for federal legislative action.  Any time a legislator offers support 
for a resolution, she opens herself up to potential challenges that could be politically 
damaging.  Given the cost of creating a resolution and gathering the necessary votes to 
pass the representative chambers of state government, these state resolutions for world 
government signal the presence of broad encouragement—if not the presence of an actual 
movement.   
For example, the California State Legislature passed “Assembly Joint Resolution 
26” that was submitted to the US Congress in 1949 that offered what was a fairly 
standard text:  
“Whereas the United Nations, as presently constituted, although accomplishing 
great good in many fields, lacks authority to enact, interpret, or enforce world 
law, and under its present charter is incapable of restraining any major nations 
which may foster or foment war.”    
 
In addition to its stated goal of preventing war, Resolution 26—a bipartisan 
creation of California’s Assembly and Senate—implored Congress to amend the UN 
Charter as to bestow it with the necessary powers to guarantee “the inalienable rights of 
freedom for every human being on earth and the dignity of the individual as exemplified 
by the American Bill of Rights.”136  Importantly, entry into a “world federal government” 
would require the cession of a portion of US sovereignty to the world government body.  
Finally, the Resolution called for a convention pursuant to Article V of the US 
                                                 
136 Most of these resolutions cited Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter, which provide procedures for 
reviewing and amending the Charter. 
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Constitution to be called “for the sole purpose of proposing amendment of the 
Constitution to expedite and insure the participation of the United States in a world 
federal government, open to all nations, with powers which, while defined and limited, 
shall be adequate to preserve peace.”137 The latter call for Constitutional Amendment was 
a standard item in the many state resolutions produced during this period (see Appendix 
for an example of one such world federal government resolution).138 
This was all part of an early acceptance of the importance of the United Nations 
and its nascent human rights project.  Though such arguments and debates were largely 
confined to members of the intellectual and political elite, this type of support for the 
Charter illustrates an early optimism about international human rights law and its 
potential as a higher (and controlling) source of domestic law.  It seemed that many in 
Congress, the executive, the judiciary, and the legal academy were taking small steps 
towards embracing international human rights law on domestic shore.  In the years 
following though, a strong backlash against using external human rights laws to alter 
domestic US laws and policies emerged.  This backlash in turn, spread hesitation and cast 
substantial doubt on the US’s participation in the post-war human rights project. 
 
The Backlash 
At war’s end, international peace and security was a paramount concern.  Even 
the cession of a degree of national sovereignty to achieve this end seemed like a small 
                                                 
137  95 Cong. Rec. 4568-69. 1949. 
138 Hennessy, Bernard. 1954. "A Case Study of Intra-Pressure Group Conflicts: The United World 
Federalists." The Journal of Politics 16 (1):76-95, at 78, 91.  The issues surrounding world federalism were 
covered in many academic and professional journals, see e.g., Farmer, Fyke. 1946. "Now: Is the Accepted 
Time." American Bar Association Journal 32:267; Andrews, Burton. 1950. "Amending the Constitution to 
Provide for Participating in a World Government." Alb. L. Rev. 14:125; Andrews, Burton.  1950. 
"Constitutional Amendment for Participation in World Government." N.Y. St. B.A. Bull. 22:391; "Survey of 
Statutory Changes in North Carolina." 1949. North Carolina Law Review 27:497. 
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price to pay for many—as evidenced by the bipartisan support for world government. 
Such support blossomed for an idea that was difficult to argue against—that there should 
be limits on state power, and humanity should be in certain key areas protected both by 
and from the state. But when this idea, through political support and legal formation, 
gained entry into the very social sphere it was designed to protect, the concrete 
implications were far too jarring for many to handle.   
If this idea were to be actually carried out in the name of international peace and 
security, the plight of minorities was certainly to be defined as a matter of international 
concern (as evidenced by the tragic consequences of the stateless populations in interwar-
Europe).  So too was the health, welfare, and social inclusion of a nation’s citizens a 
matter of concern.  As supporters began to work out the necessary legal, political, and 
social details, and members of the US Congress began to submit social welfare legislation 
on behalf of the US’s obligations under the Charter, the opposition began to mount.139  
For once the specific social implications of such an idea were articulated, the fear that the 
UN, human rights, or world government would fundamentally alter the domestic way of 
life, prompted detractors to mobilize with great urgency.  In 1949 opposition welled, the 
US State Department demurred, national attention turned to the Korean War, and very 
quickly the opposition razed virtually every part of the short-lived world federalist 
movement.140  
 Newspapers from this time provide just one example of growing opposition to the 
actual implementation of a world government.  One 1948 editorial in the Chicago Daily 
                                                 
139 Discussed in subsequent Chapters. 
140 Hennessy, Bernard. 1954. "A Case Study of Intra-Pressure Group Conflicts: The United World 
Federalists." The Journal of Politics 16 (1):76-95, at 92; Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1957. "Federation Resolution: 
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Tribune, for instance, entitled, “A Scheme to Loot America,” urged Americans to oppose 
the UN and international treaties. The author argued forcefully against world government 
which could “by taxation, appropriate [US wealth] for other world citizens.  It could, by 
passage of world immigration laws, make us open our doors to tens of millions of 
immigrants from poorer nations and poorer souls.  The proposed [world] government 
would have the world army to enforce its mandates.”141  This Chicago Daily Tribune 
piece was just one of the numerous articles that reacted with great hostility to the world 
government idea. 
 
Resistance within the American Bar Association 
Some of the most heated resistance to the world government movement arose 
from the American Bar Association (ABA).  In the early years of the UN, the American 
Bar Association was relatively quiet with respect to human rights treaties—and even 
quite supportive of the Untied Nations.  There was, however an intense rivalry between 
the ABA Section on International and Comparative Law and its Special Committee on 
Peace and Law through the UN.  The official purpose of the latter was to study all 
matters relating to “the United Nations, and to all international tribunals, resolutions, 
declarations, treaties, conventions, pacts and agreements which affect the rights and 
liberties of the American people.”142 Though the Special Committee’s name seemed to 
imply it was part of a cooperative endeavor between the US and the UN, it was actually 
comprised of some of the ABA’s most isolationist and conservative figures who opposed 
the US’s involvement in international human rights treaties.  Importantly, Frank Holman 
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(who became president of the American Bar Association and a leading opponent of the 
UN and its human rights treaties) sat on this committee.143 Given the overlapping areas of 
law that the two groups presided over, coupled with the ideological divergence in their 
support for human rights treaties, a power struggle between the groups soon developed.   
In 1948, for instance, the Committee on Peace and Law drafted several 
resolutions opposing various aspects of the UDHR and its Covenant which were not in 
“form as to be suitable for approval and adoption by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations or for promulgation and acceptance be the United States and other Member 
Nations.”144  Although the Section on International and Comparative Law categorically 
opposed the Committee’s resolutions, the ABA’s governing body—the House of 
Delegates–approved them.  After a series of such defeats in which the Section on 
International and Comparative Law succumbed to the more conservative resolutions of 
the Committee, it was clear that the Committee was becoming the more powerful group 
within the Bar Association.  With Frank Holman, one of the Committee’s most outspoken 
critics of applying human rights in the domestic realm, now president of the ABA, the 
locus of power soon came to rest with the Committee.  So although the ABA was not 
undivided matters surrounding human rights treaties, the Committee on Peace and Law 
together with President Holman became the ABA’s public voice.145   
After elected as president of the organization, Holman wasted little time in 
beginning his campaign against the United Nations and human rights treaties. Chief 
amongst his broad spectrum of concerns was the prospect that United States’ laws—and 
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therefore its traditions and practices—would be infringed upon by binding international 
human rights treaties.  In one of Holman’s first speeches on the subject as president, he 
addressed an audience of lawyers at a Bar meeting in Santa Barbara, California.146  Here, 
he argued that the UDHR and its Covenant would breach the sovereignty of the US and 
the rights of its citizens, “and seriously affect [the] whole constitutional system.”147  The 
arguments and themes touched upon here would be revisited by Holman throughout his 
crusade. 
In this early speech Holman unloaded a barrage of arguments against the United 
Nations, the forthcoming UDHR, and the Covenant.  While the UDHR was the most 
proximate concern, the main target of Holman’s attack was the binding Covenant.  His 
baleful rhetoric spanned topics that included communist infiltration, abrogation of basic 
property rights, infringement of individual rights, and the prospect of forced racial 
equality.148  All of these wide-ranging threats, however—while conjuring up a distinct set 
of political and social demons—were subsumed within the idea that the US should not 
cede a modicum of its sovereignty.  As a binding document that was being created 
outside the parameters of domestic US law with the intention of having an impact on the 
internal activities of UN member states, the Covenant was unacceptable to Holman.   
The sanctity of the US’s territorial boundaries was a major concern for Holman.  
An international bill of rights, he believed, would “emasculate” the United States’ own 
Bill of Rights.  He argued, 
“In order to enforce the provisions of a bill of rights, the United Nations will have 
to interfere continually and minutely in the internal affairs of member nations. It 
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will have to establish standards, and determine when and where these standards 
have been violated, and to take steps to correct or punish such violations.”149  
 
The other problem looming on the horizon, would be the implementation of the 
Covenant.  Holman warned that an “international court on human relations” might be set 
up to implement the foreign laws that comprised the Covenant.  If the Covenant were to 
have such binding force and a mechanism that ensured adoption of its laws, the US legal 
system could be bound by alien totalitarian concepts.   While international courts were 
certainly a topic of discussion at the UN, Holman’s phraseology conjures an entity that 
represented his most profound concerns: the extra-national control of domestic legal and 
social life.   
Holman regularly recited the refrain, that if the Covenant were not stopped 
immediately, it would eventually become “the supreme law of the land.” 150 Using the 
phrase, “supreme law of the land,” was no accident.  It represented a carefully worded 
two-pronged critique of the relationship between the US legal system and the developing 
body of international human rights law. First, the critique was one in which international 
law was viewed as a separate system of law that had no place in the domestic sphere.  As 
soon as it began to alter internal US law, it had already gone too far.  Under this line of 
thought, the US Constitution was the utmost legal authority—there were no laws higher 
or superior to it.  Second, while it held the Constitution above all other law, it was also a 
direct critique of it.  Holman and others at the ABA believed that Article VI (2) of the US 
Constitution, which states that treaty law shall become the “supreme law of the land,” 
was far too accommodating of external laws.  For these detractors at the ABA, the US 
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Constitution actually permitted its own destruction (and derivatively, the destruction of 
US law and the American way of life more generally).  
This critique was both alarmist and prescient.  The critique was alarmist because 
of its outlandish claims that were meant to arouse fear and mistrust of international 
human rights treaties.  Taking the rhetoric at face value, one would be led to believe that 
communist infiltrators and totalitarian despots were pounding at the gates.  It was 
prescient though, because if human rights were to mean anything, they would somehow 
have to be integrated into the domestic laws of UN member states.  Incorporating an 
international human rights treaty, such as the Covenant, into the existing United States 
legal system would require relinquishing a degree of sovereignty. And in this sense, 
Holman was arguing the social meaning of sovereignty.  Beyond its abstract legal or 
political guise, it meant imposing foreign values, customs, and laws on the American 
social system.  His greatest fear was that if the US were serious about ratifying and 
adhering to international treaty law, the next logical step would be to transform domestic 
laws and institutions to conform to the treaty law.  As discussed in the next section, in 
1950 a California court attempted to do just that.  
 
 The Implications of Human Rights Treaties Become Concrete 
Opponents of the US’s involvement with international human rights treaties 
issued warnings that were largely hypothetical.  The central arguments used by Holman, 
for instance, generally turned on what could happen if the Covenant were allowed to 
become law—i.e. potential threats that had yet to be realized.151  In the spring of 1950, 
however, a California court of Appeals decision catapulted such arguments from 
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conjecture to reality, thereby providing opponents of international human rights treaties 
with tangible evidence of how human rights treaties did in fact alter US law.  In doing so 
it helped the opposition focus its message and mobilize support against the Covenant.  
This decision became a major turning point in the US’s relationship with human rights.     
The subject of Fujii v. The State of California was California’s Alien Land Law 
of 1920.152  Racial discrimination against Japanese residents had prompted the creation of 
this law which prohibited non-US citizens from owning land in the state of California.153  
But due to restrictive federal naturalization laws Japanese residents were not permitted to 
become US citizens, and therefore a Japanese person could never own land in California, 
because under the Alien Land Law, they were “not qualified or permitted to acquire, 
possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy or transfer real property or any interest therein in 
the State of California, or to have in whole or in part the beneficial use thereof.”  Any 
land that a Japanese citizen acquired was automatically subject to forfeiture by the 
state.154 
Born in 1882, Sei Fujii was a business owner who after graduating from USC law 
school, started and ran a bilingual Japanese newspaper called the California Daily 
News.155  Although he had been a California resident for approximately forty years, 
under California’s Alien Land Law he was unable to own land title in California.  After 
the state of California seized his property, Fujii brought claim.  When the lower court 
ruled in favor of the state, Fujii appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Alien 
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Land Law, by arguing that it arbitrarily discriminated against him based solely on his 
race.   
Upon review of the case, Justice Emmett Wilson of the California Court of 
Appeal, Second District, produced a decision on April 24, 1950, that was unlike any 
decision to have ever come out of a court in the United States.156 As opposed to looking 
towards the dictates of domestic law, the US Constitution, or precedents in US case law, 
the Court held that the Alien Land Law was invalid because it ran afoul of the United 
Nations Charter.  In what would quickly be heralded as unprecedented overreaching of 
an appellate court, Wilson wrote that “the Charter has become 'the supreme Law of the 
Land.’”  Thus, he continued, “The position of this country in the family of nations forbids 
trafficking in innocuous generalities but demands that every State in the Union accept 
and act upon the Charter according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose and 
intent.”  
The relevant portions of the UN Charter that apparently superseded both state law 
and the US Constitution were Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, in which UN member 
states had pledged to respect “fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race.” The opinion also cited the nondiscrimination clause of Article 2 of the UDHR 
while arguing that the Alien Land Law was incompatible with Article 17 of the UDHR 
which states that “Everyone has the right to own property,” and that “no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his property.”157   Justice Wilson, argued that the discrimination 
Fujii had experienced due to his race was “contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of 
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the Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of every state in conflict with 
it.”  Based on this reasoning, he declared California’s Alien Land Law “untenable and 
unenforceable.”158  Though human rights supporters longed for such strongly worded, 
unequivocal support for international human rights, in the long term this case inflicted 
immeasurable damage on their movement. 
 
The Implications of the Fujii Case 
US law and politics and its relationship with international law were at a 
crossroads.  Down one path lay support for international human rights treaties and the 
desire to integrate their provisions into the domestic laws and policies of the United 
States.  The other path was marked by the belief that American citizens and the legal 
framework that governed their relations were not to be infringed upon by external laws or 
treaties. The Fujii decision embarked recklessly down the first. 
 Support for Fujii was muted.  The decision was based on questionable legal 
interpretation, an overreaching appeals court, and a vaguely written opinion that could be 
interpreted as citing the non-binding UDHR as a controlling source of law for its 
decision.  While other US cases had mentioned the Charter in the context of human rights 
(see above), this was the first (and quite likely, the only US case) to use the Charter to 
invalidate a domestic law on human rights grounds.  Unfortunately for human rights 
supporters, the Fujii decision was by no means an exemplar of how a domestic court 
might approach international treaty law.   
More than anything, Fujii energized the opponents of the UN and international 
human rights treaties.  The ABA’s campaign against the UDHR and the Covenant, which 
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had begun almost two years before the Fujii decision, continued on, but now with 
renewed vigor.  Fujii provided human rights opponents with a shining example of how 
international human rights would eviscerate domestic laws.  Additionally, the media’s 
harsh treatment of the case provided significant publicity that paralleled the ABA’s 
overall aims.  For instance, a Chicago Daily Tribune reporter quoted an unnamed “legal 
authority” as saying, “If the present interpretation is allowed to stand, the Russians could 
send in their people and buy up land in California.”159  Just a day after the Fujii opinion 
was written, California’s Attorney General promised to appeal to the state’s highest 
court.160  Just days before the decision, the California State legislature withdrew its 
Assembly Joint Resolution 26 (supporting World Government) that it had submitted to 
the US Congress in the previous year.  Four days after Judge Wilson’s opinion was 
released, the US Senate held an afternoon discussion of this case that held the UN Charter 
as the supreme law in the United States.  Those who discussed the case derided the 
court’s decision and did not hide their anxieties about international treaties usurping state 
and federal laws.  For these Senators Fujii opened up the possibility that many US laws 
could be nullified by US courts that cited the Charter.  If upheld by the higher court, Fujii 
did actually cast doubt on the laws of six other states (Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Montana, and Wyoming) with similar laws barring non-citizens from owning 
property.161 
   Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) was vexed.  Amongst his many concerns, 
Ferguson worried that the principles of equality that were outlined in Article 55 of the 
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Charter could now be the “law of the land.”  He warned his colleagues that Article 55 
stood to “void all statutes in any State in relation to distinctions made between the sexes.”  
But the implications of Fujii went far beyond gender equality.  After a heated discussion 
against accepting international treaties as a superior source of law, Ferguson saved his 
most damning arguments for his conclusion: if Fujii stands as law, “we may find that [via 
Article 55 of the Charter] equal rights have already been established in the United 
States.”  Offering well-timed support, Forrest Donnell (R-MO) spoke up and solemnly 
agreed that it “is entirely possible that a court might so hold.”162 
Though the discussion was focused on the Charter, the nature of the opposition 
posed a major problem for the Covenant that was then being drafted.  For if the Senate 
was unwilling to allow any external treaties from impacting domestic laws in the United 
States and desired to hold on to laws that would stand in clear contradiction with the 
Covenant, the chances of ratifying such a human rights treaty was slim.   
Additionally, immediately after the Fujii decision, Manley O. Hudson, a respected 
international lawyer at Harvard who chaired the UN’s International Law Commission, 
and who had been involved with the drafting of the UN Charter, believed that the case 
had been decided erroneously and was based on a “misconception of the human rights 
provisions of the Charter.”163  Though Hudson was a supporter of human rights, he 
argued that Article 56 of the Charter listed a set of broad goals to be promoted by 
member states, but did not establish any formal obligations that automatically would be 
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part of domestic law.164  He argued that it was not the intention of the drafters of the 
Charter at the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization, to create any specific 
obligations with respect to human rights, which themselves had not yet even been 
defined.  The only obligation incurred by the US, he argued, is the obligation to cooperate 
with the international community with respect to the goals outlined in Article 55 of the 
Charter.165  In this sense, Hudson and other jurists argued that the judiciary was not the 
right body to implement the Charter (if at all).  Instead it was a political question that 
would require the executive or legislative branch to act.166    
The legal community, the press, the general public and the federal government 
had all taken great interest in the Fujii decision (virtually all of which was critical). Given 
the questionable nature of the decision, even human rights supporters did not offer the 
case much support.  Notwithstanding the questionable nature of the decision, the critical 
response illustrated that many in the US were not about to quietly accept the superiority 
of international human rights law.  Here the Charter, which was not even a proper human 
rights treaty, was being used to nullify domestic laws.  For the opposition, things could 
only get worse with the Covenant, since it was being created to do just that. Here was one 
of the most decisive steps a US court has ever taken to honor international human rights 
in the domestic realm.  This venture into internationalism, however, garnered little 
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support while providing opponents more ammunition against international human rights 
than they could have possibly conjured on their own.   
 
The ABA Continues its Push with Renewed Strength 
The “dangers” of the United Nations and the international human rights treaties 
that the US was engaged with were in many ways abstract quantities.  Whether the US 
would actually be bound by the future Covenant to any major extent in practice was still 
unknown. The Fujii decision galvanized the ABA’s opposition, for suddenly after two 
years of trumpeting the hypothetical dangers of international treaty law, the ABA had a 
concrete example of what could happen if international law were allowed to trump 
domestic laws, practices and mores.  At the annual meeting of the Washington State Bar 
Association in Spokane, Washington on August 12, 1950, Holman was invigorated.  “In 
April of this year the District Court of Appeal of California …unequivocally sustained 
what I predicted…”167  Holman viewed Fujii as “incontrovertible” evidence that his 
previous concerns about international human rights treaties were justified and not at all 
“alarmist.”  Holman pledged that the ABA would intensify its efforts to “save” the US 
from the host of evils it now confronted.  
In September of 1950, the ABA House of Delegates issued a formal resolution 
opposing the Draft Covenant, while the accompanying report cited very similar concerns 
and consequences associated with ratifying the actual Covenant.168  Such a resolution 
was by no means an idle threat to the Covenant as the ABA was well-connected with 
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members of Congress, many of whom were members themselves.169  The ABA’s 
solution for shoring up the US’s defenses against such external scourges was to alter
US Constitution before human rights treaties did so first.  Though dramatic, this propos
solution was not novel.  As discussed above, it had been attempted numerous times in the 
previous years by the internationalists who feared just the opposite—that the Constitution 
restricted access to treaty making.   
 the 
ed 
                                                
During this period the ABA was responsible for initiating a movement to amend 
the Constitution—a movement that would later become one of the largest and influential 
coalitions against international human rights law.  In 1950, the ABA House of Delegates 
also authorized an internal study of the feasibility of a constitutional amendment relating 
to treaty making.170  Its goal was to limit the ability of international human rights treaties 
from becoming law in the US.  It recommended that the US Constitution be amended in 
three ways:  First, all international treaties would require congressional legislation before 
they applied domestically—that is, they could not automatically become law (as assumed 
in the Fujii case). Second, Congress would not be allowed to make laws that were not 
otherwise “authorized by the Constitution.” Third, no international law could alter the 
Constitution the individual rights and freedoms it grants to Congress, the states or the 
people. The House of Delegates additionally authorized copies of the resolution opposing 
the Covenant, resolutions relating to the proposed constitutional amendment and any 
suggestions by the committee and its members to be transmitted to Congress and the US 
Delegation to the United Nations.171   
 
169 Kaufman, Natalie. 1990. Human Rights Treaties and the Senate. 
170 “Report of the Special Committee for Peace and Law Through the United Nations,” Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 
75:286-329. 
171 Id. at 286-87. 
 93
 
 Various scholars and human rights supporters pushed back against the ABA’s 
attack.  Quincy Wright, a preeminent US scholar of international law and international 
relations, and President of the American Political Science Association from 1948-1949, 
argued that in time a gradual use of the courts for implementing the UN Charter would 
provide international legal consistency and create an environment in which the 
observance of human rights would become a reality (though he realized there were major 
political hurdles that still needed to be overcome).172  Oscar Schachter, Deputy Director, 
United Nations Legal Department, believed that the opponents were exaggerating their 
claims about the dangers of international human rights treaties.173  
As shown in detail in subsequent chapters, the strength and momentum, however, 
seemed to lay with the opponents of international human rights treaties.174  Former 
president Herbert Hoover seemed to agree as well.  In a national radio address on January 
27, 1952 he warned that the US’s “relations to the United Nations Charter should be 
revised. It must not be allowed to dominate the internal sovereignty of our Government. 
Our courts have already made decisions that the Charter overrides our domestic laws.”175  
For opponents of international human rights treaties Fujii was a godsend.  In addition to 
directly addressing the ongoing controversies surrounding human rights laws, the central 
issues of the case mapped directly on to a set of gripping civic concerns.  First, the 
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question of whether and how international human rights would be applied in the domestic 
context was a controversial topic to begin with.  Even steadfast human rights supporters 
understood it was a complex and charged matter that required incredible political 
dexterity and legal acumen to implement successfully.  The Fujii court, however, used a 
hammer for a surgeon’s job.  As a result supporters could not rally behind the historic 
moment and opponents fed on the opinion like hungry sharks.  Second, the Cold War fear 
of communist infiltration and McCarthyism was top of mind for many. Associating 
human rights with communism and enemies of the state was just one way that opponents 
gained traction.  The fact that the plaintiff in the case was a Japanese citizen did not help 
matters so close to the end of a war in which the US fought against the Japanese.  The 
particular confluence of facts in this case (i.e. an international treaty dictating the terms of 
domestic social relations between a racial outsider and war-time enemy and the American 
public) provided detractors a ready-made package of social demons to rally against.  As a 
test-case for the promotion of increased internationalism, this was a complete failure.     
In 1952, the California Supreme Court invalidated the Appeals Courts’ ruling, 
holding that the lower court had erred in its decision—international treaty law was not an 
appropriate source of law on which to base its decision.176  In addition to this ruling 
serving as vindication for the opponents of international human rights treaties, it all but 
closed the door on incorporating international human rights laws through judicial 
decision. 
 
                                                 





Saving Empire: The Attempt to Create (non)-Universal Human Rights 
 
 
As a set of rules for delineating appropriate social, political, and economic 
relationships between states and their populations, after World War II, human rights 
offered much to be hopeful for—and much that threatened the status quo.  While human 
rights held great promise for the hundreds of millions of people who then lived in 
colonial dependencies, the colonial powers were much less sanguine about the universal 
extension of this empowering concept. With concepts like equality and self-
determination, the colonial powers were now faced with an emerging conception of law 
that undercut the foundations of the colonial relationship.  So during the drafting of the 
International Bill of Human Rights, Great Britain endorsed a conception of human rights 
that would be as consistent as possible with the social relationships of its colonial empire. 
Although today colonialism and human rights seem entirely antithetical to one 
another, it is important to note that during this time period “human rights” remained a 
partially-formed concept—its precise terms were still a matter of intense debate and had 
yet to be worked out.  During the drafting of the UDHR and its Covenant(s), the scope of 
human rights—i.e. whether it was to become a universal or restricted concept, as well as 
its source—whether created by a sovereign authority or fundamental and natural—both 
became important sites of debate over colonialism.  
 
UNESCO, Human Rights, and Philosophy 
Before the UDHR was drafted, the United Nations hoped to attain some clarity (or 
perhaps even consensus) about what human rights actually were.  A specialized agency of 
the United Nations solicited the aid of over thirty of the leading philosophical minds of 
the time to identify the nature, sources, and foundations of human rights.  Among the 
many notable figures enlisted for this task were the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, 
Quincy Wright, an American political scientist and international law scholar, Aldous 
Huxley, and Mahatma Gandhi.  Designed to serve as a resource for the drafters (though 
never seriously used), the resulting, nearly 300-page document captured an extremely 
broad spectrum of theoretical perspectives and justifications for the human rights that 
were being considered at the UN.   
Identifying the basic philosophical underpinnings of human rights was soon 
deemed a task wholly separate from the actual mechanics of the drafting process, and was 
therefore undertaken by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)—a specialized UN agency separate from the Human Rights 
Commission that was responsible for drafting the International Bill of Human Rights.177  
The compartmentalization of these duties was in part a function of pragmatic 
considerations.  For one, the vast (yet predictable) breadth of the philosophical 
orientations that emerged, though excellent food for debate and discussion, was decidedly 
stifling in the context of drafting.  For often, the intellectual starting points—be it 
Marxism, classical liberalism, Christianity, or Buddhism—represented starkly divergent 
intellectual schools of thought that were often mutually exclusive of one another.   
                                                 
177 Under its constitution, UNESCO was created in part to promote “collaboration among nations through 
education, science and culture” and to “bridge the cultural differences of the nations by fostering 
cooperation and intellectual activity.” 
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John Humphrey—the Canadian legal scholar responsible for creating the initial 
draft of the UDHR—realized just how heated and passionate some of these philosophical 
discussions could become while having breakfast with Charles Malik. In his memoirs, 
Humphrey recalls the Lebanese natural rights philosopher, diplomat, theologian, and 
member of the Commission on Human Rights (later President of the General Assembly), 
erupting in “a fit of temper” after Humphrey brought up Hans Kelsen’s influential theory 
of legal positivism.178  For Malik, one of the most disturbing debates over human rights 
was the one between natural and positive law.  As a philosopher and a man of religious 
faith, Malik believed that humans possessed inherent characteristics such as dignity, the 
capacity for reason, and conscience.  Nature also endowed man with a set of natural 
rights, 
“that he cannot be held in slavery or servitude, that he cannot be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest, that he is presumed innocent until proved guilty, that his 
person is inviolable, that he has the natural right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion and expression and so on down the list of proclaimed 
rights.”179 
 
Suggesting that a state, a parliament, or even the United Nations could somehow 
create or grant such preexisting rights was utter blasphemy.  The converse of this 
common (yet, for Malik, thoroughly mistaken) belief was even worse, for positive law 
could be used just as easily to revoke anything it extends. Malik firmly believed that 
human rights were “metaphysically prior to any positive law, and any such law must 
either conform to them or else be by nature null and void.”180 
 
                                                 
178 Humphrey, John P. 1983. “The Memoirs of John P. Humphrey, the First Director of the United Nations 
Division of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 387-439, at 397. 




Given such deep-rooted beliefs on all sides, it was decided that creating a human 
rights treaty would be virtually impossible if discussions of theory and metaphysics were 
permitted at the drafting table.  Nevertheless, the UNESCO committee was actually quite 
optimistic about the ability for the Commission on Human Rights to reach consensus and 
agreement on the substance of the law—at least in the narrow confines of political 
diplomacy and legal draftsmanship.  Opening up the drafting discussions to the all-
important questions, What is a right? and Where do rights come from? was a recipe for 
endless debate, discord, and most likely failure.  The oft-quoted quip from a UNESCO 
representative, “Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition that no on asks us why,” 
nicely sums up the dilemma as well as the chosen solution.181 
For a task as novel and potentially monumental as drafting an international bill of 
human rights, pragmatic solutions are necessary.  But for a comprehensive analysis such 
as the present one, these philosophical debates are virtually inseparable from the legal 
drafting debates; they are in fact part of the very same social struggle.  For both the legal 
text of a human rights instrument, as well as its philosophical underpinnings serve to 
carve out an institutional sphere in which a particular class of social and political 
relationships can flourish (while its competitors falter).   
If Humphrey integrated Kelsen’s theory of law into his draft of the UDHR, the 
consequences for colonial territories and their inhabitants could be devastating.   For if 
the status of law only vests from pronouncements issued and executed by a sovereign 
                                                 
181 This was the reply offered by a UNESCO committee member when asked by an incredulous observer 
about whether proponents of such vastly different philosophical orientations had in fact led to a common 
list of rights (Maritain, Jacques, “Introduction,” in UNESCO Symposium 1948: Report Comments and 
Interpretations, Page 1).  John Humphrey also noted the same thing during one of the very first meeting of 
the Commission on Human Rights (Humphrey, John P. 1983. “The Memoirs of John P. Humphrey, the 
First Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
pp. 387-439, at 403).  
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authority, those living in colonial dependencies would remain bound by the laws and 
dictates of the metropole.  On the other hand, for those living in colonial dependencies, 
the idea of universal, natural rights was emancipatory and held great hope (just as it did 
for those on the winning sides of the French and American Revolutions).  Recall Edmund 
Burke’s and Jeremy Bentham’s mutual disdain for natural rights (the latter calling natural 
rights “a bastard brood of monsters, ‘gorgons and chimaeras dire’”).  The ferociousness 
of the Bentham’s anti-natural rights diatribe similarly shows that much more than 
philosophical ideas was at stake.  Indeed, natural rights permitted the destruction of the 
social and political arrangements that were both created and protected by existing 
positive law.  Thus, the natural rights that were embraced by revolutionaries, for Bentham 
were nothing more than the “mortal enemies of law, the subverters of government, and 
the assassins of security.”182   For regardless of what a sovereign power decrees through 
law, under a natural rights orientation, the final source and authority exists above and 
beyond the sovereign authority of state or empire.  Unwittingly, through jurisprudential 
path, Humphrey had just tread into one of the most pressing and emotionally charged 
social issues of the day: did colonial inhabitants have human rights?     
Even when the differences between natural and positivist theories of 
jurisprudence were jettisoned for law and politics in the Commission on Human Rights, 
this was precisely the ongoing battle fought during the drafting of the International Bill of 
Human Rights, between the colonial powers and their foes.  Whether approached through 
philosophical debate, the language of law, or the conventions of diplomacy, the 
underlying social question was the same: could colonial inhabitants have international 
                                                 
182 Bentham, Jeremy. 1843. "Anarchical Fallacies: Being An Examination of the Declarations of Rights 
Issued During the French Revolution." In The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, at lns. 731–36. 
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legal, political and social recognition absent the colonial authority.  Though perhaps 
never even mentioned by name, colonial powers such as Belgium and France (but Great 
Britain in particular), were tireless executors of a positivist theory of law during the 
drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights.  Whatever it was called—a 
philosophy, a drafting strategy, a political orientation, or simply a “world view”—it was a 
strong scaffold upon which to construct the human rights concept in the image of empire. 
 
1946-1948 – The Debates over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
World War II left behind a power vacuum and an uncertain future for Europe.  In 
its immediate aftermath, wartime allies quickly became Cold War rivals.  For the Soviet 
Union, if the colonial powers—particularly Great Britain—were permitted to regain their 
power and re-establish the rules and structures of their empire within the framework of 
the United Nations, the Soviet Union would suffer.  Very early on, the Soviet Union 
began to target the Western colonial powers and advocate on behalf of those in 
dependencies for a swift end to colonialism.  The International Bill of Human Rights 
became an important battleground in this struggle. The human rights documents that 
emerged from the drafting process would speak to whether or not the nations of the world 
believed the colonial relationship was a legitimate one.  The Soviet Union therefore 
pushed for a concept of human rights that unequivocally rejected colonialism.  Great 
Britain, on the other hand, searched for a way to emerge from the drafting process with a 
definition of human rights that was as least damaging as possible to its imperial system. 
During the drafting of the UDHR, the colonial problem didn't develop into debate 
until the end of 1947, at which time the Soviet Union increasingly began to define itself 
in the Commission on Human Rights as a strong opponent of colonialism.  Tension 
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between the British and Soviet delegations began to appear during the deliberations of the 
Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights in December of 1947 when the 
Soviet and Belarus representatives in the Commission on Human Rights voiced their 
concerns about issues surrounding elections and whether basic political rights would be 
extended to trust and non-self governing territories. It was their opinion that colonial 
dependencies should be explicitly included as beneficiaries of any human rights 
document.183  This posed at least two problems for Great Britain.  First, political 
questions—especially those relating to elections—were particularly worrying to a 
government that presided over a decidedly undemocratic empire.  A second issue 
however was much more pressing: would colonial dependencies and their inhabitants be 
mentioned at all as rights holders?  The British delegation strongly opposed any explicit 
mention of its dependencies.  
By the late 1940s the colonial powers were fighting an uphill normative battle—
the universal character of human rights was gaining considerable momentum.  But UN 
rules, organizational structures, and simple power politics were leveraged with great skill 
by the colonial powers. These structural inequalities weighed heavily in favor of the 
colonial powers reinstalling their colonial structures within the emerging human rights 
concept itself (and in a perverted tautology was evidence of the correctness of their 
theory of legal positivism).184  
 
The Covenant and the Colonial Clause 
                                                 
183 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.2/SR.7; E/CN.4/57. 
184 The colonial debates during the drafting of the UDHR are recounted in great detail in, Morsink, 
Johannes. 1999. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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While the mention of the colonies in the UDHR was a central issue for Great 
Britain, whatever the result, it did not create any binding legal obligations.  The 
Covenant, however, was to be a legally binding international treaty.  What was 
incorporated within it would have a legally enforceable character.  Accordingly, Great 
Britain, in its attempt to maintain the legal conventions and political structures of its 
empire, introduced a proposal for a colonial clause.  
 
The Colonial Clause as Law-- Overview 
There were several different versions of this legal device which by the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had become a common convention in colonial 
governance.185  Some colonial clauses, for example, contained provisions for the optional 
application of a particular treaty.  That is, the colonial clause granted the colonial power 
the discretion to withhold the treaty from (or apply it to) any or all of its dependencies.  
E.g. a model colonial clause created in 1948 stipulates:  
A state party to the present agreement may at the time of signature, ratification, 
accession or at any time thereafter by notification given declare that the present 
convention extend to any of the territories for the international relations of which 
it is responsible, and the agreement shall, from the date of the receipt of the 
notification, or from such other date as may be specified in the notification, 
extend to the territory named therein.186 
In other cases a colonial clause could hold that a treaty automatically applied to a colonial 
power’s dependencies, but included a stipulation allowing the power to exclude any (or 
all) of its dependencies if it so chose.  For example:   
                                                 
185 See the 1904 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic.  Fawcett (1949) 
traces this colonial tradition to the mid nineteenth century, though territorial exclusion clauses in treaties 
appear as early as 1528 (see Fawcett, J.E.S. 1949. "Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories." 
British Yearbook of International Law 26:86-107). 
186 Draft Art. 25. Yearbook on Human Rights, 1947:549; also cited in Simpson 2001:289. 
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Any Member or State signing the present Convention may declare that the 
signature does not include any or all of its colonies, overseas possessions, 
protectorates or territories under its sovereignty or authority.187  
Another version of the colonial clause granted the colonial signatory the right at any time 
to withdraw the treaty’s application with respect to any of its dependencies.  For 
example:  
Any High Contracting Party may at any moment withdraw, in whole or in part, 
any declaration made under the second paragraph of this Article. Such withdrawal 
will take effect one year after its receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations.188 
Finally, a colonial clause might mandate the automatic application of a treaty to 
all dependencies.189  Whichever form it took, the presence of a colonial clause advanced 
the proposition that colonial territories were not valid, independent actors, and that in 
international law their existence was solely a function of the colonial relationship.   
Though the colonial clause had been used for decades in the colonial context, it 
was not clear what the implications were for including a colonial clause in United 
Nations treaties—particularly at a moment when the trend was towards decolonization.  
In 1947 though, the representatives in the General Assembly established a very important 
bright-line rule; they decided that the deletion of such provisions meant that the 
Conventions would automatically “apply to all territories for which the Contracting 
States had international responsibility.”190  From this moment, the colonial powers were 
on notice, for this decision implied that if a colonial clause was absent from a treaty, a 
                                                 
187 Article 14 of the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and 
Children. 
188 Article 10 of the1933 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age. 
189 In 1950 the Commission on Human Rights requested that the Secretary General draft a report on the 
history, uses and legal issues surrounding the colonial clause issue.  This document (UN Doc E/1721) 
became an important resource in the debates over the colonial clause.  For a discussion of the colonial 
clause, see Liang, Yuen-Li. 1951. "Colonial Clauses and Federal Clauses in United Nations Multilateral 
Instruments." The American Journal of International Law 45 (1):108-28. 
190 See E/1721, p.16, 36. 
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colonial power’s dependencies would be recognized by international law.  In the case of 
human rights treaties, they would be covered under the treaty and would therefore be 
entitled to all of its rights.  While this alone did not necessarily bestow sovereign equality 
upon the trust and non-self governing territories, it was a step towards leveling a 
relationship that depended on sovereign inequality.191  The treaties that had been in 
question with respect to the colonial clause however, had not been human rights treaties. 
During the drafting of the Covenant this battle would take new form, becoming 
increasingly bitter and hostile.  The colonial powers attempted to retain the colonial 
clause and establish a restricted and limited conception of human rights law, despite the 
growing momentum towards a “universal” conception of human rights.        
When inserted into an international treaty, this legal mechanism would give a 
colonial power complete control over whether it extended or blocked the application of 
that particular treaty with respect to its colonial territories.  Though a colonial clause 
generally constituted no more than a paragraph or two text, it embodied a social ideology, 
a political system, and a legal framework that was colonialism.  The black-letter law of a 
colonial clause stood for a particular social relationship between metropole and colony 
that was both private and unequal.  It was a private relationship between metropole and 
colony because international law did not apply directly to colony and was required to be 
filtered through the legal framework of the metropole for it to even be considered.  
Second, it was a relationship of political inequality because the colonies were dependent 
upon the metropole for legal and political recognition and subject to its decisions and 
policies.  Finally, it preserved Great Britain’s colonial legal framework of “indirect rule,” 
                                                 
191 “Trust and non-self governing territories” is a term which was in common use at the time, and refers to 
colonies, dependencies, and territorial possessions. 
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in which the consent of local-level legislative bodies was required before an international 
treaty could take effect.192  In this way the colonial clause and the practice of colonialism 
(even when integrated into the framework of human rights) were mutually reinforcing.193 
Though not unknown, the battles over the colonial clause have not enjoyed much 
attention in the literature on colonialism and the development of modern international 
human rights law.  Because researchers often begin with the texts of the UDHR and the 
Covenants, as they appear today, and work backwards to examine how various individual 
articles came to be, amongst the many International Bill of Human Rights drafting 
debates between colonial and anti-colonial factions, the battle over the right to self-
determination (which appears prominently in Article 1 of both of the Covenants) tends to 
be highlighted in historical research.194  In-depth analyses of the colonial clause (which 
unlike the right to self-determination, did not survive the drafting process and appears 
nowhere in the body of the International Bill of Human Rights), tend to take a back seat 
to the items that actually appear in the text.  For instance, in the 800 pages that comprise 
what is probably some of the most thorough and exhaustive research of the drafting of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Bossuyt does not discuss the 
colonial clause.195 
                                                 
192 Although the system of “indirect rule” was unique to Great Britain, France, Belgium and the United 
States generally voted as a bloc in support of the colonial clause. See Simpson, Brain A.W. 2001. Human 
Rights and the End of Empire, at 290. 
193 Since the British colonial relationship was based on a legal system in which the consent of local-level 
legislative bodies was required before an international treaty could take effect, the inclusion of a colonial 
applications clause was most strongly fought for by Great Britain (see Simpson 2001:290).  That said, 
France, Belgium and the United States were strong allies and generally voted as a bloc in support of the 
colonial clause.  
194 E.g. Cassese, Antonio. 1981. "The Self-determination of Peoples." In The International Bill of Rights, 
ed. L. Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press; 
El-Ayouty, Yassin. 1971. The United Nations and Decolonization;  
195 Bossuyt, Marc J. 1987. Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. But see, Fawcett, J.E.S. 1949. "Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories." 
British Yearbook of International Law 26:86-107; Liang, Yuen-Li. 1951. "Colonial Clauses and Federal 
 106
 
Methodologically, it is of great value for a researcher to take note of the rejection 
of certain ideas that do not enter legal texts.196  What is perhaps even more important, 
however, are the “aversive alternatives”—i.e. those elements “that are so forcefully 
rejected that they cast their influence over the whole…effort.”197 Indeed, when 
examining legal documents the negative elements (i.e. items that do not appear in the tex
because they were actively removed, prevented from being included, or were nev
considered as valid in the first place) can be just as important as the items that actually 
show up in the text.  These insights are particularly relevant in the present case; in 
addition to examining the actual contents of the International Bill of Human Rights, 
researchers must also focus on what did not become a part of it.  In this regard, the 
“missing” colonial clause is no exception.
t 
er even 
                                                                                                                                                
198  
This research approach demonstrates that the colonial clause debates were at least 
as important as those over self-determination.  For while the battle over self-
determination focused on the validity of a specific right, the battle over the colonial 
clause was essentially a debate over the entire meaning of universal human rights. If the 
colonial powers had succeeded in placing colonial clauses in the International Bill of 
Human Rights, human rights would not be “fundamental” to all humans. Instead, human 
rights (at least in theory) would have become subordinate to an individual’s political 
situation—an understanding of human rights that is completely antithetical to its 
contemporary meaning.  At stake, then, was the question of whether colonial territories 
 
Clauses in United Nations Multilateral Instruments." The American Journal of International Law 45 
(1):108-28. 
196 Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2003. "Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross National Influence Through Negative Models." International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 
(2):296-324. 
197 Id, at 298. 
198 Though Scheppele’s discussion is oriented towards national constitutions rather than international 
human rights instruments, I will borrow the substance of her approach and apply it to the latter.    
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and their inhabitants had any fundamental human rights absent the administering colonial 
power.  Were the inhabitants of the colonial territories to be recognized by the 
international community first as humans or as imperial subjects?  As illustrated 
throughout this project, in addition to creating a lasting definition of human rights, how 




The Fight over the Colonial Clause in the Draft Covenant-The Sides Form  
Most studies of the drafting process look at the drafting of the UDHR or of the 
Covenants in isolation from one another.  It is important to recognize that between 1947 
through the end of 1948, that the UDHR and its Covenant were being discussed 
concurrently by the Commission on Human Rights.   Because the UDHR and its 
Covenant were typically discussed at the UN as separate agenda items, with very 
different time horizons for their completion, the official records typically 
compartmentalize these drafting processes.  The delegations of course, were quite aware 
of the concurrent processes, and tailored their arguments and strategies accordingly. The 
battles won or lost with respect to the UDHR impacted the debates on the Covenant as 
well as the relative strength of the delegations’ bargaining positions. This is very 
important in the present narrative, for even if the colonies were mentioned explicitly in 
the UDHR, the British delegation possessed a trump card within the colonial clause.  At a 
legal level, anything given to the colonies in the UDHR, could technically be withheld 
indefinitely through a colonial clause.   
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Just one day after the Soviet Union raised the question about elections in the 
discussions over the UDHR, Great Britain fired right back with a proposal to include a 
version of the colonial clause with in the draft Covenant.199  In addition to opposing such 
issues as they arose, Great Britain deployed this legal backstop to prevent the Covenant 
as a whole from automatically applying to its dependencies.  The colonial clause was 
therefore something of an insurance policy for the British delegation. While it would 
certainly be opposed by many states at the United Nations, if included, the British 
government would have the final say on the actual application of the rights.   When voted 
on, Great Britain’s colonial clause proposal passed and became Article 25 of the “Draft 
International Covenant on Human Rights.”  The text of this colonial clause read: 
1. This Covenant shall apply in respect of any Colony or overseas territory of a 
State party hereto, or to any territory subject to the suzerainty or protection of 
such State, or to any territory in respect of which such State exercises a mandate 
or trusteeship, when that State has acceded on behalf and in respect of such 
Colony or territory. 
 
2. The State concerned shall, if necessary, seek the consent at the earliest possible 
moment of the governments of all such colonies and territories to this Bill and 
accede on behalf and in respect of each such colony and territory immediately its 
consent has been obtained.200 
 
The Anti-Colonial Position 
The issue was tabled until the next meeting of the Human Rights Commission 
during the spring of 1948.  During these meetings, the Soviet delegation believed that the 
question of how (if at all) the Covenant would be extended to the colonies was of major 
                                                 
199 At this early stage, the terms Declaration, Convention, Covenant, and International Bill of Human 
Rights were used with some confusion.  In a meeting on December 16, 1947, the Commission on Human 
Rights decided “to apply the term ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, or for brevity, ‘Bill of Rights’, to 
the entirety of documents in preparation”—i.e. the UDHR and the Convention.  The Convention, in turn, 
refers to what later became the two Covenants. UN Doc E/600, p.6; E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.8; E/CN.4/56. 
200 UN Doc E/600. 
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importance and should be discussed by the drafting sub-committee.201  Pavlov, the Soviet 
representative, believed “it was clear that the authors of draft Article 25 [i.e. Great 
Britain] did not wish those rights and liberties to be extended to non-self-governing 
territories. The equivocal wording of the article left the final disposal of the non-self-
governing territories to the arbitrary decision of the administering authority.”202  In a bold 
move that initiated a major drafting battle over the Colonial Clause, Pavlov suggested 
replacing the British text with an article that that was “clear, concise and unequivocal”: 
an anti-colonial clause.   
“The provisions of this Covenant shall apply to the territories of States parties to 
the Covenant, and to any territories for the international relations of which the 
said contracting Government is responsible (non-self-governing territories, trust 
territories and colonial territories).”203 
 
 
A Line is Drawn—Human Rights Stand for two Competing Social Orders 
The line had been drawn. The drafting committee now had before it two 
competing articles on the issue of the colonies.  The British draft which would establish a 
limited conception of human rights that incorporated colonial legal, social and political 
conventions into the nascent framework of the human rights concept, and the Soviet draft 
that pushed for a universal human rights concept.  This moment represented a potential 
turning point for colonial empires, their dependencies and the concept of human rights, 
itself.  The Soviet’s strategy of drawing a bright line between those who supported the 
                                                 
201 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.43. 
202 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.43/p.7. 
203 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.43/p.7. 
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British proposal and those who supported their own was excellent politics.  It was in fact 
the legal manifestation of the Soviet’s stated foreign policy.204   
The conventions and practices of colonialism were becoming less and less tenable 
in the post War world—a reality that Great Britain, not least of all, understood quite well 
when engaging in foreign affairs.  During this period, Great Britain was not entirely 
unified in its support for the colonial clause. At times, the growing strength of the human 
rights discourse proved to be a conundrum for the diverging aims of Great Britain’s 
Foreign Office on the one hand, and the Colonial Office on the other.  The former being 
responsible for foreign relations and the latter was charged with maintaining the British 
colonial empire.205  The Colonial Office tended to fall in line with traditional colonial 
ideology and resisted a universal conception of human rights more so than the Foreign 
Office. The Foreign Office understood that at times maintaining adequate relations with 
other states often depended on taking a more progressive approach to human rights than 
the Colonial Office might have been able to, lest it sabotage its own mandate.206 
 
Soviets Try to put US in Colonial Camp 
In addition to the Soviet-led strategy of opposing colonialism at every turn, the 
Soviet Union also actively sought to define the US as a leader of the “imperialist 
camp.”207  As an institution that was clearly in decline (though no one knew whether it 
would be years or decades), there were political gains to be had at the US’s expense.  In 
                                                 
204 Recall from Chapter 2, Andrei Zhdanov’s Report on the International Situation to the Cominform, in 
which he divided the world into two camps: “the non-democratic, imperialists which were led by the US, 
and the democratic, anti-imperialists, led by the Soviet Union. 
205 Simpson (2001) recounts some of the heated internal debates between the two offices in 1948 when 
Great Britain was creating its own draft of the UDHR.  
206 Simpson, Brain A.W. 2001. Human Rights and the End of Empire. 
207 Jacobson, Harold K. 1962. "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal." International 
Organization 16 (1):37-56. 
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terms of political alliances, bloc politics, and the broader arc of the burgeoning Cold War, 
this was an image that was potentially very damaging for the US.  In this regard, the US 
and the Soviet Union were fighting for the same limited resource: a position of moral 
leadership at the UN.  This was a valuable asset that would pay dividends in cultivating 
relationships with not only the smaller and non-Western states that were in the UN at the 
time, but also all of the dependencies that eventually would become members.   
The difficulty for the United States was that it in many respects it was a member 
of the older Western, colonial imperialists.208  As their strongest ally, the US typically 
sided with colonial powers such as Great Britain, France and Belgium.  Historically, the 
US originated from the same social, political and legal stock.  But perhaps even more 
damaging, was the fact that the US seemed to adhere to the same exclusionary legal 
positions as the British, while subscribing at home to a racial ideology that they saw as 
inseparable from the one central to colonialism.  As discussed in subsequent chapters, at 
the time the US was waging a concurrent and just as unpopular battle to get a “Federal 
State Clause” included in the text of the Covenant (this was essentially a colonial clause 
intended for federal states).209  One of the major issues that was debated extensively was 
whether the colonial clause and the federal state clause issues should (1) be discussed 
together in debate, and (2) whether they should be merged together in the text of the 
Covenant as a single article.  This of course was much more than simply a matter of legal 
drafting.  It was a way to legally enshrine the US’s close relationship with the colonial 
tradition.  While the US fought and won on both points, the hours of debates over how 
                                                 
208 Id. at 42. 
209 As discussed in the following Chapter, the effect of the Federal State Clause was that the Covenant 
would not automatically apply to the federal states of the United States with respect to matters that were not 
within the jurisdictional purview of the federal government—e.g. racial discrimination.  
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similar the colonial and federal state clauses were (on its own, regardless of outcome) put 
the US closer than it would have liked to the colonial powers.210  Throughout these 
colonial and federal state clause debates the US and Great Britain—at a definite cost to 
their moral leadership at the UN—remained loyal in their support for the other’s clause.  
 
Human Rights Without Political Recognition? 
History seemed to be repeating itself.  The debates over what was right for the 
colonial dependencies were for the most part initiated and waged by the great powers, on 
behalf of what was right for the great powers.  While the smaller states certainly joined in 
and took sides, the terms of the debates were typically set by the more powerful states. 
The nobility of rhetoric offered by all sides barely hid (if at all) the self-interest brimming 
within their positions.  For the Soviets, for instance, striking the colonial clause from 
international agreements was argued as a necessary step towards the ending the evils of 
colonial rule—and as it so happened, a prerequisite for achieving its own geopolitical 
ambitions.   
For smaller anti-colonial states (a political faction within the UN that was 
increasingly becoming more united and powerful), Great Britain’s attempt to restrict the 
automatic application of human rights from including trust and non-self governing 
territories was one of the most blatant and abhorrent attempts to write the idea of imperial 
superiority into law.211  Given the fact that human rights (under a natural rights 
orientation) were supposedly granted by virtue of one’s humanity, these states saw 
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Britain’s conduct as unforgivable.  While colonial officials argued that their policies 
fostered democracy, colonial autonomy, and were a necessary antecedent of self-
determination, opponents saw the colonial clause as a mechanism to maintain the colonial 
relationship and its system of economic exploitation.212  The anti-colonial states believed 
that the presence of a colonial clause would enshrine into international law the very 
relationship of legal and political dependency they were attempting to shed.213  But as a 
political fact, even the smaller and non-Western, anti-colonial states that so often 
advocated on behalf of the dependencies had their own political interests in mind (though 
these interests were much closer to those of the colonies). 
Self-interested politics is an integral part of human rights formation—it is not 
necessarily a bad thing.214  But in this setting, those whose rights were being bargained 
over and whose territories fought for were not able to become member states and 
therefore had little opportunity or power to voice their own positions.  The structures, 
power differentials, and overall organizational framework made it extremely difficult for 
smaller states (let alone dependencies) to actually make these human rights “their own.” 
Instead, the rights being discussed were in large part defined and given meaning by the 
more powerful states.  The tricky thing about human rights is that at the legal, political, 
and philosophical levels, they typically appear universal, sound emancipatory, and are 
presented as altruistic.  The colonial structures and systemic inequities underlying the 
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colonial clause’s promises of increased autonomy, independence, and self-rule is just one 
forceful example. 
As one of the several dozen thinkers asked to provide his thoughts on human 
rights for UNESCO, Gandhi’s contribution was inseparable from his larger struggle 
against the institutions and practices of colonialism.  Interestingly, of all the contributors, 
it was Gandhi—the tireless opponent of human suffering and imperial domination—who 
provided the most damning (yet infinitely edifying) social statement of human rights.  
While other contributors provided detailed and lengthy philosophical tomes, Gandhi’s 
three paragraph contribution captured up in a few short sentences all of the social powers 
and illusions of human rights.215 
“I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and 
preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only 
when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental 
statement it is easy enough to define the duties of Man and Woman and correlate 
every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right 
can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.”216 
 
This theme of “duties before rights,” was one that he spoke of long before the 
UDHR was to be drafted (and even before World War I or II), as he fought to secure for 
colonial people, the recognition necessary to have any rights at all. For Gandhi, human 
rights granted or bestowed upon a population by its captors had little, if any, substantive 
meaning.  It was only by acting out the “duties” of a global citizen—and in doing so 
effacing the sovereign boundaries of empire within which brown-skinned human life was 
nothing more than fuel—that a sphere of human inviolability could first emerge.  Any 
other freedom or right—no matter how pious sounding—represented the freedoms and 
rights of others.  For Gandhi, the “sacred trust,” the colonial right of “indirect rule,” and 
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even the “universal” political freedoms outlined in the Atlantic Charter were the very 
“usurpations” that were hardly worth fighting for.217  But was the UDHR or the Covenant 
any different?  Could colonial inhabitants act out Gandhi’s call to become global citizens 
and cross the structural barriers that currently held them as non-entities in international 
law and politically, as silent wards of metropolitan exigencies?  Gandhi was intensely 
ambivalent. 
Indeed, the boundaries, ideologies, and dictates of empire (and now perhaps the 
UN) had all but prevented such duty formation, international recognition, or for that 
matter, a sphere in which a political voice of their own was possible.  And this of course 
was the insidiousness of the imperial project—it prevented colonial subjects from acting 
out the very human rights they apparently possessed.  For Gandhi, the debate between the 
legal positivists and the natural rights theorists was irrelevant.  Within either frame—be it 
through sovereign edict or one’s own inherent dignity—legal bearers of human rights so 
often remained as a matter of social fact, completely rightless.   
 
Smaller and Non-Western States Gain Recognition in the General Assembly 
In many respects the smaller states that opposed colonialism were woefully out-
muscled by Great Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union.  These powerful states 
maintained a disciplined staff of experienced diplomats who were supported by legions of 
analysts, lawyers, and governmental officials at home.  Virtually every major move that 
was made at the United Nations had been extensively researched and vetted before the 
final instructions were transmitted to the United Nations representatives for action.  In 
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addition, a global network of diplomats and foreign officers was in constant contact with 
embassy counterparts, making deals and trading favors ahead of the major decisions at 
the United Nations.  In terms of achieving their agendas, all of this provided the more 
powerful states a major advantage over the smaller states.218  As a political bloc however, 
these smaller states were not powerless.  There was one post-war political innovation that 
seemed to catch many of the larger powers off guard: the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly.   
As a political forum, the General Assembly’s Third Committee—the body 
responsible for debating, voting on and approving the provisions within the UDHR and 
its Covenant(s)—offered a new sense of political equality for the United Nations member 
states.219  Each state had an equal vote and was granted equal opportunity to voice its 
opinions, complaints, and concerns on the official record.  Because other United Nations 
bodies such as the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council were exclusive and non-
representative of the UN’s overall membership, the smaller states made extensive use of 
their positions in the General Assembly—more so than was originally envisioned.220  
Since the official proceedings were matters of public record, the Committee’s debates 
were monitored and reported on by news agencies around the world, and could therefore 
be used to rally public opinion and sway political blocs.  This influenced the political 
dynamic considerably on many issues, as it permitted the smaller, resource-strapped 
states to compete directly with the larger powers such as the United States and Great 
Britain by leveraging public opinion.   
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The tenacity with which the colonial powers fought to hold on to various elements 
of their empires—and in doing so maintain the systemic inequities associated with 
imperialism—helped spur the development of a strong, and vocal anti-colonial bloc in the 
UN.  On such colonial matters the smaller states recognized that their larger adversaries 
were in many ways out of step with an increasingly widespread, progressive public 
sentiment.221  These states seized upon this perceived weakness and broadcast it to the 
world.  In the Third Committee the colonial powers were all but powerless to stem the 
flow of this discomforting anti-colonial discourse.  So during the debates over the 
colonial clause, many of the smaller states—embittered by colonial behavior past and 
present—unleashed torrents of harsh rhetoric against Great Britain’s continued 
opposition to extending human rights to its colonies.  As a State Department memo 
voiced the US’s frustrations in the General Assembly, the smaller states often exhibited 
little “diplomatic restraint” when confronting the larger, more powerful states.   
The smaller state’s tactics in the General Assembly were derided by powers such 
as the US and Great Britain.  For one, their modus operandi did not conform to the 
established political decorum and diplomatic conventions that put Great Britain and the 
US at such an advantage.  So most importantly, it was an effective way to mitigate the 
great disparities in state power.  The US State Department, for example, often expressed 
the difficulties it had in many of the General Assembly debates over human rights. When 
interacting with developing Arab, Asian, Africa, Latin states, a State Department report 
summarized the US delegation’s two major difficulties.  Tinged with the undertones of an 
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assumed racial superiority, this report also unintentionally illustrates the wide social 
divide between the US and “the others.”:  
(1) They generally attend UN meetings without instructions and speak 
idealistically, holding up to Western states western ideals in abstract form, while 
ignoring the inadequacies of their own Governments and countries.  
(2) In matters concerning discrimination, their intensity and emotionalism make it 
next to impossible to reason with them. Many are colored, and those that are not 
feel a close bond to those that are. 222  
 
The State Department also objected that ideals such as equality, freedom from 
oppression, human rights and tolerance of racial and cultural difference were “employed 
by a majority of ex-colonial and economically backward peoples in an emotional and 
frequently reckless campaign in GA committees.”223  The Third Committee could 
certainly be a difficult place to implement an agenda—particularly if that agenda was 
contrary to prevailing interests.  It was a place that John Humphrey said lacked 
“inhibitions,” and was replete with “bad manners, bad temper, fake points of order, 
irrelevant speeches and ambitious men who wanted to play a role in the international 
arena.”224 Accordingly, when dealing with drafting issues related to colonialism, it was 
generally in Great Britain’s and the US’s interests to make as much progress as possible 
in the smaller Commission on Human Rights (which included building a strong coalition 
of support and squashing unfavorable proposals), before taking the matter to the more 
representative General Assembly.225  
This, however, is precisely what happened when the Commission on Human 
Rights reached a deadlock over whether to support the British proposal or the Soviet 
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proposal on the colonial clause.  Given the mutually exclusivity of these proposals, a 
compromise solution was virtually impossible).226  So the commission—urged by various 
unnamed members—decided to put the matter before a broader and more representative 
forum for discussion.227 
 
Social Meaning is Given to Colonial Clause and Human Rights By Smaller and Non-
Western States 
 
It was now the fall of 1950.  Since the founding of the United Nations, a handful 
of new members had been admitted (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Israel, Indonesia, 
Iceland, Yemen, Sweden, and Thailand), influencing the political dynamics of the 
General Assembly.228  During this next round of debates the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly discussed the colonial clause at length.229  Fueled by the unrelenting 
position taken by the colonial powers, the anti-colonial rhetoric reached a boiling point 
over several weeks of bitter deliberations.   
This session was certainly full of bad manners, bad tempers, and ambitious men—
all wonderful for capturing the attention of the media.  Indeed, the colonial issue at this 
session of the General Assembly garnered much attention by major news outlets.  And 
this was of course part of the strategy—one that Great Britain and the US had little ability 
to control.  So when the Soviet representatives made inflammatory remarks about the 
US’s colonial credentials or how Great Britain, France and Belgium were failing to live 
up to their responsibilities with respect to their dependencies, the papers were there to 
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report on it.230  While this of course has become standard practice in international 
politics, for the former colonial territories that just a few years before had virtually no 
international recognition, this was a major shift (and as State Department records 
indicate, a constant source of irritation for the US).231 
The colonial powers outlined their reasons for supporting the colonial clause 
which tended to repeat the same arguments that had been used over the past several years.  
Both Great Britain and France for example, argued that to not have a colonial clause 
would be a great disadvantage to their dependencies since, as Lord MacDonald from the 
UK said, the colonies would “find themselves deprived of the right to decide” if they 
wanted to accept the Covenant or not.  Attempting to turn the argument back on his 
opponents, he followed up by saying that the “opponents of the colonial clause would 
therefore seem to be illogical since they demanded autonomy for the peoples of the non-
self governing territories while at the same time denying them the right to decide for 
themselves.”232 When it was turn for the United States delegation to voice their reasons 
for supporting the colonial clause, Eleanor Roosevelt attempted to balance all of the 
competing interests while exposing the US as little as possible to the charge of being a 
“colonial power.”  She told the General Assembly that unlike Great Britain, the United 
States was not obligated by its internal laws to have a colonial clause in the text of the 
Covenant. The US, delegation was, however, “aware of the constitutional difficulties that 
might be encountered by certain States in that connexion [sic], and would therefore 
support the inclusion of a colonial clause in the draft covenant.”233 In this way, the US 
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boiled the issue down to a legal obligation unique to the colonial powers, distanced the 
US from its peculiarities (and colonialism altogether), while offering support for an ally 
that would do the same for the US while it argued for its federal state clause.  
Each of these positions, was slammed by the members of smaller states.  Menon 
from India, for instance, called upon the first hand experience of the former British 
colony.  She correctly argued that the colonial clause would be a way for the colonial 
powers to maintain their ability (through force of human rights law) to “impose their will 
upon” their dependencies.  It was specifically in the colonies-- where people subjected to 
generations of abuse—specifically needed human rights.234  Kayali of Syria—another 
representative from a former colonial territory—warned the General Assembly to not be 
fooled by those colonial powers “posing as champions of non-self governing  
countries…Their only purpose, of course, was to prevent the application of the covenant 
on human rights to colonial territories.”235  Pazhwak of Afghanistan said that his 
delegation regarded colonialism as a flagrant violation of the most sacred rights of the 
individual. In depriving peoples of their rights to govern themselves, colonial powers 
often violated the right to life and liberty and many other fundamental rights of the 
individual.”236  The Cuban representative, used the very composition of the General 
Assembly to bolster what he saw as the “most eloquent argument in favor of rejecting the 
colonial clause”: the presence “at the committee table of the representatives of countries 
which had once been Non-Self-Governing Territories.”237 
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At the conclusion of the debates on the colonial clause on October 27, 1950, 
participating states were permitted to submit their own draft resolutions.238  In light of the 
discussions, the Philippine and Syrian delegations submitted a jointly authored draft 
resolution that, similar to the Soviet proposal, stated in unequivocal terms that the 
Covenant would apply to all territories (non-self-governing, trust, or colonial) that were 
administered by a metropolitan signatory.239  The Delegate of the Philippines did not 
mince his words when stating the purpose of the resolution: it was to “do away once and 
for all with the so-called colonial clause which constituted a constant source of irritation, 
as well as of embarrassment for the colonial powers.”  The resolution not only advocated 
for an important shift in international law, if accepted, it would also be instrumental in 
bringing it about.  Mendez of the Philippines continued, “…a new concept had arisen in 
public international law—that the individual could be the subject of international law. 
The benefits of the covenant should therefore be extended to human beings 
everywhere…From the moral viewpoint the inhabitants of the dependent territories were 
clearly as much entitled to the enjoyment of human rights as anyone else.”240 
By 1950, the normative tide had turned.  Not only was the decolonization process 
undeniably underway, the membership of the United Nations—as represented in the 
General Assembly—had ratcheted up the anti-colonial sentiment.  To the extent that this 
mood had been reflected before in the Commission on Human Rights the limited 
composition of the body had enabled the colonial powers to keep the colonial clause 
alive.  However, in the Third Committee of the General Assembly the colonial powers 
took a political beating and were now faced with an emerging conception of law that 
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undercut the foundations of their colonial law and ideology.  The anti-colonial states had 
used the forum to their advantage by focusing their efforts on waging a war of public 
opinion.  For the major news outlets reporting on the United Nations, the inflammatory 
language and heated political conflict was excellent material.  Indeed, during the General 
Assembly meetings of 1950, the major newspapers in the United States printed scores of 
articles covering United Nations events.241  It appeared as if the smaller and non-Western 
states had begun to carve out a political sphere for themselves where they could challenge 
the more powerful states and define for themselves their own social meanings of the 
human rights they were fighting for.   
Though unsuccessful, the attempt to incorporate the colonial clause into the main 
body of the Covenant colored much of the drafting process.  In response to the persistent 
attempts to integrate the inequities of the colonial relationship into the framework of the 
nascent human rights concept, the anti-colonial states fought (successfully) for the 
explicit mention of the “Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories” and the inclusion of 
the right to self-determination.  Both now enjoy pride of place in the very first article of 
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  So even in its absence, the colonial 
clause (and the underlying social struggles), was an extremely formative element in the 
overall development of the Covenants.
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Chapter 5 




The United Nations General Assembly—particularly its Third Committee—
provided smaller states a place to raise issues and wage debates (often times against the 
wishes of the more powerful states) that would have been impossible just a few years 
before.  Accordingly, representatives of the smaller states and non-Western states took 
every opportunity to use the forum extensively, often raising issues their colleagues from 
the more powerful states would have rather left alone.  One such issue that merged the 
matters of race and colonialism became a matter of international concern in the summer 
of 1946 when India filed a complaint with the UN about the discriminatory treatment of 
Indian workers in South Africa.242  As one of the first major international conflicts at the 
United Nations, India’s complaint effectively internationalized an issue that for hundreds 
of years had been considered a private colonial matter.   
When the South Africa issue came to debate at the UN, the United Kingdom and 
the United States could only sit uncomfortably as Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the Indian 
representative, gave a passionate and stirring speech condemning South Africa’s racial 
policies.  Though India could not match the power and influence of states such as the UK 
and the US, what Pandit could leverage was what she referred to as the “bar of world 
 
242 Filed on June 22, 1946. 
 
opinion.”FP243 PF  As opposed to offering the “legal and meticulous arguments” that were 
typically favored by more powerful states, India’s strategy was to leverage international 
public opinion and call upon the “nations of the world” in “defense of the law, ethics and 
morality.”244 
As states such as the Philippines, Panama, and the USSR joined India’s side, Sir 
Hartley Shawcross of the UK, sought to squash the entire debate on the issue by arguing 
that Pandit’s concerns were out of place in the present forum of the General Assembly.  
Shawcross, who was then trying war criminals as the lead British prosecutor at the 
Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal, attempted to remove the issue of race from the 
political forum of the General Assembly.245  Joined by states such as the United States, 
Belgium, and Canada, and South Africa, who no doubt worried about establishing the 
precedent that such mattes were fair game in the new General Assembly, Shawcross 
argued for the issue to be taken up behind the closed doors of the International Court of 
Justice, where the court would only focus on legal issues and be insulated from such 
appeals to public opinion.246  In this way, many of the less powerful states at the UN used 
the General Assembly as an international political forum to voice their opinions and 
define issues of importance to them.   
 
Racial Issues in the United States enter the International Arena 
Because the paths leading to racial justice and equality were all but blocked in the 
US, many black advocacy groups during this period, like Pandit, focused their efforts on 
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internationalizing their social struggle.  By joining the global populations that faced 
similar discrimination, these groups also sought to use the United Nations as a political 
venue.  Broadly defined as pan-Africanism, this involved reaching out to other oppressed 
populations of color around the world who were fighting concurrent battles against racial 
discrimination.247   
One method undertaken by such groups was to submit petitions to the UN 
outlining the US’s systemic practices of segregation, discrimination and racial violence.  
If enough pressure could be leveraged on the United States and the international human 
rights treaty making process it was engaged in, they reasoned, these international treaties 
could lead the way towards substantive racial equality at home.  In the summer of 1946, 
for instance, the National Negro Congress unveiled a petition that was to be submitted to 
the UN entitled, A Petition to the United Nations on Behalf of 13 Million Oppressed 
Negro Citizens of the United States of America.  This resource-strapped, advocacy 
group’s effort to bring the petition before the world’s eyes, however, was hampered by 
the UN’s onerous policies that required petitioners to thoroughly document actual 
violations.  Nevertheless, this strategy was part of a growing effort to effect local changes 
by appealing to international audiences.  In their words, US discrimination was not only 
“domestic in character… and was far more than an internal problem.”248 
Understanding that race relations were an obvious sore-spot for the US in its 
foreign relations, W.E.B. Du Bois and the NAACP soon thereafter built upon the efforts 
of the National Negro Congress.  In October of 1947 they submitted to the UN an aptly-
worded petition entitled, An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human 
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Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of 
America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress.  Walter White of the NAACP 
said that the petition was capitalizing on the great opportunity by “lifting the struggle of 
the Negro” out of the “local and national setting and placing it in the realm of the 
international.”249  In this way they hoped to use the negative publicity generated by such 
a report as a lever of domestic change from outside of the United States. 
It was not just advocacy groups and former colonial states that were connecting 
local and global matters surrounding race.  In the United States, legislators, foreign 
diplomats, the State Department, and Truman, himself all felt the international pressures 
that arose from the US’s own racial policies and practices. Though this phenomenon has 
only recently been studied in depth by historians, these linkages quickly became critical 
issues for the US on multiple fronts.250   
In the years following the War, the domestic and foreign presses often reported on 
the staggering brutality of race relations in the world’s most powerful and prosperous 
nation.  This, the Truman Administration began to realize, posed significant issues for its 
diplomats. A US diplomat in India, for example, relayed his concern to the US over the 
Indian press calling the treatment of African Americans “shameful” and a “blot” on the 
US.251  From 1945 to 1947, the London Times carried many articles about lynchings and 
other race problems in the United States.252  British diplomats worried to their US 
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counterparts that such stories would be excellent propaganda items for the communist 
bloc states to use against the US (and by association its allies).253  Acting Secretary of 
State, Dean Acheson wrote to the Fair Employment Practice Committee that it is “quite 
obvious…that the existence of discriminations against minority groups in the United 
States is a handicap in our relations with other countries. The Department of State, 
therefore, has good reason to hope for the continued and increased effectiveness of public 
and private efforts to do away with these discriminations.”254     
Within the United States, some lawmakers also embraced the international 
dimensions of domestic racial issues—not just in their political rhetoric—but in their 
actual proposed legislation.  For instance, on March 27, 1947 two bills were introduced to 
both chambers of Congress to prohibit discrimination in employment based on “race, 
religion, color, national origin, or ancestry.”255  Importantly, they contained verbiage that 
used the various human rights obligations imposed by the UN Charter as a reason for the 
civil rights legislation. Subsection (c) of the House bill read:   
“(c) This act has also been enacted as a step toward fulfillment of the international 
treaty obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations upon the United 
States as a signatory thereof to promote universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. (d) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States 
to protect the right recognized and declared in subdivision (b) hereof and to 
eliminate all such discrimination to the fullest extent permitted by the 
Constitution. This act shall be construed to effectuate such policy.”256  
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NJ: Princeton University Press. (esp. Chapter 3). 
256 93 Cong. Rec. A2554 1947. 
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The attrition rate for bills in Congress is quite high, with most dying silently in 
committee (as did these).  So while too much should not be read into such legislative 
proposals in terms of their legal standing, such referencing of race and international law 
is highly significant since the language of such bills is not at all chosen by chance.  These 
bills frame racial discrimination as both a domestic and an international matter.  Within 
their texts, there is a claim that US citizens have a right to be free from racial 
discrimination.  These bills also state that the US—as a member of the UN—has an 
affirmative duty to guarantee that its citizens in fact remain free from racial 
discrimination.  As discussed in previous chapters, recognizing this rights-duties nexus is 
imperative for actualizing, implementing, and enforcing any such rights principles.  
Without named duty holders that are accountable by force of law, rights principles largely 
remain at the normative and discursive levels.  In this sense, the type of language within 
such bills represented a possible legal sea change for the United States.  While Truman, 
the State Department and its foreign diplomats recognized a need (but not a duty) to 
improve domestic race relations at the service of pragmatic political concerns, these bills 
leveraged the force of international and domestic law to establish an affirmative duty on 
the part of the US government. 
Legislators often use the text of bills as signaling devices—ways to curry favor 
with various constituencies by showing that a representative supports a shared cause.  
This means that bills are often drafted with the knowledge that even in the event that it 
becomes law, there is a strong likelihood that relevant sections will be amended or struck 
from the bill entirely.  This does not in any way, however, mean that such provisions are 
not important.  A legislator exposes herself politically when supporting such an issue and 
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will resist incorporating inflammatory or unpopular provisions that can be used by 
opponents.  Amazingly, at the time, referencing such international legal obligations to 
override entrenched domestic racial practices was perceived as being not nearly as 
politically perilous as it has now become in domestic politics 60 years later.  This 
contemporary reality is in part an outcome of this very social struggle.257   
Similar themes were present in To Secure These Rights—a 178 page report issued 
in October of 1947 by the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.  A major aspect of this 
report linked the domestic issue of racism and discrimination with broader international 
issues such as the push for human rights at the United Nations.  This report maintained 
that matters typically treated as “local issues”—such as discrimination, lynching, and 
voting problems were not local issues, or even national matters—have serious 
repercussions that “echo from one end of the globe to the other.”258  It argued that the 
US’s international standing would deteriorate with domestic racial violations.259 This also 
affected the US’s diplomacy efforts.   
“Similarly, interference with the right of a qualified citizen to vote locally cannot 
today remain a local problem. An American diplomat cannot forcefully argue for 
free elections in foreign lands without meeting the challenge that in many sections 
of America qualified voters do not have free access to the polls.”260 
 
                                                 
257 In the coming years the mood shifted dramatically.  For example, less than twenty years later, the 
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not mention the words “treaty” “human rights,” or “United 
Nations,” or any sources of law beyond the US Constitution.  The one place that international matters were 
referenced in Civil Rights Act was in Title VII.  Here, its ban on unlawful discriminatory employment 
practices was deemed to not apply to employment actions taken against members and associates of 
communist organizations. 
258 “To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights,” 1947, at 100-101. 
259 Id. at 98-101, 146-148.  
260 Id. at 101.  The Alabama voters’ ballot during this period included a drawing of the Democrat’s 
mascot—a rooster—and the motto: “White Supremacy.” See Time Magazine, “National Affairs: Tom in the 
Fight,” Monday, Oct. 20, 1952.  Also see “Is This What They Mean by Civil Rights?” In Cornell Political 
Americana Collection, Political Cartoons, 1952.  
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Whether such rhetoric was earnest and substantive, merely window dressing, or 
political bargaining chips that were never really expected to succeed, is important, though 
only a minor part of the overall story.  Either way, they existed within the parameters of 
acceptable public discourse (though only for the moment). The noble sounding rhetoric 
upon which the US often gave reason and justification for its international agenda were 
hollow as long as stories and images of lynchings continued to flow in the press.  
Towards the end of 1947, this was excellent fuel for the communist bloc’s campaign to 
brand the US as a “colonial power.”  Because racial discrimination was fundamentally a 
colonial matter in the mind of colonial dependencies, smaller and non-Western states, the 
US needed to take proactive steps to dispute this label and make the US seem like a 
progressive supporter of liberty, rather than a regressive oppressor.  So when Truman 
spoke to international radio audiences, for instance, saying that the United States’ case 
for representative forms of government and freedom around the world rested on 
“practical evidence that we have been able to put our own house in order,” this was the 
sort of thing he was speaking of.261 
The moral aspects of racial discrimination were a major concern for the United 
States’ foreign policy.  But at the time, one would be hard pressed to find a nation that 
did not have its own problems of discrimination. New Zealand and Australia had their 
problems with their indigenous populations, the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
states had their gulags, pogroms, and entrenched anti-Semitism, India its caste system, 
and so forth.262  So what had the US in a difficult spot was not merely the presence of 
                                                 
261  "Truman's Address" June 29,1947 speech, Crisis, July 1947:200. Cited in Borstlemann, Thomas. 1993. 
Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle, at 558. 
262 Gross, Jan T. Fear: Anti-semitism in Poland After Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation. 
New York: Random House, 2006. 
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discrimination within its own borders, it was the social meaning that the international 
community was attaching to it.  This social meaning (a social reality, in fact), was one 
that had been lived for centuries by those in former and existing colonies.  It was one that 
viewed racism and colonialism as inseparable.  Colonialism was becoming a liability not 
just for Great Britain, but for the US as well.  Ironically, back in the US, colonialism was 
the last thing on the minds of the Southern segregationists.            
The one thing that the segregationists could reliably count on was their filibuster.  
The filibuster had been used to block all federal civil rights legislation since 1875.263  In 
addition to lynching—which was the most horrific example of the broader white 
supremacist policies of the South—the southern senators also blocked anti-poll tax bills 
in 1942, 1944, 1946, and 1948, as well as fair employment bills in 1946 and 1950.264  
Any human rights treaty that attempted to alter US laws on race was all but certain to be 
rejected by the Senate.     
 
Deliberation at the United Nations: The US and the Federal State Clause 
The principle of non-discrimination was a foundational human right that was sure 
to be a part of any international human rights treaty.  Even the UN Charter, which offered 
only the most basic and vague definition of human rights, incorporated the idea of non-
discrimination, mentioning the need to respect and observe human rights and 
                                                 
263 Maslow, Will, and Joseph B. Robison. 1953. "Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-
1952." The University of Chicago Law Review 20 (3):363-413, at 382, 404. For example, between 1921 and 
1948 the following anti-lynching bills, each varying in small details, were introduced but never passed:  
H.R. 13, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); H.R. 1, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924); S. 121, 69th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1927); S. 1978, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (I934); S. 24, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935); H.R. 1507, 75th Cong., 1st 
sess. (1937); H.R. 2251, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937); H.R. 800, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940); H.R. 5673, 
80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948); S. 2860, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948), (list of bills provided by Harvey, William 
B. 1949. "Anti-Lynching Legislation." Michigan Law Review 47 (3):369-77, at 370.  For a discussion of 
many more legislative actions surrounding race that were blocked, see generally Ford, William D. 1948. 
"Constitutionality of Proposed Federal Anti-Lynching Legislation." Virginia Law Review 34 (8):944-53.  
264 Maslow and Robison (1953:400). 
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fundamental freedoms for all without “distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” 
four times.265  With over a third of the US Senate sure to reject a treaty containing an 
enforceable non-discrimination clause, early on in the drafting process the US devised a 
pre-emptive strategy that it hoped would preserve its international standing by allowing it 
to at least offer nominal support for human rights while allowing it to pass with the 
Senate’s approval at home.  This strategy involved placing a federal state clause, in the 
Covenant.  The US introduced the first version of this federal state clause on November 
26, 1947.  The proposed federal state clause read:  
“In the case of a Federal State, the following provisions shall apply: (a) With 
respect to any article which the Federal Government regards as wholly or in part 
appropriate for Federal action, the obligations of the Federal Government shall, to 
this extent, be the same as those of parties which are not Federal States;  (b) In 
respect of articles which the Federal Government regards as appropriate under its 
constitutional system, in whole or in part, for action by the constituent states, 
provinces or cantons, the Federal Government shall bring such provisions to the 
notice of the appropriate authorities of the states, provinces or cantons” 
(E/CN.4/37/p.6-7).266 
 
The main argument put forth by the US delegation in support of the federal state 
clause was that the federal government could not take responsibility for all potential 
matters that were covered by the Convention— it “could not dictate to the Governments 
of the various federated States the course of action they should take” in all such 
matters.267  The legal impact of the proposed federal state clause was that under 
                                                 
265 UN Charter, Articles 1, 13, 55, 76.  
266 This US proposal was introduced just two weeks prior to Great Britain’s introduction of its colonial 
clause.  
267 UN Doc A/C.6/SR.201.  The use of the federal state clause was not entirely unprecedented. Previously, 
the United States had proposed (unsuccessfully) for its inclusion in the Convention on the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (UN Doc A/C.3/L.13, p.3). The 
only other treaty under the UN framework that contained a federal state clause was the Constitution of the 
International Labor Organization of 1946.  The federal state clause in the ILO Constitution however, 
contained five subparagraphs making the mechanism of application much more explicit.  For discussions 
 134
 
paragraph A, if a particular article of the treaty was determined (by the state, itself) to lie 
within its federal jurisdiction, the obligations of the signatory federal state were no 
different than the obligations of non-federal states.  
The federal state clause, however, “kicked in” when the signatory state 
determined a particular article of the treaty was a jurisdictional matter for its constituent 
states (such as racial segregation in the US).  In this case, the federal government was not 
responsible for exercising authority over the states.  Instead, it was only to inform the 
states about potentially relevant articles in the treaty.  For practical purposes, the federal 
state clause would have done absolutely nothing to combat the discrimination, 
segregation, and lynchings in the United States since such issues were already determined 
to lie within the purview of states’ rights.  The only thing the federal government could 
do was bring the Covenant(s) to the attention of the states.  In other words, with a federal 
state clause in place, nothing would change. 
When the matter was debated at the UN, for many of the delegations, the 
hypocrisy of creating a human rights treaty that permitted lynchings was a moral 
disgrace.  It also put the US in the dubious company of the colonial powers that were 
similarly pushing for a very unpopular colonial clause.268  But in the event that any party 
in the Commission on Human Rights failed to appreciate the practical consequences of 
the federal state clause, Borisov of the Soviet delegation was quick to spell it out with 
deliberate frankness: “The lynchings of Negroes in the United States is the most horrible 
crime of civilization,” he began.  He continued by saying that Daniels, the US 
representative in the Sub-commission, only wanted to “protect his right to discriminate 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the federal state clause, also see Looper, Robert B. 1955. “Federal State Clauses in Multi-Lateral 
Instruments.” British Yearbook of International Law 32:162-203. 
268 See previous chapter. 
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against Negroes.”269  The Soviet delegation proposed its own article, which, as was the 
case during the “colonial clause” debates, represented the polar opposite of the US’s—
intended not to supplement, but to negate.  The article, which was introduced first in the 
Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities on November 28th read:270 
“All people are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal rights in the economic,  
cultural, social and political life, irrespective of their race, sex, language, religion, 
property status, national or social origin. Any advocacy of national racial and 
religious hostility or of national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, as well as 
any action establishing a privilege or a discrimination based on distinctions of 
race, nationality, or religion, constitute a crime and shall be punishable under the 
law of the State.”271  
 
The Soviet delegation came to these debates heavily armed with damning 
evidence of the US’s racial problems.  At one point during these meetings, the US 
delegation was even forced to concede that it had been out-muscled by the extent of 
Borisov’s knowledge.  After being pummeled with a barrage of unpleasant evidentiary 
support, Daniels, the US representative, could only reply that he was not an expert in the 
affairs of the Soviet Union and could not “review the situation as thoroughly as Mr. 
Borisov had done” with respect to the United States.”272  As a result of these discussions, 
the members of the sub-commission voted to explore the Soviet proposal in-depth.273  
Rounding out his performance, Borisov argued strongly for the UN to include both the 
NAACP’s and the National Negro Congress’ petitions on its agenda to help continue the 
mounting Soviet propaganda attack against the US. 
                                                 
269 See Anderson 2003:109-12 for part of this story.  
270 “Soviets Blast US Lynchings,” The Chicago Defender, Dec 6, 1947, pg. 1. 
271 UN Doc E/CN.Sub.2/21.  Also see CN.4/Sub.2/SR.15-18. 
272 Intolerance Crime Issue in U.N. Group. Special to The New York Times; Nov 29, 1947, pg. 2. 
273 “Intolerance Crime Issue in U.N. Group,” Special to The New York Times, Nov 29, 1947, pg. 2. 
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Just a few weeks later Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris suggested that 
the Soviet proposal be discussed in the full Commission on Human Rights (rather than its 
sub-commission).274  Eleanor Roosevelt immediately objected to the proposal citing the 
difficulties a federal state like the US would have with the enforcement of such a law.  As 
an example (and no doubt eager to move the conversation away from race), she argued 
that the failure of the prohibition law in the US was evidence of the difficulties a federal 
government encounters when attempting to control the behavior of its constituent states. 
A focused Bogomolov, brought the issue right back to race and replied that without such 
an article, the “lynching of negroes would continue”).275 While the Soviet Union was 
stoking the fire, the US hoped to ease tensions by making the draft Federal State Clause 
as palatable-sounding as possible while retaining its overall impact.  Thus minor changes 
were made to its text. The changes (in italics) read:  
In respect of articles which the Federal Government regards as appropriate under 
its constitutional system, in whole or in part, for action by the constituent states, 
provinces or cantons, the Federal Government shall bring such provisions, with 
favorable recommendations, to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the 
states, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment.”276   
 
 
The NAACP’s International Strategy Dies 
If the purpose of the NAACP’s petition, An Appeal to the World, was to bring the 
lynchings, institutionalized segregation and racial injustices to the attention of the UN, its 
petition was a success. But after the meetings at the UN, Daniels had no polite words for 
the NAACP’s international petition strategy.  To the consternation of the US delegation, 
                                                 
274 Anderson, Carol. 2003. Eyes off the Prize, at 131. 
275 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.34, p.10-11, December 12, 1947. 
276 For the progression of these textual changes see UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.8, p.15; UN Doc E.CN.4/56; 
UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.42, p.41; and also see UN Doc E/800, Art, 24. 
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the communist bloc had used the NAACP’s report for its own battle against the US.  For 
the NAACP’s petition strategy, things were becoming perilous.  By the end of the year 
even Eleanor Roosevelt, an ally and board member of the NAACP, had decided that her 
support for the organization had limits.  Going to the UN with its petition, she believed, 
had been a major mistake.  In a clear signal that would effectively end the NAACP’s 
human rights petition strategy, Roosevelt submitted a letter of resignation threatening to 
resign from its board.  Though she later agreed not to quit the board, the repercussions of 
this episode were lasting.  The NAACP was on notice—its important relationship with 
Roosevelt could not withstand another public relations debacle.  At this most critical 
moment of human rights formation the UN was essentially off limits for the NAACP.277 
The diverging aims of the black advocacy groups and the US State Department 
were quite apparent.  The NAACP’s strategy was to reveal the truth about domestic race 
relations, while the US strategy was to conceal it from its adversaries.  The NAACP’s 
goal was to gain substantive rights for black Americans, while the US strategy was to 
settle for nominal support of human rights.  On this last point, in a 1947 memo to Walter 
White, Du Bois wrote that the problem with human rights was “not the lack of pious 
statements, but the question as to what application is made of them and what is to be done 
when human rights are denied in the face of law and declarations.”278  But Du Bois 
underestimated the US’s predicament, for soon, under the weight of Southern opposition, 





                                                 
277 Anderson, Carol. 2003. Eyes off the Prize, at 112, also see generally, pp. 109-112. 
278 W.E.B. Du Bois to Walter White, memo, November 24, 1947, cited by Anderson (2003:105).  
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Activities in the International Arena Challenge Domestic Practices in the US 
On December 10, 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  The fact that the world community could come together 
and agree upon a statement of moral principles seemed to show that the UN—this 
“experiment in world cooperation—was surely working.279  Riding the celebratory wake 
of this international accomplishment, President Truman signed the Genocide Convention 
the very next day, signaling that the United States government was ready to ratify this 
treaty.  Even more so than the non-binding UDHR, this enforceable treaty against 
genocide gave credence to the notion that the international community would actually act 
on its promises.  For the moment, the prospect of an enforceable covenant to go along 
with the UDHR appeared to be close at hand.  But tugging at the seams of the supposedly 
“united” nations was the matter of race.  For as seemingly unassailable as the 
criminalization of genocide would seem, racial bigotry prevented ratification of the 
Genocide Convention in the Senate.280   
The Genocide Convention was of immediate concern to certain powerful 
members of the legal and political establishment within the US for several reasons.  For 
many members of the American Bar Association and the Senate—especially Southern 
Democrats—it was an unprecedented overreaching of international law that threatened 
not only US sovereignty, but state sovereignty vis-à-vis the US federal government (i.e 
“states’ rights”).  Moreover, for those with preexisting isolationist sentiments, with Cold 
War tensions rising, all things international came to be associated with communism and 
                                                 
279 Chamberlin, William Henry. A Look at the United Nations.  Wall Street Journal; Dec 26, 1946; pg. 4. 
280 The US, however, was not alone: In 1947 Great Britain resolved to oppose the Convention on Genocide, 
and if unsuccessful in that venture, to use delay tactics to stall its creation indefinitely (Lauren 1988:196).  
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socialism (these issues are discussed in subsequent chapters).  But it was the issue of race 
that was central.  
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (the Genocide Convention) defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”281  Given the 
systemic discrimination and violence against African Americans, many of these 
subparagraphs were worrying for some Southerners.  While the Truman administration 
made it clear that no activities that were taking place in the US would or could be tried 
under the Convention, it did seem to many that there might be an argument for it.282  The 
fact that the Convention actually had “teeth”—“persons committing genocide or any of 
the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (Art.4)—was of 
even greater concern.283   
There were numerous instances of opposition to the Genocide Convention in the 
United States.  For example, after the American Bar Association released its formal 
resolution stating that the US should not ratify the Genocide Convention until it could be 
further studied, its president, Frank Holman, followed up with his own campaign. As an 
outspoken opponent of international treaties and human rights laws, Holman played 
strongly upon prejudice, fear, and blatant racism to rally opponents.  Holman for 
example, in 1949 wrote that the Genocide Convention opened a “Pandora’s Box” of 
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individual crimes that US citizens could be charged with.  Segregating troops in the 
National Guard (a practice he apparently had no qualms with) could be considered 
genocide; authorities who kill African Americans while  “attempting honestly to 
suppress” a race riot could be charged with “complicity in genocide”; an organization 
that advocates birth control: genocide; a white motorist who accidently kills an African 
American: genocide.284       
 
Domestic Resistance Highlights the Social Consequences of International Treaties 
In 1949, there was much that had been written by lawyers, political scientists and 
legal specialists about the implications of international treaty law.  But it was the series of 
editorials in the New Orleans States newspaper, written by William Fitzpatrick that 
provided some of the most diligently researched and methodically argued statements 
outlining the social consequences of such treaties that was written for a broad audience.  
Fitzpatrick assumed the role of city editor of the paper when his predecessor, F. Edward 
Hebert vacated the position after being elected to the US House of Representatives.  
Were it not for Hebert, it is quite likely that Fitzpatrick’s ideas would have never had the 
chance to reach beyond the limited readership of his local paper.285  
Representative Hebert was a Southern conservative who championed the causes 
of segregation and state’s rights.  He referred to himself as one of the last 
“unreconstructed rebels.”286 According to Carson, his “world view was framed by four 
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basic tenets: defense of Southern racism and of states' rights, fierce anti-communism, 
super patriotism, and enthusiastic support of the American military.”287  Importantly, 
Hebert also shared Fitzpatrick’s disdain for international treaty law.  On a number of 
occasions, Hebert extolled the virtue and insight of Fitzpatrick’s editorials before his 
Congressional colleagues, urging them to read his articles and to take the necessary 
legislative actions to prevent racial integration through treaty.  He also reprinted over a 
dozen of Fitzpatrick’s articles opposing international human rights treaties, as well as the 
text of several of his speeches in the Congressional Record.  
But it was Fitzpatrick (who apparently shared Hebert’s predilections and 
prejudices) who deserves the credit for translating the technical legal provisions and the 
abstract principles of international law into the language and substance of American 
social relations.  The difficulty with extracting evidence of racism from public materials 
is that the speakers so often employ coded prose that have double meanings or alternate 
(and acceptable, if not pious sounding) interpretations to fall back upon if pressed. 
Hebert, for instance, praised Fitzpatrick’s contribution, by saying that international 
human rights might appear noble and laudable, but are in reality “an insidious and 
destructive force, which, in the ultimate, will destroy the very thing we seek to 
preserve—our American way of life.”  The latter phrase was purposefully ambiguous.  It 
referenced a picket-fence, Norman Rockwell-style vision of Americana that also stood 
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for state’s rights, segregation, and Southern justice. “Disaster lurks near us,” he grimly 
warned the members of Congress, “it is important that we be made fully cognizant of that 
impending disaster.”288 
In Fitzpatrick’s editorials, however, there is no need to parse his prose for 
evidence of racism. Using the UDHR as an indicator of the nature of the rights that would 
follow in the enforceable covenant, Fitzpatrick, warned that the latter, if adopted, “would 
strike down laws of many States and social customs of wide acceptance among the 
people.”289  First, it would affect immigration.  Article 14 (1) of the UDHR states that 
“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”  
If this provision were part of a covenant, he argued, it would “open the gates wide” to 
people from all over the world to come live in the United States.   
Second, Article 16 (1) of the UDHR which covers the right to marry “without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion,” would prohibit anti-miscegenation laws. 
Fitzpatrick argued that “There are on the statute books of 29 States, laws forbidding 
miscegenation or marriage between different races. In most other States which do not by 
law ban such unions, the social customs of the people forbid it.”  So that those who 
resided in such states could understand that the UDHR affected them, he listed each.290  
To drive this point home, and place the implications in a more private context of the 
family, he argued that these provisions, not only alter existing laws governing marriage 
and racial mixing, but fundamentally alter the basic structures of parental authority in the 
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American family.  “Should any mother try to prevent the marriage of her child because of 
objections to a suitor on racial, national, or religious grounds, that parent would be 
answerable to an international court of human rights,” and would be found “guilty of 
incitement to discrimination.”291  Finally, he argued, that the principle of non-
discrimination which figures prominently in the UDHR, would, if incorporated into an 
enforceable covenant, “obliterate” the segregation laws of seventeen states and the 
District of Columbia, while impairing the six additional states that give discretionary 
powers to their school boards to segregate.292  For his efforts (and perhaps his 
connections) Fitzpatrick would later receive a Pulitzer Prize for his editorials opposing 
international human rights treaties.293   
Updating the longstanding arguments supporting institutionalized Southern 
racism to include international elements was a new trend.294  Fitzpatrick leveraged a 
complex of ready-made ideas, laws, and political connections to help defeat the 
international treaty laws that threatened the version of social ordering they prized. His 
editorials for example, brandished familiar rhetoric about states’ rights and the limits of 
the law—only now the agents forcing change came from the United Nations.  Most 
importantly, though, influential voices of opposition often had strong social and political 
connections at the highest levels.  In this way, the social implications of human rights 
treaties were sounded out for audiences that actually controlled the treaty making 
                                                 
291 95 Cong. Rec. A1927, 1949. 
292 He lists the former grouping as including:  Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and  
West Virginia.  The latter grouping of six states included: Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico, New 
York, and Wyoming. 
293 See Pulitzer Prize Editorials: America's best writing, 1917-2003, eds. William David Sloan, Laird B. 
Anderson.  
294 Lewis, George. 2004. The White South and the Red Menace, at 47. 
 144
 
process.  In September, members of the American Bar Association met with members of 
the US Senate and suggested that a better strategy than fighting every international treaty 
in turn, would be to create a constitutional amendment that would prohibit international 
treaties from becoming the “supreme law of the land”—i.e. applicable at both federal and 
state levels.295  The opposition which was now banding together against international 
human rights treaties, was focusing on several well-known issue areas to drive its cause: 
states’ rights, racial segregation, hostility towards social and economic rights, US 
sovereignty, and anti-communism. 
 
Expelling Black Advocacy Groups from the American Nation  
The social implications of the Genocide Convention were rendered through this 
association with lynching.  The latter was a vile an insidious crime that both symbolically 
and in practice prevented African Americans from becoming integrated into the public 
sphere; from voicing opinions or taking actions on their own behalves.  Now, in its 
rejection of the Genocide Treaty (a treaty that took the US another four decades to finally 
ratify), Southern power was asserting itself over the international sphere—the very sphere 
that African Americans had placed their hope.  The places where African Americans 
could possibly live out their rights and create the attachments necessary to achieve their 
own human rights were closing down one by one.   
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Anti-communism was a potent and destructive force of American nationalism.  
Because any link with communism—real or supposed—could be so devastating, charging 
black advocacy groups with communist affiliation became a powerful weapon of the 
white supremacists.296 What was so damaging for all of these groups in this moment of 
anti-communist hysteria, were their actual organizational connections with communism. 
The National Negro Congress and the Civil Rights Congress (two prominent black 
advocacy groups), for example were both open about their communist ties.297 And now 
with their petition strategy at the UN, the NAACP appeared to some to be working more 
with the Soviets than with the Americans in the State Department.  This was more than 
enough ammunition to destroy their efforts at internationalizing their efforts for human 
rights and racial equality. 
The opposition broke down the legitimacy of these private civil society groups, 
enlisted agents of the state to monitor and publicize their communist associations and 
condemn their un-American activities.298  This ruthless campaign (that also captured 
many others in its net), had black groups scrambling to preserve their remaining social 
and political connections.  But the resulting organizational disarray led to infighting, 
conflicting allegiances, and left their human rights strategy ransacked and in a tangle of 
fractured alliances—but most importantly, with no protected sphere from which to repair 
them.  To salvage the remnants of their political projects they were forced to make a 
series of dead-end decisions to prove their Americanism: the former head of the National 
Negro Congress became an FBI informant and downplayed South African racism, while 
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the NAACP tried to duck the charges of un-Americanism by joining the communist 
purges.299  For these African American advocacy groups, these events raised substantial 
doubt about the viability of an international human rights strategy at all, or whose human 
rights they were now fighting for.  As black advocacy organizations were now unable to 
participate in the United Nations and were charged with being anti-American, the spaces 
in which they could define and shape the terms of the emerging human rights concept and 
create the attachments necessary to achieve their own human rights, were lost one by one.   
The tragedy of this episode in the social struggle over race, however, is how systematic 
(and tried) this process of social dislocation already was.  
Around the same time, the Modern Review published an article by the 
philosopher, Hannah Arendt.  She wrote of the inability of international treaties to protect 
minorities who had lost the protection of their governments.  She, however, was not 
speaking about African Americans in the United States, but the stateless minorities in 
interwar Europe, who under the Minority Treaties apparently had rights, but lacked the 
most fundamental human right of all—a guaranteed “place in the world which makes his 
opinions significant and his actions effective.”300  She worried that the ongoing United 
Nations human rights project was similarly continuing to “overlook and neglect the one 
right without which no other can materialize—the right to belong to a political 
community.”301  Once the Jews were stripped of political membership, the preconditions 
for social disaster were set—and finalized, ironically with an idea of right.  Right was 
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what was “good for Germany.”302  What makes this historical parallel so chilling is that 
just a few years after the “final solution” was laid bare for the world to see in all its 
horrific detail, the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was a promise 
the US would not make for its own minority population.  What was right for the 
American people remained an open question. 
 
The US in the International Arena 
Before the General Assembly meetings convened in September of 1950, State 
Department officials met to work through the US’s plan for the Draft of the Covenant on 
Human Rights.303  In light of the US Congress’ refusal to support the Genocide 
Convention it was the general consensus at this meeting that there “was no chance that 
the United States Senate would accept the Covenant without the federal-state clause.”  
And how things were turning out, the State Department officials conceded that “even 
with a federal-state clause there would be difficulties.”304  So despite its great 
unpopularity in the General Assembly, the State Department decided to keep its course.  
They decided, that even with all of the opposition they faced over the clause, to actually 
gain the Senate’s approval to ratify the Covenant, it was a fight they would have to win.  
In General Assembly debate, almost anything was fair game—and even if it was 
not fair game, if mentioned it went on public record.  These dynamics changed the rules 
of international relations substantially. Now smaller states, less powerful by orders of 
magnitude, rivaled the US in political debate.  It was a new type of diplomatic warfare 
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that actually caught State Department officials quite off-guard.305 Though the US 
delegation approached its federal state clause plan with the combination of diplomatic 
dexterity and brute force that it was known for, the public opinion battle had it 
scrambling.   
As indicated by a subsequent State Department report, the US did not fare as well 
as it would have liked in these General Assembly meetings.306   One by one, various 
delegations took turns launching thinly (and not so thinly) veiled barbs at the US.  Azmi 
Bey of Egypt, for example, cryptically suggested that in the US’s federal state clause 
proposal, there was an element of legal “algebra” at play, full of “equations and unknown 
factors.”  Some states or provinces, he speculated, “might perhaps cling to somewhat 
erroneous and outmoded traditional views which were contrary to the principle of the 
equality of all individuals.”  Perhaps, he wondered, there were some “undisclosed 
considerations [that] lie at the root of the federal clause.”307  While he spared the United 
States the explicit mention of the domestic variables that were behind its position, his 
inferences were blunt and without a doubt not lost on anyone at the meeting. 
What the Egyptian delegation might have left to the imagination the Polish 
representative painted in clear and vivid detail. Mr. Altaian used the floor to wonder out 
loud what the consequences would be for the US if the federal state clause was included.  
What if “for example, in the United States of America, such southern states as Georgia, 
Mississippi and South Carolina known for their racial legislation and for their racial 
discrimination would not be obliged to implement the draft covenant when it was of the 
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utmost importance that those states in particular should he bound by that instrument?”308  
His argument—valid, on-point and logically sound—highlighted the Southern racism that 
in such debates had become a perennial thorn in the side of the US delegation. 
The US’s federal state clause was but one of many issue areas that served to 
bolster the Soviet Union’s propaganda line that the US was simply just another colonial 
oppressor.  To honor all of its competing domestic and foreign policy imperatives, the US 
continued to make decisions that put it in an unfavorable light in the international arena.  
For instance, the State Department had just banished NAACP from the United Nations, 
the Senate was sitting on the Genocide Convention, while the US delegation to the UN 
was expending political capital in several other ongoing drafting battles. Its steadfast 
support for Great Britain’s colonial clause (something of a quid pro quo for its own 
federal state clause), as well as its hugely unpopular desire to keep socioeconomic rights 
from the Covenant all conspired to present the US as an uncooperative and disingenuous 
participant in the drafting of the Covenant.309  
At the close of the Third Committee’s 5th session, the State Department provided 
an ex post analysis of the US’s record in the heated debates.  One of the most telling 
passages of the report explains that the opposition the US experienced was in large part 
unexpected: “We had not anticipated the vigor and bitterness of their disagreement with 
United States policies on almost every item.”310  The US was socially and politically out 
of touch with the developing world.  The State Department officials who produced some 
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of the most eloquently written, insightful appraisals of US foreign policy and geopolitics 
were, in this area, remarkably uninformed.  Though on the defensive and in need of Cold 
War allies, the US continued to make policy decisions that distanced itself from much of 
the developing world. 
As outlined in State Department memos and reports, there were now four options: 
(1) join the smaller and non-Western states in their fight against colonialism (which 
would anger its most important NATO allies); (2) join with the “administering powers” 
(which would anger the developing world and endanger those potentially valuable Cold 
War alliances); (3) become a strong advocate of human rights (which would enrage 
domestic opponents and endanger the human rights project altogether); or (4) oppose 
human rights at the UN (and disappoint progressive human rights supporters at home and 
abroad).311 
The fourth option—to walk away from the Covenant if it became too difficult to 
manage—was definitely a serious option. In a fall meeting at the State Department, 
Eleanor Roosevelt said that the Covenant probably could not survive if US dropped it.312  
Because this was no doubt known by the other delegations, the US could drive a hard 
bargain.  There were, however, limits.  A State Department memo reveals that quitting 
the Covenant was actually considered as a serious option (though at this time such a 
solution was not endorsed).  The memo acknowledged that the smaller and non-western 
states in Latin America and the Middle East were extremely serious about creating a 
strong Covenant.  If the US were to withdraw from the Covenant, these geopolitical 
relations would suffer dramatically and “countries unfriendly to the United States, 
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particularly the Soviet bloc, would be presented with a propaganda weapon for use in the 
cold war, which we could expect them to exploit particularly in under-developed 
areas.”313 But nevertheless, as political constraints increased, so too did the possibility of 
the US walking away from the table.  This, however, would prevent the US from taking 
the moral high ground and perhaps even put it in the same camp as the one state that had 
refused to sign the UDHR on account of its own racial issues—South Africa.   
Ironically, the US seemed to be moving closer to South Africa quite well on its 
own.  The need for allies in the Korean War pushed the US closer to South Africa as it 
turned a blind eye to its instituted system Apartheid.314  At the end of 1950, the State 
Department chose a course and outlined its policy directive:  
“…in order to limit the formation of opposing blocs of underdeveloped 
countries and prevent their playing the other highly developed countries 
off against the United States,” the report concluded, “we need particularly 
to try to reduce to an absolute minimum our differences with the United 
Kingdom, the old Dominions, and the Western European countries.”315  
 
The US Goes on a Public Relations Campaign at Home 
If the US State Department was losing the public relations campaign in the UN to 
the smaller and non-western states, it could always fall back on its political might to forge 
its desired path.  But at home, the Eisenhower administration was out-muscled in both the 
political realm (via the Senate’s filibuster) and the public relations arena. For the better 
part of the past two and a half years, domestic opponents of the US’s involvement in 
treaty-making at the UN had been speaking out in the public media, academic journals, 
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and speeches. By 1952, the domestic opposition to international treaty making and human 
rights had swelled from a number of isolated voices to a bona fide movement which was 
now pressing for a Constitutional amendment to limit the president’s ability to enter into 
treaty agreements. The strength of the movement had grown considerably in the past year 
and was something the State Department believed could “no longer be dismissed, as 
some have urged, as isolated misinterpretations.”316  The Assistant Secretary of State for 
United Nations Affairs, John D. Hickerson suggested that the State Department initiate its 
own domestic public relations campaign.   
In February of 1952, he wrote, “I believe that some positive action by the 
Department is required…a statement by the Secretary, a letter to a Senator, or any other 
medium appropriate for placing the legal views of the Department before the public…”  
He thought it was essential to forcefully reassure the public that their fears about the 
changes that would be brought to the US through the Covenant were completely 
unfounded.317  Roosevelt agreed that there was,  
“a great need for the State Department to undertake a general public 
relations program to meet the attack on U.S. participation in the United 
Nations which is now concentrated on the work in the human rights field. 
Something needs to be done at home to make for understanding of the 
U.S. position…It is time to meet the attacks being made on the United 
Nations which take the line that it is a highly dangerous organization.”318 
 
Unfortunately for the advocates of racial equality and human rights, the public 
relations campaign amounted to a program of capitulation.  When discussing the 
Covenant at a June 6, 1952 press conference, Eleanor Roosevelt said that the objective of 
the federal state clause was to “insure that the constitutional balance between the powers 
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delegated under the Federal Constitution to our federal government in Washington…and 
the powers reserved to the states… are not altered.”  This was the standard line of 
argumentation that she had been giving at the UN for the past several years.  But she also 
offered a concrete example that she hoped would allay the fears of the conservative (and 
racist) Southerners who opposed the Covenant by appealing obliquely to their fears of the 
Covenant’s jurisdiction over lynching.  
“For example, under our constitution, the authority to enact laws against 
murder rests for the most part with the several states.  The ‘federal state’ 
clause would ensure that authority remains with the several states and is 
not transferred, even in part, to the National Government by the operation 
of the covenants.  The federal-state balance would be preserved: the 
national power would not be increased.”319  
 
The US’s position on the Covenants hit a new moral and political low.  The US’s 
realpolitik strategy had forced Eleanor Roosevelt and the Department of State to write off 
Du Bois, banish the NAACP along with any of its petitions (present or future) from the 
halls of the UN, stand by the side of South Africa’s sovereign right to discriminate, while 
attempting to legally guarantee its own right to do the same.  But when Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the apparent champion of human rights at the UN, the Chair of the UDHR 
drafting committee, and the most recognizable face at the UN made the promise that 
lynching could continue as a matter beyond the purview of human rights, surely 
something was amiss.  Perhaps in trying to support human rights, the US was actually 
causing irreparable harm. Though Eleanor Roosevelt believed that the US should lead the 
world “in standing for the rights of human beings,” the social pressures against doing so 
were proving to be overwhelming.320  She did find solace in the fact that during the first 
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part of 1952, her mail from concerned individuals and advocacy groups supporting the 
US’s human rights efforts had tripled.  Such perspectives, however, were muted under the 
weight and political strength of the domestic opposition.  Unless things changed 
dramatically, any hope that the Covenant could immediately rectify longstanding racial 
injustice in the US was pure fantasy.  And even the hope that the US would offer nominal 








                                                
Chapter 6 
The United States’ Unequivocal Ambivalence towards Socioeconomic Rights 
 
At the very first meeting of the Commission on Human Rights on April 29, 1946, 
Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social Affairs, instructed the 
Commission to include socioeconomic rights in the bill of human rights they would soon 
draft.  Because modern industrialization inflicts “intolerable servitude” on otherwise free 
individuals, Laugier informed the Commission that “the declaration of the rights of man 
must be extended to the economic and social fields” to include rights such as labor rights, 
the right to education, social security, and adequate medical care.321  A year later during 
the First Session of the Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, Eleanor 
Roosevelt reminded the representatives that because of their importance (and because 
they had been instructed to include them), socioeconomic rights, “could not be 
omitted.”322  But beneath the US’s apparent support for these rights that enjoyed 
widespread backing amongst many other members of the United Nations, there existed 
deep anxieties about actually including them in a binding Covenant. So Roosevelt, who 
knew that the US Senate was likely to reject a Covenant with strongly-worded 
socioeconomic rights, hedged. She added, socioeconomic rights, should remain
 
321 This is only a partial list of rights that typically fall within the category of socioeconomic rights.  UN 
Doc E/HR/6, pp. 1, 3.   
322 UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.9, p. 11. First Session of the Commission on Human Rights Drafting 
Committee, Ninth Meeting, Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, l8 June 1947, at 10:30 a.m. 
 
minimally articulated and “could not be expanded too much in a Declaration.”FP323 PF  This 
was one of the early signs of what John Humphrey—the Canadian legal scholar 
responsible for creating the first draft of the UDHR—later recalled was the “considerable 
opposition in the Drafting Committee to their inclusion.”324 
The competing desires to (1) keep socioeconomic rights out of the Covenant, 
while (2) appearing as a cooperative and progressive leader in international politics had 
the US in a difficult position.  As Eleanor Roosevelt wrote in a letter to Secretary of State 
George Marshall, the great political concern was having to state openly at the UN that the 
US, “in view of the fact that Congress would have to ratify such treaties, can not [sic] 
agree to wording which goes beyond our own Constitution.”325 Accordingly, the US 
delegation to the UN advocated for a series of covenants—first, one on civil and political 
rights, and then others in areas such as socioeconomic rights.  In this way it could give its 
full support for the initial Covenant, while not worrying as much about subsequent ones.  
In 1948, the US State Department remained “satisfied” that socioeconomic rights were 
not being considered for incorporation within the Covenant.326 
On the domestic front, after Truman’s reelection in 1948 many opponents of 
progressive social reform began to voice their concerns about his national healthcare 
proposal.  Though this opposition was focused on the narrow topic of healthcare, it was 
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emblematic of an antipathy towards social welfare programs, and a loathing of the 
stronger, universal category of socioeconomic rights.  A certain amount of opposition to 
his national healthcare proposal was not unexpected. The New Deal programs enacted by 
Truman’s predecessor certainly had their share of opponents (and universal healthcare 
provisions were not popular enough at the time to gain inclusion).  Like previous health 
bills that had failed to garner support over the past decade, Truman’s proposal called for 
the expansion of hospitals, an increase in public support for mothers and children, and a 
system that would provide federal aid for medical education and research.  But Truman’s 
proposal was far more robust than the Wagner healthcare bill of 1939 or the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bill of 1943, for instance.  The crux of Truman’s plan was a single 
insurance system that would cover not just the needy, elderly, veterans, children, or 
mothers.327  It would include all Americans—even those who were too poor to pay the 
premiums themselves.328 
  Though in 1948 the Truman Administration believed there would be enough 
support for such a proposal to become law, conservative forces both in Congress and 
within the general public were strong and well-organized.  These opponents viewed 
Truman’s healthcare proposal as part of a broader social and political trend that upset 
existing social relations as the government encroached into sacrosanct areas of social, 
economic and personal life.  Increasingly, this opposition against social welfare was 
becoming enmeshed in the anti-communist mood that was then gathering strength in the 
United States. 
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The domestic response to Truman’s healthcare plan (as well as to his other 
domestic social welfare proposals) became something of a political bellwether for 
gauging the support for an international human rights treaty that contained 
socioeconomic rights.  Those members of the US Senate who opposed a universal 
healthcare system and similarly objected to piecemeal, non-universal, domestic welfare 
initiatives, would certainly oppose the stronger, universal socioeconomic rights that 
would be included in a binding Covenant. Procedurally, if Truman could not garner a 
filibuster-proof two-thirds majority of the US Senate to support his domestic health 
proposal, he certainly would not be able to reach the same super-majority threshold to 
ratify a Covenant that included socioeconomic rights.329  The State Department watched 
attentively as a groundswell of opposition surged against Truman’s national healthcare 
proposal.  But because the fate of an international covenant on human rights soon became 
inseparable from the domestic battle over social welfare, Eleanor Roosevelt and her State 
Department colleagues were thrown headlong into this tumultuous struggle. 
 
The Opposition Forms 
Under fear of universal healthcare, in 1948 the American Medical Association 
(AMA) went into high gear.  It was one of the most powerful and influential 
organizations to oppose Truman’s health plan.  Its ability to mobilize quickly and 
efficiently was in part due to its already strong and well-organized, dues-paying 
membership base.  It also maintained connections with high-ranking governmental 
officials, media outlets, and had its own high-profile publication (The Journal of the 
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American Medical Association [JAMA]) in which it could disseminate its message 
widely.  With these existing resources it soon became a formidable opponent of Truman’s 
healthcare plan.330   
In December of 1948, the AMA House of Delegates—the organization’s policy 
making body—voted to initiate a “national education campaign” to inform the public 
about the danger of national healthcare legislation.  Its stated goal was to fight “the 
enactment of a compulsory sickness insurance act covering every person in the United 
States.”331  In its view, the government had no place in this sphere of human relations.  
Healthcare was a private matter that should be governed by the free market of healthcare 
providers and patients. 
In terms of social relations, domestic social welfare and the stronger 
socioeconomic human rights were actually quite similar.  They both called for the 
government, acting in a protective capacity, to mediate aspects of social existence that 
were then often governed by the market, the Church, the family, or simply by life 
chances.  For some this offered much-needed protection from the vicissitudes of a 
market-based civic existence. For the opponents, however, increased government 
involvement in these areas of society amounted to social tyranny. There were already 
many in the US Congress who opposed Truman’s domestic social welfare agenda.  But 
its connection with the ongoing human rights project that the State Department was then 
involved with at the UN was not yet a legislative concern, nor was it a matter of public 
consciousness.     
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 It was William Fitzpatrick however—the City Editor of the New Orleans States 
newspaper (discussed in previous chapters)—who linked the parallel and ongoing debates 
about socioeconomic rights at the United Nations and Truman’s domestic proposals as 
part of the same “pincer movement” to force alien laws and social customs upon the 
American people.332  As Fitzpatrick saw it, there were now two fronts to the battle—one 
that came from domestic and other from the international.  It was the latter movement, 
largely occurring outside of the public’s view, which he was particularly concerned about 
in his editorials.  Now the potential for social and economic reforms came not only from 
legislative fiat, but from potentially binding human rights treaties.333   
All one had to do, he warned, was read the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights—upon which the Covenant would be based—to see that the UN had a “plan for 
worldwide socialism.”  He cited Article 22 (the right to social security) and Article 25 
(e.g. the right to an adequate standard of living for health and well-being, including food, 
clothing, housing, medical care, social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, or old age).  In addition to imposing 
revolutionary changes to the freedoms associated with the “American way of life,” US 
citizens would be forced to care for foreigners—this was “social security for all the 
world, with Uncle Sam…footing most of the bill.”334  As absurd as this last assertion 
sounds, Fitzpatrick was quite in sync with the pressing debates of the day.  At the time, 
there were ongoing discussions in Congress questioning the wisdom of the Marshall Plan 
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and whether it was being used to fund socialist governments in Europe—such as Great 
Britain, France and Germany—with American tax dollars.335  
At this point, there were actually very few opponents who were speaking to a 
broad public audience about the connections between human rights treaties and domestic 
law.  Most of the opposition was preaching to limited audiences of academics, legal 
professionals, and politicians.  Increasingly, though, other journalists, activists, and 
organizations would soon join Fitzpatrick, and connect the United Nations with social 
welfare and communism. For his editorials on the dangers of human rights treaties, 
Fitzpatrick would soon be awarded a Pulitzer Prize.336  
Given the early indications of opposition Truman was concerned (quite rightly) 
about the Senate’s filibuster.  One potential way around this was to amend the rules of the 
Senate to disempower the Southern Democrats by limiting the use of their procedural 
weapon of choice. Truman initiated the push for a Senate rules change that would allow a 
simple majority vote for cloture to debate.  His attempt, however, was quickly foiled by a 
bipartisan coalition of Southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans.337  This 
setback—which amounted to maintenance of the legislative status quo—imperiled 
Truman’s agenda.  Soon after, Truman struck a conciliatory chord and faced the reality 
that he would have to compromise with the conservatives or suffer defeat. Truman 
assured both his opponents and his allies that, “the Congress and the President are 
working together and will continue to work together for the good of the whole country.”  
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In his own prophetic words, he promised that he and the Congress were “going to agree 
on a lot more things than we disagree on.”338 
Throughout 1949 the AMA continued to publish articles in its journal that offered 
scathing critiques of Truman’s National Health Plan.  The arguments that appear in these 
JAMA articles, as well as the statements and speeches of the AMA’s president, typically 
counter-posed themes such as compulsory insurance program versus a voluntary one; 
socialized medicine versus a free-market program; foreign socialism versus the 
“American way”; government domination versus liberty and independence.  In this 
campaign, these arguments were boiled down to several well-used phrases, such as 
“socialized medicine,” and “the voluntary way is the American way.”339   
The goal of their “education campaign” was to put pressure on elected officials by 
raising the fear and ire of the general public through a well-coordinated grassroots 
movement. By July of 1949, the AMA had produced 25 million copies of 25 different 
information brochures, each meant to appeal to a different target audience, shipping 
millions of copies to various state and county medical societies.  Over 40,000 doctors had 
ordered color posters for their offices that implored the government to “Keep Politics Out 
of the Picture.”340  In its opposition to national healthcare, the AMA claimed the support 
of over 800 other organization such as The American Farm Bureau Federation, the 
American Legion, the American Bar Association, the National Grange, the National 
Association of Small Business Men, the National Fraternal Congress, and the General 
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Federation of Women's Clubs (the latter boasting 5,000,000 members).341  In the political 
arena, several state legislatures (e.g. Delaware and Michigan) had already drafted 
resolutions to submit to the US Congress opposing national healthcare.342 At this point, 
however, the AMA had not yet even begun to ramp up its campaign.  
 
International Support / Domestic Opposition 
In early 1949, the State Department was pleased with the draft covenant since it 
was limited to only civil and political rights.  By the close of the Fifth Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights though, things changed dramatically for the US when 
Australia and the USSR submitted detailed proposals calling for the inclusion of 
socioeconomic rights.343  The Australian proposal included the right to work, fair wages 
and reasonable working conditions, the right to social security, limitations on working 
hours, and the right to education, while the Soviet proposal included the right to work, 
gender equality with respect to pay, the rights to rest and leisure, social security and 
social insurance, decent living accommodations, access to education, trade union rights, 
and the right to strike.344  These two proposals were a very important development for the 
Commission on Human Rights since they raised the possibility that socioeconomic 
rights—which were already popular with a large portion of UN member states—would be 
placed alongside civil and political rights in the Covenant.  The fact that Australia joined 
the Soviets showed that such proposals were not simply Cold War propaganda items—
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socioeconomic rights were of genuine importance to Western nations as well.  This was a 
troubling development for the State Department.     
 
Opposition Surges and Brands Social Welfare a “Socialist Threat” 
By the end of the First Session of the 81st Congress in October of 1949, the 
House and the Senate had failed to act upon (or had rejected outright) much of the social 
legislation bills that Truman had endorsed. In addition to the civil rights legislation he 
failed to pass, he did not muster the necessary support for the Point Four program of 
assistance to underdeveloped areas, the Brannan Plan (aid for farmers’ incomes), or the 
extension of Social Security coverage.345  Finally his health plan, though not entirely 
dead in the water, was floundering on dry pavement.  The American Medical 
Association, nevertheless, was unremitting.  
According to AMA literature, government incursions into the private lives and 
business relationships of citizens was an alarming trend in the US—one that had already 
swept through many European nations.  Such invasions were apparently destroying not 
only market productivity and business innovation, but were responsible for spoiling the 
soul of American individualism and personal autonomy.  In this campaign to “educate” 
Americans about healthcare, the AMA often used social democratic nations (Great 
Britain in particular)—as social and economic foils of the US.  Great Britain, the one-
time dominant world-power, had apparently made a wrong turn down what Hayek had 
recently called “the road to serfdom”—a warning, lest the US do the same.346  In this 
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respect, the AMA campaign capitalized on the American public’s familiarity with the 
post-war difficulties many other nations were experiencing. Though not necessarily a 
function of state socialism, the food shortages, rationing, and even starvation in Eastern 
Europe had been impressed upon the American public by the Truman Administration‘s 
recent efforts to garner support for the Marshall plan.347  While the AMA’s central 
concern remained with domestic healthcare, the fear of such international social and 
political forces was becoming a strong undercurrent in its campaign rhetoric. 
Even more menacing than social democracy—though for the AMA only one step 
away—was the threat of communism.  During this period the campaign began to borrow 
the language and rhetoric of the anti-communist movement that was beginning to sweep 
through America.  What in hindsight can be referred to as mass hysteria or a “moral 
panic,” for the AMA was simply an opportunity.348 The AMA—like so many others 
during this period—could just point to a handful of current events to stir the fear and 
fancy of the nation’s civic imagination.  In the fall of 1949, for instance, eleven members 
of the United States Communist party were convicted of attempting violent insurrection 
and attempting to overthrow the US government.  In January of 1950, as the AMA was 
beginning to ramp up its campaign, a former State Department employee, Alger Hiss, 
was convicted in a case surrounding state secrets and a communist spy ring.349 And 
finally with the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, communism became 
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the official enemy of state.  Never mind that there was absolutely no connection with 
Truman’s desire to provide adequate heath care to all Americans and these events; they 
all provided the AMA with the ammunition to make the case that the communist 
infiltrators already had breached America’s ramparts. The greater fear, however, were 
those home-grown enemies within the government who shared Truman’s social welfare 
aspirations. 
 
The American Medical Association’s Massive Campaign Blitz 
 The American Medical Association (AMA) focused its campaign efforts on 
influencing the outcome of the 1950 midterm elections by replacing supporters of 
healthcare reform with steadfast opponents.  This effort grew considerably throughout the 
year as influential organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers and 
the Chamber of Commerce joined the effort to warn Americans about the dangers of a 
“state-managed economy.”350  The culmination of this endeavor was a massive media 
blitz timed to coincide with the November elections.  In this unprecedented $1.1 million 
advertisement campaign, the AMA placed large, five-column ads in 11,000 daily and 
weekly newspapers, bought airtime from 300 radio stations, and placed full-page 
advertisements in 30 magazines.  The organization boasted that during the week of 
October 8, 1950, every “bona fide daily and weekly newspaper” in the US would carry its 
ads.351 
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The AMA’s campaign was designed to reach not just doctors and legislators, but 
to alert every American about the dangers of “socialized medicine” and the broader 
“threatening trend toward state socialism” in the United States.352  Accordingly, the 
organization created and promoted a wide variety of campaign materials to ensure that by 
the November elections virtually every major demographic category in the US would 
know about the perils of “politically controlled socialized medicine.”353  As an AMA 
official explained, those who did not read the more “formal treatises” on the subject, 
would find quite illuminating the sixteen-page color comic book entitled, The Sad Case 
of Waiting-Room Willie.  This publication—for which the talents of a preeminent graphic 
artist were solicited—tells the story of a sympathetic patient who is unable to receive 
medical care in the “New Utopia” because all of his doctors are overrun by “unsick” 
patients.354  On the other hand, the professional-types who took national publications 
such as the New York Times would find the AMA’s imposing full-page advertisements 
asking its readers in large, bold face print, “Who Runs America?  The Congress? The 
President?   OR YOU AND THE MAN NEXT DOOR?”355  At its heart, this was a 
massive effort to shape public opinion and motivate civic action.  
Following the elections, the AMA claimed victory in two related fields.  First, it 
claimed victory in creating a grassroots campaign of unprecedented size and power.  
They enlisted over 65,000 individuals and organizations that together spent an 
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unprecedented $2 million dollars in a two week period on the effort.  Second, the AMA 
believed that the massive mobilization of opposition had influenced the elections.  The 
number of advocates of national health insurance who had been replaced by opponents in 
the elections was cited as such evidence.  Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
disaggregate the actual causal factors in this series of defeats, the scientific analysis of 
electoral politics was not of great concern to the AMA’s leadership.356  Senators Claude 
Pepper (FL), Frank Graham (NC), Elbert Thomas (UT), and Glen H. Taylor (ID), as well 
as Representatives Andrew Biemiller (WI), and Eugene O'Sullivan (NE)—all supporters 
of healthcare reform—had each lost their seats.357 By the end of November, the AMA 
had members of the US Senate on notice: support social welfare initiatives at their own 
peril.  These, of course, were the same individuals who eventually would be providing 
their “advice and consent” on the Covenant.  Whether or not it included socioeconomic 
rights would very likely determine its fate in this legislative chamber.  
 
AMA Influences Public Opinion- Brands “Socialized Medicine” 
In a March 4, 1949 Gallup poll taken during the early days of the AMA’s 
campaign, about 60% of those polled had heard or read about Truman’s national health 
plan. 50% favored the AMA’s “voluntary” insurance plan, while only 32% favored 
Truman’s plan that was being branded by the opposition as “socialized” or “compulsory.”  
Interestingly, the vast majority of those who were familiar with the ongoing healthcare 
debates (over 72%), did not know any specifics about Truman’s plan, yet still knew 
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which plan they favored.358  In less than two months, the percentage that had heard or 
read about the national health plan had increased by 16% to over 76% of the 
respondents.359   
Ironically, the public was still broadly supportive of social welfare programs—
and continued to be so throughout the campaign.  By July of 1949, 54% of respondents 
supported the creation of a new Department of Public Welfare which would preside over 
social security, public health, and education matters, while only 28% disapproved.360  In 
March of 1950, when asked about government spending on social welfare, health, and 
social security, 41% of respondents believed spending should be increased, 16% thought 
it should be decreased, while 36% believed it should remain the same.361  Despite the 
greater support for government involvement in health and welfare, the public continued 
to oppose Truman’s national health plan, with 60% disapproving of it (versus 23% 
approving of it), by October of 1950.362  The AMA’s campaign had done something.  By 
the end of 1950, when asked what best argument against Truman’s National Health plan 
was, the highest percentage of respondents replied that it was “socialist” or 
“communistic.”363 
The type of social welfare legislation being promoted by Truman domestically (as 
well as the stronger universal human rights that were being considered at the UN) was 
now politically toxic.  It so thoroughly bore the taint of communism, internationalism, 
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and un-Americanism that the fleeting moment in which such policies had a chance of 
survival in Congress was all but over.  In 1950, Truman dropped any serious push for 
health reform as his attention turned toward the Korean War.364  
 The “socialized medicine” epithet that was thrown about so liberally by the AMA 
finally stuck.  It represented a conceptual basket within which the uncertainties of the 
moment, as well as a broad spectrum of fears, social anxieties, and prejudices could be 
placed.  This strategy permitted something as valuable and universally necessary as 
access to decent medical care to become a “threat” to all Americans.  The organization 
positioned itself as a last defense against the ill-conceived socialist mood that was 
“infecting” the world and now was threatening to destroy America.  By joining the AMA 
and its growing network of supporters in the fight against national healthcare (now 
socialized medicine) Americans were taking part in a much larger battle against “the alien 
philosophy of a government-regimented economy.”365 
 
The US’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Keep Socioeconomic Rights Out of the Covenant 
Given the fervor of the domestic opposition against Truman’s social welfare 
proposals, the US State Department was hard-pressed to ease its own opposition to 
incorporating socioeconomic rights in the Covenant.  In preparation for the General 
Assembly meetings that were to convene on September 19, 1950, the State Department 
met with the US delegation to the UN and distributed briefing papers that outlined a two-
prong strategy for approaching the issue of socioeconomic rights in the Covenant.  First 
the US delegation was instructed to support the creation of a Covenant that mirrored the 
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principles and rights within the US Constitution—i.e. one that did not contain any 
socioeconomic rights.  James Simsarian, advisor to the US delegation at the UN, 
discussed the Covenant in a State Department briefing session.  He explained to those 
present—which included Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Cabot Lodge, and John Foster 
Dulles, who was then a delegate to the UN General Assembly, and would later become 
Secretary of State under Eisenhower—that the US State Department wished to maintain 
the general status quo with respect to the Covenant.  Importantly, at this point “only a 
limited number of rights were covered—fundamentally the same area as that included in 
the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.”  Thus, as far as the State Department was 
concerned, the Covenant remained in “satisfactory” shape “since loose language covering 
economic and social rights had been excluded.”366  But because it appeared that many 
other states would try to push for the inclusion of socioeconomic rights, however, the 
State Department conceded it was “particularly anxious.”367  
With Cold War tensions rising, the State Department deemed the cultivation of 
geopolitical relationships to be an important part of its UN activities.  So the second 
prong of the State Department’s strategy emphasized the importance of working with 
other member states and not appearing obstructionist.  In addition to its increasingly 
unpopular position on socioeconomic rights, the ongoing (and very unpopular) federal 
state clause battle opened the US up the charge that it was intentionally impeding not 
only the development of the Covenant, but the extension of its provisions as well.368  The 
State Department stressed that the delegation should be prepared “to join with other 
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countries in inviting the Commission on Human Rights to consider the desirability and 
feasibility of developing further covenants or taking other measures concerning 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as other categories of rights in the civil and 
political field.”369   
Merely discussing the feasibility of socioeconomic rights at future meetings was 
far from what other member states had in mind, though.  In this respect, the US—though 
wishing to “work” with other states on the issue—vastly underestimated the value of 
socioeconomic rights for many of the UN member states. Consequently, the two strategic 
goals were in many respects mutually exclusive of one another.  If the US adhered rigidly 
to its strategy of creating a Covenant that mirrored the US Constitution, it would be 
forced to oppose the inclusion of any socioeconomic rights at all.  But if a significant 
number of states strongly endorsed socioeconomic rights, this strategy would run 
headlong into its second goal of working with other states and not appearing 
obstructionist.  So from the start, the US boxed itself into a contradictory policy 
approach. 
At the General Assembly meetings, the US’s satisfaction with the limited rights in 
the Covenant stood in marked contrast to many of the other delegations’ opinion of it; it 
soon became clear to the US that its stance on socioeconomic rights did not sit well with 
the majority opinion of the General Assembly.  The State Department expected the usual 
Cold War diatribes from the members of the communist bloc who were amongst the most 
steadfast supporters of these rights.  In this regard they did not disappoint. Stephan 
Demchenko from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic said the draft Covenant 
appeared to be rather a digest of limitations of human rights than a catalogue of such 
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rights.” 370 The Polish representative, Henryk Altman’s comments echoed those of the 
other communist representatives who all in turn voiced their revulsion that 
socioeconomic rights—the “very foundations of democracy [which] could not in any way 
be separated from the recognized civil and political rights”—had not been incorporated 
into the Covenant.371   
But what caught the US off guard was the number of non-communist states such 
as Mexico, Uruguay, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Chile that shared the communist 
delegations’ desire to see socioeconomic rights incorporated into the Covenant.372  What 
was so disturbing for these delegations, though, were the broader implications of 
producing an inadequate Covenant.  Omitting socioeconomic rights, many believed, 
raised serious doubts about the future of the Covenant altogether. Dr. Raul Noriega, from 
Mexico, for instance, voiced his concern over the Covenant by arguing that “it would be 
better to have no covenant at all if the economic and social rights were not included in it.”  
Omitting socioeconomic rights from the binding Covenant would only send the message 
that they were of little importance, and thereby “destroy the value of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”373  Carlos Valenzuela of Chile voiced his disappointment, 
saying that in its present shape, the Covenant was wholly inadequate.   Like so many of 
the other members of the General Assembly, “the delegation of Chile could not imagine a 
covenant on human rights worthy of the name which did not include economic, social 
and cultural rights and particularly the right to work and the right to social security.”  
Perhaps, Valenzuela wondered, the Committee should admit that attempting to draft an 
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enforceable Covenant was an “over-ambitious project and even a dangerous one in that it 
risked compromising the moral prestige enjoyed by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.”374  It was not, of course, the hope or intention of these states to abandon the 
human rights project altogether.  Much of the disappointment with the Covenant was of 
course directed towards the US delegation which was the chief resister.  The type of 
diplomatic gamesmanship played here—blaming without naming—was a staple at the 
UN, particularly when confronting a much more powerful adversary such as the US.   
As in so many of the contentious debates in the General Assembly, the now-very 
familiar division between colonial powers and the smaller and non-Western states was a 
central element.  The Saudi Arabian representative, Jamil Baroody, said, “It was not 
surprising that most of those who took that cautious position were representatives of 
colonial Powers. It was plainly not in their interest to accelerate the implementation of an 
effective covenant, since the result in dependent territories might be to awaken the 
population from its lethargy.” 375  Nizar Kayali of Syria, like many of the other 
delegations, voiced the opinion that the Covenant would be quite incomplete without 
socioeconomic rights.  With the US in his crosshairs, Kayali suggested that the 
opposition to such rights that came from some of the powers, “arose either from a 
superiority complex or from a keen sense of selfish colonial interest…Those imbued with 
the colonial mentality could argue that such rights were good for the inhabitants of the 
metropolitan country but not for the natives of the colonies.”  The colonial powers’ 
steadfast resistance to including socioeconomic rights in the Covenant, he continued, 
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could be explained because these rights would interfere with the ongoing “exploitation” 
of non-western states. 376 
The US did not have much to say that directly addressed any of these arguments.  
Roosevelt provided a short statement of the US position that held tightly to the State 
Department’s “playbook.”  Namely, the US did not support the inclusion of additional 
articles in the Covenant, it supported completion of the document without delay, and 
finally, it supported the future examination of socioeconomic rights for subsequent 
covenants.”377  The US position in no way swayed the other delegations, for on 
December 4, 1950, the Assembly passed Resolution 421(V) which stated in no uncertain 
terms that because the current draft of the Covenant was limited to just civil and political 
rights, it lacked the most basic and “most elementary.”  Accordingly, the Resolution 
called upon the Commission on Human Rights, “in accordance with the spirit of the 
Universal Declaration, to include in the draft Covenant a clear expression of economic, 
social and cultural rights.”  The Resolution, which passed 23 to 17 with 10 abstentions, 
not only delivered a major blow to the US delegation’s hopes of avoiding socioeconomic 
rights, it also painted a picture of a nation that was out of touch with much of the world’s 
people and governments.   
 
Domestic Opponents Target International Treaties 
Throughout 1951, the opposition against domestic social welfare reform 
continued to press on.  The isolated voices of the early opponents such as William 
Fitzpatrick and Frank Holman, were now joined by a resounding chorus of detractors 
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who—now mobilized and primed—trained their sights on the dangers of international 
human rights treaties.378 All the same arguments that had been used in the previous years 
to object to Truman’s Fair Deal programs (e.g. the importance of a free market, the 
“dangers” of socialism, and so forth) were still being hurled about—only now, the prime 
targets were the United Nations and the Covenant the US was then drafting.   
The associations with communism and socialism that the AMA had conjured in 
its campaign the year before were even more apparent, not because they were actually 
present, but because of the growing distortions of the anti-communist perspective.  Many 
watched as the US was sat at the drafting table with communist and socialist nations—not 
only considering their proposals for socioeconomic rights, but actually succumbing to 
their demands (e.g. General Assembly Resolution 421[V]). Business leaders recoiled 
against what was now framed as encroaching limitations upon their various industries by 
UN mandate.  Alexander Summer, president of Real Estate Boards, for example, lashed 
out against the US’s involvement with the United Nations on behalf of its work on 
housing, which he believed would lead to “socialized housing in the United States.”379  
Conservative Chicago Daily Tribune editorial writer, Chesly Manly, warned about a 
“rising school of thought” that believed that United States law was subordinate to 
international treaty law and the dictates of the United Nations.380  Another reporter wrote 
that within the United Nations people do not believe in capitalism and individual 
freedoms—the “United Nations is one world, and that world is international 
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socialism…[y]ou can read the same thing in the Soviet literature that circulates freely 
inside the UN.”381 William Fitzpatrick received widespread acclaim for his work, was 
awarded the Pulitzer Prize for a second series of editorials against “Government by 
Treaty,” and stormed onto the conservative lecture circuit as a plebian prophet.382   
There was still support for human rights, social welfare, the United Nations, and 
socioeconomic rights—it was just drowned-out by the opposition and silenced by the 
rising mood that condemned all things international. A “leading American lawyer” 
quoted in the New York Times, bemoaned “you could not get a treaty incorporating our 
own Federal Bill of Rights ratified by the United States Government today.”383  
Referencing the disheartened human rights advocates from various labor, religious, and 
cultural groups who were monitoring the UN meetings on the Covenant, an April article 
in the New York Times expressed great doubt as to whether the Covenant would ever 
amount to anything, since there was little, if any, chance it would pass the US Senate.384     
 The Senate opposition was now focused and fierce.  One year after the AMA 
declared its campaign victory, it invited two US Senators to speak to its policy making 
body, the House of Delegates—the den of doctors who had first “educated” the American 
public, molded opinion, and helped sink Truman’s domestic health proposal.  Still strong, 
mobilized, and rabid, on a flag-draped stage in Los Angeles’ opulent Shrine Auditorium, 
they welcomed Senators Robert Taft (R-OH) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) to speak to an 
audience of over 6,800 doctors and members of the public.   
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Just how strong the opposition was against virtually any form of social welfare—
let alone socioeconomic rights—was made clear. As the informal leader of the “anti-
Truman Southern Democrats,” Senator Byrd (D-VA) maintained that the President was 
destroying America’s system of free enterprise—a system that was “a more dependable 
guardian of peace than the United Nations [would] ever be.”  For Byrd, the “vague 
altruism” of Truman’s social programs and policies was influenced by socialist and 
communist principles.  As he saw it, the Covenant (which now included socioeconomic 
rights) would destroy the US’s best asset against Russian aggression—a strong 
economy.385 Taft offered the standard warnings about the misguided path Great Britain 
had taken—a critique quite familiar to any of the doctors who had attended past AMA 
meetings or had even just glanced at the organization’s campaign materials.  For Taft, it 
was more than obvious how outrageous and shockingly dreadful things had become in 
Great Britain where “the government furnishes free service for the birth of babies, for the 
support of children, for burial at death, and for every misfortune of life.”  This, Taft 
forewarned was also the goal of the US Federal Security Administration.  This type of 
government control, he argued, destroys businesses freedom, individual incentives to 
innovate, while reducing “everyone to the dead level of mediocrity.”386  For Byrd, the 
type of programs in Truman’s Fair Deal would irrevocably put the US on the “road to 
socialism.”  What Byrd saw at the end of this “one-way street” was the welfare state.  
This, he told the doctors as he drifted into a poetic lilt, was a “state of twilight in which 
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the glow of democratic freedoms is fading beyond the horizon, leaving us to be 
swallowed in the blackness of socialism, or worse.”387   
Short of a major existential conversion, there was absolutely no chance of 
changing the minds (and voting behavior) of such Senators.  Accounting for all the others 
in the Senate like them, as Eleanor Roosevelt saw it in 1951, the US “would never ratify 
economic and social rights in a treaty.”388 Though conversions do happen, Roosevelt’s 
prognostication still holds sixty years later.389 
 
US Redoubles it Efforts at the UN 
As the domestic opponents painted vivid images reminiscent of Hayek’s 
allegorical return to serfdom, and the pending dissolution of America’s market society, 
the US Department of State struggled to maintain its position of moral and political 
leadership at the UN. Having lost the battle to keep socioeconomic rights out of the 
Covenant the State Department chose to focus much more intensely on the first of its 
two-prong United Nations strategy (creating a Covenant that mirrored the US 
Constitution) while using “creative” legal drafting techniques to honor the second prong 
(not appearing obstructionist).  To do so, it focused heavily on employing legal 
mechanisms that would limit the reach and strength of socioeconomic rights while 
maintaining the outward appearance that the US did in fact support socioeconomic rights.  
If successful, the US would appear to be a willing and cooperative participant in the 
drafting process.   
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A State Department memo entitled, “Instructions to the United States Delegation” 
outlined the specifics of this approach.  This memo stated that the Draft Covenant should 
be limited to “general language” that related to the promotion and development of 
socioeconomic principles rather than any articulation of them as actual enforceable 
rights.  To this end (and depending on the general sentiment of other states at the 
Commission), the Department of State proposed three options of various proposals that 
varied in specificity and strength.  Each option was intended to show other states that the 
US was “prepared to support the inclusion of such language in the Covenant,” while in 
substance creating a definition that would be as consistent as possible with the US 
Constitution.390  The first proposal, designed to substitute for the explicit mention of any 
substantive socioeconomic rights (e.g. right to work, right to strike, right to adequate 
medical care, etc.) referred to as “Option A,” read:  
"Each State party hereto undertakes to promote conditions of economic, social 
and cultural progress and development for a higher standard of life in larger 
freedom for all, with due regard to the organization and resources of the State; 
and to cooperate for effective international action in economic, social and cultural 
matters with organs of the United Nations and with specialized agencies 
established by intergovernmental agreement and brought into relationship with  
the United Nations under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."391    
 
Note the legal sleight of hand: The proposed article mentions “economic, social 
and cultural progress,” “economic, social and cultural matters,” but never anything 
concerning “economic, social and cultural rights.” With the above text, in reality, the US 
would not be ceding any ground at all.  Legally, such a statement could not even be 
classified as a “statement of rights.”  This, of course, was the entire purpose of the 
statement—to establish a working definition of socioeconomic rights that did not actually 
                                                 
390 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. II, at 735 (1979).  
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constitute “legal rights.”  The US delegation was after a definition that amounted to 
progressive realization of principles and goals, rather than legally binding rights. If 
however, the other members of the Commission on Human Rights did not support such a 
vague, thin articulation of socioeconomic rights, the State Department provided the 
delegation with a second and a third statement (referred to as “Option B” and “Option 
C”), each increasing in strength and specificity.  Even with the most forcefully worded 
“Option C,” however, socioeconomic rights were still articulated as goals, or principles, 
rather than being raised to the level of “rights.”   
In the event that the Commission on Human Rights rejected all three of the US’s 
vaguely worded proposals and opted to list specific socioeconomic rights, the fourth 
contingency plan outlined by the State Department was to limit the “language as far as 
possible along practical lines generally in harmony with American practice and 
constitutional principles.”392 Fifth, the Department of State also reminded the US 
delegation of another legal backstop it could rely upon—any socioeconomic rights that 
did enter the Covenant would be subject to the limitations created by the Federal State 
Clause (see chapter on Race).  According to the sixth and final contingency plan to defeat 
socioeconomic rights proposals, the State Department instructed the delegation to 
emphasize that much of the work on socioeconomic rights is being, and should be, 
completed by specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).393  
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The US delegation carried out its mission with great faithfulness to the State 
Department playbook, deploying its mechanisms to limit or forestall the adoption of 
specific provisions on socioeconomic rights one by one.394  With respect to the actual 
drafting of proposals, at times the delegation was allowed to “freelance.”  But typically 
the US delegation, which kept in close contact with Washington during each of the 
sessions, was guided by the State Departments’ policy papers, memos and ad hoc 
instructions. 
In addition to the official plan, another method the US regularly employed in its 
attempt to weaken what the State Department referred to as “extremist” socioeconomic 
rights resolutions was to submit a series of US-sponsored amendments that little by little, 
whittled away at the strength and force of the initial resolution.395  For example, when 
discussions turned to healthcare, the USSR submitted a proposal stating that all states had 
the duty, “To provide conditions which would assure the right of all to medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.”396  The US countered with a much more 
delicately worded proposal that read, “The States parties to the Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest standard of health obtainable.”397  The 
tactic of waging “proposal battles” was quite common at the UN and other delegations 
certainly practiced it just as fiercely as the US.398 
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Having assessed the support for socioeconomic rights amongst the other 
delegations, the US decided that it would need to submit its proposal of last resort, its 
most strongly worded “Option C,” which read,  
“Each State party to this Covenant undertakes, with due regard to its organization 
and resources, to promote conditions of economic, social and cultural progress 
and development for securing” education, improved standards of living, 
“measures of social security,” “effective recognition of trade unions,” labor rights, 
and “the preservation and development of science and culture.”399  
 
What on the surface presents as a respectable list of socioeconomic rights, was 
severely limited for two reasons. For one, just as with the aforementioned “Option A,” 
the “rights” within this proposal cannot in fact be considered legal rights at all. They were 
articulated as important social, economic and cultural goals that states should “promote.”  
Nowhere in the proposal are these principles raised to the level of a right—i.e. establish 
an affirmative duty that signatory states are under legal obligation to ensure.  Over the 
next several years, the Department of State would continue to speak of socioeconomic 
rights as not constituting “true legal rights,” using quotation marks around the word 
“rights” whenever mentioning socioeconomic rights in its writings.400  Second, the US 
soon after submitted a “limitations clause” that further eroded the strength of this already 
weak proposal.  It read:  
“Each State Party to this Covenant recognizes that in the enjoyment of those 
rights provided by the State in conformity with this Part of the Covenant, the State 
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law and 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
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freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.”401 
 
Thus, any state that would be obligated to enact socioeconomic rights would also 
be able to limit its obligations to guarantee such rights only to the extent it determines 
that the socioeconomic rights do not conflict with others’ rights and freedoms.  Since 
rights usually, if not always, conflict with other existing provisions of law, this 
limitations clause would essentially give a signatory carte blanche ability to derogate 
from its socioeconomic rights obligations.  The general purpose of a Bill of Rights is to 
establish a set of rights that rise above the dictates of other laws—not a set of rights that 
is subordinate to them.  However, with this proposal (which did not survive the drafting 
process) the US essentially would be able to decide whether any of the socioeconomic 
rights applied.  The State Department later wrote that the US delegation “urged the 
inclusion of this provision…to make it clear that the economic, social, and cultural rights 
recognized would not be absolute but subject to reasonable limitations. In the case of 
social security, for example, it is sometimes necessary to condition disability benefits 
payable to disabled workers on their willingness to take vocational rehabilitation 
courses.”402 
The State Department later wrote about its strategy in the State Department 
Bulletin that was published just after the Commission’s meetings.  It maintained that the 
Covenant was being drafted in the image of the US Bill of Rights; “The basic civil and 
political rights set forth in the draft covenant are well known in American tradition and 
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law.”403  The socioeconomic rights, in the draft Covenant, however, “were recognized as 
objectives to be achieved ‘progressively.’”   
“The term ‘rights’ is used with respect to both the civil and political provisions as 
well as the economic, social, and cultural provisions. This term is used, however, 
in two different senses. The civil and political rights are looked upon as ‘rights’ to 
be given effect almost immediately. The economic, social, and cultural rights 
although recognized as ‘rights’ are looked upon as objectives toward which states 
adhering to the covenant would undertake to strive.” 404 
Just as the US had done with its reservation in the Commission, the State Department 
used the Bulletin to publicize its position that socioeconomic rights did not constitute 
“real rights.”   
Thus, largely through the submission of substantive proposals the US set up a legal 
gauntlet, hoping that these socioeconomic rights would become skewered upon one or 
more of its procedural barbs.   
UN deliberations are typically treated by historians as matters of politics and 
law—and indeed these were.  But from the perspective taken in the present study, they 
are also the indicators of the underlying domestic and international social struggles of the 
day.  The use of what the State Department termed “creative” legal drafting was part of 
the very same social struggle that the smaller and non-Western states, William 
Fitzpatrick, the AMA, and Senators Taft and Byrd were all engaging in. Though each 
fought in their own theater they were all attempting to create structures (be they legal, 
ideological, political, or institutional) that permitted a certain type of social ordering to 
take root within their confines.  Once these structures became a reality and took form, 
they would shield certain, specific desired social relationships (e.g. a market-centered 
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society) from outside assault by competing social configurations (e.g. a state-centered 
society).405  
In form, the social and economic rights that were being drafted at the UN 
permitted particular international relationships to develop.  For the US they allowed key 
Cold War alliances between itself and the smaller and non-Western states.  For the 
smaller and non-Western states, socioeconomic rights represented a progressive 
alternative to the past era of colonial domination.  On the domestic side, with its legal 
drafting techniques the US delegation was also attempting to carve out an institutional 
sphere within which a particular class of domestic social and political relationships could 
flourish.  These social relationships in large part were the ones that the domestic 
opposition had already defined: a relatively small, non-interventionist government and a 
free-market environment.406  In essence, the US sought to draft social and economic 
rights, without social and economic “rights” (and perhaps this is why the State 
Department referred to its drafting techniques as “creative”).   
Once the US delegation had defined socioeconomic rights, not as “rights” but as 
“goals” or “principles,” it had paved the way for its next move.  On May 19, 1951 it 
informed the Commission that it was “now of the view that the provisions in the [Draft 
Covenant] dealing with economic, social and cultural rights—being loosely drafted and 
                                                 
405 Recall the previous Chapter 1 discussion: In this regard, the three most common intellectual approaches 
to the study of human rights (and the sub-debates within) are not politically innocent. The structuring 
imposed by these frameworks represents important strategies of action—and indeed, a certain form of 
collective action—in the struggle over human rights.  In this history, proponents and opponents alike often 
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not being expressed in terms of legal rights and with different implementation and 
undertaking—should be dealt with in a separate legal instrument.”407  What the 
Department of State had not anticipated fully, however, was that the strength and force 




The US Finds it is Quite Vulnerable to Public Opinion 
While the US’s comparatively vast diplomatic resources permitted a powerful 
approach and a technical dexterity over matters of law that was virtually impervious to 
attack, it was quite vulnerable to public opinion.  For when members of the UN 
excoriated the US over its human rights drafting policies, they were talking—through the 
media—to people the world.  Charles Malik of Lebanon (now Chairman of the 
Commission on Human Rights), for example, lamented that the draft Covenant embodied 
a “certain lack of balance” between civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights.  
This of course was the very lack of balance that Eleanor Roosevelt and the State 
Department were fighting for.408  But suddenly, what in the UN was simply a matter of 
legal and political difference, in the New York Times became an epic struggle between the 
two titans of the UN—a news story wonderfully fit for print.   
As reported in the Times, the problem for Malik was that certain rights such as 
“social security” were only listed in the vaguest of terms, while signatory states only 
agree to “progressively” strive for the socioeconomic rights within the limits of available 
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 188
 
resources.  Both items were entirely consistent with the State Department’s policy 
approach discussed above.  In the same New York Times article, Eleanor Roosevelt is 
cited (off the record) as saying that progress has been made towards defining the 
difference between civil and political as legal rights, and socioeconomic rights as “no 
more than aspirations or norms…to aspire to.”  Second, that no matter how these rights 
are defined, the US would not sign any covenant without a federal state clause that would 
prevent socioeconomic rights from being implemented in the US federal states.  And 
finally, that “with such a clause the convention would have very little practical impact on 
United States law or practice.”409 
This debate was difficult enough to navigate within the confines of the UN.  Now, 
it was on display for the world—a world that often interpreted the very same human 
rights, in entirely different ways. US opponents, for example, were outraged at any 
mention of socioeconomic rights which implied a wide ranging mix of social evils 
ranging from increased government involvement in their lives, to full fledged state-run 
economy, socialism, communist infiltration, and the end of American life as it was.   The 
smaller and non-Western states saw socioeconomic rights as indicating the end of a long 
era of imperialism in which human livelihood was sacrificed for the economic gain of the 
metropole. A power such as the US refusing to abide by such basic principles that the rest 
of the world supported indicated a broad chasm between the “West and the rest” and was 
reminiscent (if not an outright reproduction) of the very systems of imperialism they were 
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trying to shed.  Finally, the communist states had based their entire economy and social 
order on related principles—that if subordinated in the Covenant to the civil and political 
rights the US prized—would send a message to the world about the appropriateness of 
their own system.  The very same human rights had a wide range of disparate civic 
meanings and social translations.  In the UN debates, the representatives were speaking 
about the same subject, using the “universal” language of human rights to do so, while 
engaging in familiar diplomatic conventions, and well-tried legal drafting techniques.  
But they were universes away from one another once human rights were given social 
meaning.   
Less than two weeks after their differences had been aired to the world in the New 
York Times, Malik and Roosevelt were sitting together trying to locate common ground.  
Malik explained the deeply important social meaning of the human rights that the US was 
now opposing.  Their conversation revealed a major blind-spot for the US.  Many of the 
lesser-developed nations, he explained, were experiencing degrees of social and political 
turmoil.  Endemic political “corruption and incompetence,” as well as “tremendous social 
and cultural problems,” created a situation in which they looked towards the UN for 
leadership.  Within the UN it was the US in particular that could provide such leadership.  
As Malik and other representatives confided in Roosevelt, “the Economic and Social 
Articles had become a symbol of the aspirations and needs of these countries.” 410    
That these conversations left an impression on Eleanor Roosevelt, was revealed in 
a subsequent letter she wrote to President Truman.  She began by saying she believed that 
the US must “understand that there is a feeling in the world of a desire to attain some 
kind of a better standard of living and they feel that particularly the United States has an 
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obligation to make the plans and help them to carry them out to apply those standards.”  
She went on to explain that the US was missing key opportunities to win the support of 
such smaller states which generally had “mixed feelings” about the US, and might even 
be leaning towards the Soviet Union.  “They are afraid of the USSR,” she continued, “but 
in some ways most of these nations have never known freedom and therefore it is almost 
easier to accept the type of totalitarian system that tells them definitely what to do than it 
does to accept the democratic system which seems to require so much of them.”  With 
respect to the nations of the Near East, Malik had assured her that “unless [the US was] 
going to take hold, the USSR undoubtedly would.”  Unfortunately for the US, 
socioeconomic rights—an important issue-area where it could cultivate important 
allies—was the precise area in which it was actively creating opponents.  Roosevelt 
closed her letter by outlining the bind the US was in.  For the developing states, 
socioeconomic rights were of utmost importance—“those are the rights that mean 
something tangible to them in their every day lives.”  On the other hand, the domestic 
opposition against the Covenant—and certainly a Covenant with socioeconomic rights—
was strong and active.  “How are we going to explain all this to the American Bar 
Association and Congress I really do not know, but somehow it has to be got across 
because everywhere the emphasis is going to be on how they are going to get a sense of 
hope of attaining even one notch on the upward path.”411 
 
The Two Covenant Solution 
                                                 




When the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) met for its Thirteenth Session 
later in the summer of 1951, the US delegation sensed that there might be a small 
opening for it to lobby again for two Covenants.  Though the two-Covenant solution 
remained hugely unpopular with many of the delegations, there were several now that 
backed the US’s efforts.  The US saw it as its job to influence, sway, and actually 
“create” the majority that would go along with it.  Given its power and resources, one 
method the US was quite adept at, and acknowledged in State Department papers, was 
“armtwisting.”  Though the US was often accused of “throwing its weight around” too 
much at the UN, it was a price it was willing to pay to prevail on such matters.412   On 
February 5, 1952, the General Assembly adopted the GA Resolution 543 (VI) which 
called for two Covenants by a vote of 27 to 20 with 5 abstentions.  The US prevailed in 
its effort to see two Covenants created by the UN, but not without inflicting significant 
collateral damage.  John Humphrey later wrote that this decision split not only the 
Covenant into two, but the UN, itself.”413   
 
Though the State Department’s ability to execute its strategies and achieve its 
goals was unrivaled, when it came time to define what human rights actually were, it was 
often reading from a script that was not its own.  So despite the momentous role that the 
US delegation played in the actual drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights, 
much of the human rights formation process (perhaps the majority of it) took place far 
afield from the halls and backrooms of the United Nations where ink and parchment met.   
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In significant measure, human rights were defined by members of the 
conservative vanguard who connected the ongoing domestic and international struggles 
over the role of the market and the place of the government in society. They grounded for 
the American public economic ideas espoused by Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek.  
They translated the impenetrable complexities of international law into a social verse that 
mothers and fathers recited to their sons and daughters while reading about the hardships 
of “Waiting Room Willie.”  A right was taking form.  When the AMA and its supporters 
spent several million dollars to change the words “national healthcare” to “socialized 
medicine” a right was being made.  And when the US delegation to the UN, no matter 
how hard it tried, could not shed its colonial image, the most basic aspects of existing 
social relations and divisions moved ever closer to becoming right. 
Four months after the Covenant was split, Eleanor Roosevelt outlined for the 
American public the nature of the human rights that the State Department was then 
fighting for. As she spoke to members of the press with script in hand, it might have 
seemed as if these human rights were created not by the State Department, but by 
Senators such as Robert Taft (R-OH) and Robert Byrd (D-WV).414 Indeed they were.  
Having accepted their advice and now beseeching consent, Roosevelt promised that none 
of the human rights that the US was sponsoring at the UN would allow anyone a “free 
ride through life at the expense of the government.”415   
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Attaining Senate input can occur informally long before an actual treaty is officially put to vote in chamber 
(Article 2, §2, US Const.).  
 193
 
The human rights she spoke of could also be found in the text of William 
Fitzpatrick’s editorials and the AMA’s campaign materials.  She declared that the 
Covenants would not impress upon the US “any provisions which depart from the 
American way of life”; a promise that would be kept, no matter what social arrangements 
that phrase invoked.416 
Roosevelt continued on, informing all those who had taken part in these struggles 
of the State Department’s plan to enshrine the human rights they had just created. The 
draft Covenants also contained the rights of those who had come to abhor the UN and 
fear that international human rights would limit American liberty.  Roosevelt explained 
that the State Department was busy fighting for the inclusion of several “special 
provisions” to prevent any “dilution or diminution of our rights and freedoms.” First, 
because the Covenants were non-self executing, she explained to her fellow Americans, 
they would not and could not automatically become enforceable law in the US.  Then 
turning to the hordes of states’ rights stalwarts, she assured them that with the Federal 
State Clause in place, the Covenants would have no impact on matters that fell into the 
jurisdiction of the individual states.  All such affairs—whatever they might be—“will 
remain with the states.” 417 
Roosevelt revealed that the State Department was also fighting for the human 
rights of those who feared communism. She promised that human rights in no way 
contained any traces of “communism, socialism, syndicalism or statism.”418  As for social 
and economic rights—the rights championed by so many non-Western states, though 
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most strongly associated with the Communist Bloc—she assured the American public 
that they were not actually “rights” but merely goals or aspirations to be achieved over 
time.419  These principles were in fact of such a different species they did not belong 
together with the type of civil and political rights that were in the American 
Constitution.420  
The State Department could not ignore the fact that the smaller and non-Western 
states (potential Cold War allies for the US) had also named what was right for them.  
Indeed, in a previous press statement, Roosevelt circled round and said that though they 
should be housed in separate quarters, “each group of rights [was] of equal 
importance”421 
And as for its own notion of right, the State Department chose a definition that 
would help it maintain its position of moral and political leadership in the international 
sphere:  Human rights were “part of an international effort designed to acquaint the world 
with the ideas of freedom.”422 
But amidst this spectacle of a supposedly natural concept turning positive, the 
US’s recent political victory over socioeconomic rights amounted to a great concession: 
the center of the human rights project had not held.  And so the Covenant was drawn and 
bifurcated.  The supposed organic unity and universality of its constituent parts was no 
match for the competing social forces that wrenched right from right and fractured the 
                                                 
419 Id. at 1024.  Note: In the official text of her press statement quotation marks are used around the word 
“rights” when discussing socioeconomic rights, but not when mentioning civil and political rights.  
420 Roosevelt made other similar statements to the press about the need for two Covenants.  See e.g. 
Roosevelt, Eleanor.  December 31, 1951. “Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.” State Dep’t Bull.   
1059-1061, 1064-1066 
421 Roosevelt, Eleanor.  December 31, 1951. “Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.” State Dep’t Bull. 
1059-1061, 1064-1066; At 1065.  
422 Roosevelt, Eleanor. 1952. “Progress toward Completion of Human Rights Covenants.”  Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 679, pp. 1024-1028, at 1026. 
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nascent human rights concept along the fault lines that had been present from the start.  
This was not just about law, politics, or ideas—this most fundamentally was about 
people.  So clearly imprinted on the face of the human rights that were born from these 
struggles are the invisible lines that at the time cut swaths through the terrain of the 
social, as the global West pulled from the East and North from South, separating 
prosperity and poverty, and people from people.  These are the social struggles that in the 





                                                
Chapter 7 
From Social Struggles to Human Rights 
 
 
In the United States, during the early 1950s the powerful forces of opposition 
banded together under common cause to see to it that human rights treaties would have 
no impact on domestic law.  Between 1951 and 1953 there were at least four senate 
resolutions for constitutional amendments restricting the president’s treaty-making 
powers.423  By January of 1953, Senator John Bricker of Ohio—the leader of this 
movement—announced that he had garnered enough support amongst his colleagues for 
one such proposed amendment to pass.   A February 1953 State Department memo dryly 
summed up the situation: 
“The Covenants are under attack by large and important groups in this country 
such as the American Bar Association and a number of members of the U.S. 
Senate. For the administration to press ahead with the Covenants would tend to 
keep alive and strengthen support for the Bricker amendments to the 
Constitution.”  
 
In this memo, the State Department outlined its increasingly slim range of 
options.  The State Department saw three possible courses: First, the US could just end its 
support for the Covenants altogether.  This might quell the rising tide of domestic 
opposition and quiet down the push for a constitutional amendment—if the US ceased its 
support for human rights treaties, removing the main object of Bricker’s ire might deflate 
 
423 S.J. Res. 102 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess, September 14, 1951) - Introduced by Senator Bricker; S.J. Res. 130 
(February 7, 1952) - Introduced by Senator Bricker S.J. Res. 1 (January 7, 1953) - Introduced by Senator 
Bricker S.J. Res. 43 (February 16, 1953) - Introduced by Senator Watkins for the ABA. 
  
the movement.  Second, the US could focus only on the ICCPR, ignore the ICESCR, and 
work on shaping the former in the image of US Bill of Rights.  To a certain extent, 
downplaying social and economic rights while attempting to limit the Covenants’ 
provisions to those already articulated in the US constitution had always been a part of 
the US strategy—this angle of attack though, probably would not placate Bricker and 
company.  The final option would be to stall the creation of the Covenants indefinitely by 
employing delay tactics.424 
In the Spring of 1953, Eisenhower chose to quit the Covenants: the US would not 
attempt to ratify the Covenants, but it would continue to take part in their drafting.  In 
rapid succession—first in the Senate on April 6, 1953, and then just a day later at the 
opening of the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights—the US unveiled its 
new policy approach.  The State Department and the US delegation to the UN scrambled 
to choreograph their movements, draft speeches, notify important allies ahead of time, 
and set meetings with the press.  When the US alerted its strongest UN allies about its 
policy shift, the British representative replied matter-of-factly that the UK had little 
intention of signing the Covenants either…it just did not understand the need to make 
such a “public spectacle” out of it all.  But both he and the French delegate said they 
understood the US’s position and thought it was sound.425   
 
By 1966 the fight to integrate colonial institutions into the human rights 
framework was a losing battle with the UN swelling in membership to 122.  The fierce 
                                                 
424 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (1979), Vol. III, United Nations Affairs, at 1552-
1554.  See Anderson, Carol. 2003. Eyes off the Prize, at 227-29. 
425 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (1979), Vol. III, United Nations Affairs, at 1562-63, 
1567-78.   
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colonial opposition to the automatic extension of the Covenants to colonial dependencies 
gave way to quiet resignation as the strength of the colonial empires faded and the global 
trend towards decolonization made the colonial clause a non-issue.  In 1960 the UN 
passed a resolution granting independence to colonial territories,426 and the Twenty-First 
Session of the General Assembly adopted the Covenants in 1966 without the inclusion of 
any such colonial clause.  The adoption of the UDHR and its Covenants represented a 
titanic shift: the unprecedented political and legal recognition granted to individuals and 
former colonies had in many important ways transformed international law and 
geopolitical relations.  
 
Theory: The Constitutive Capacity of Social Struggles 
Below, I offer a brief restatement of the multiple (and seemingly disparate) 
research goals that were outlined in the first chapter.  I then integrate this project’s 
findings into a cohesive theory that addresses each of these research goals.  In Chapter 1, 
the thematic goal of bridging the well-known gap between the rhetoric and the reality of 
human rights was identified.  Shoring up this “chasm” into which socially dislocated 
populations fall, between the comforting assurances of universal human rights and the 
devastating capriciousness of their application, has been the overarching theme of this 
project.  Next, a preliminary observation and an initial hypothesis provided the 
foundation of a possible research approach for addressing this issue.  The observation 
related to the fact that there was a great deal of (overlooked) resistance against various 
aspects of the modern international human rights concept during its most formative 
                                                 
426 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted in 
1960 under Res. 1514 (XV).  
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moments of development. The initial hypothesis was that this opposition might have been 
integrated into the human rights concept from the start; and this perhaps can explain some 
of the contemporary problems surrounding human rights.  From here, I set out to answer 
two research questions: What was the nature of the opposition and what was its impact on 
the foundation of the modern international system of human rights, the International Bill 
of Human Rights?   
But methodologically, the project was stalled before it even began, since none of 
the typical orientations for examining human rights—e.g. through law, politics, or 
philosophy—provided access to the relevant empirics.  They each in their own way 
neglect the social aspects of rights formation.  So now, in addition to the aforementioned 
thematic goal of reconnecting the socially dislocated populations with their human rights, 
as well as answering the two research questions, I added one more task: to identify a 
social scientific methodology for accessing the social aspects of human rights formation.  
As it turns out, all of these seemingly disparate goals have the same solution.  
Already in the first chapter it seemed that there might be a relationship between 
the overarching thematic problem of socially dislocated populations and the intellectual 
question surrounding the “missing social” elements in contemporary studies of human 
rights.427   Addressing this association, however, had to be put on hold while the two 
research questions—what was the nature of the resistance, and what was its impact?—
were examined. 
Studying the nature and impact of the resistance required a different approach 
than simply looking at law, politics, or ideas.  The chosen alternative was to adopt a 
                                                 
427 For discussion of the missing social in contemporary understandings and practices of citizenship, see 
generally, Somers, Margaret R. 2004. "Citizenship Troubles: Genealogies of Struggle for the Soul of the 
Social." In The Making and Unmaking of Modernity. 
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widely accepted (though rarely implemented) understanding of human rights:  human 
rights as statements of social relationships. This definition of human rights, when paired 
with the initial hypothesis that the opposition might have had an impact on rights 
formation, represents the beginning of a both a theory and a methodological approach.   
Opposition requires an adversary—it is impossible to have resistance without 
having something to resist.  If there was resistance over certain statements of social 
relationships, there must have been support for contrary notions.  So formalizing the 
initial hypothesis, I surmised that the modern human rights concept has been shaped by 
both positive support and (paradoxically) its opposition.  Following World War II, the 
human rights concept fostered a vital consensus-building process by absorbing 
oppositional elements into its unitary frame.  Thus from its inception, the concept has 
been encumbered by a series of “internal contradictions” that have created enduring 
structures that today enable rhetorical praise for human rights, while constraining their 
enforcement.  
This hypothesis moved the project closer to a method.  In the search for causal 
relationships, causal mechanisms, and crucial historical contingencies in the human rights 
formation process, the overall approach taken in this project has been one that focuses on 
the process through which competing forces (i.e. supporters and the opponents) engage in 
“social struggles” over human rights.  And within these social struggles (if the hypothesis 
is correct) reside the causal mechanism(s) whereby the struggles transcend their existence 
as social action, and become a structural entity that in law, politics, and philosophy is 
known as “human rights.”   
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Under this “social” orientation, the more common understandings of human rights 
as seen through the lenses of the law, politics and philosophy, are just as vital and 
important as ever. They, however, become the empirical indicators of the underlying 
social struggle. The difficulty for accessing the underlying social elements, is that a 
surface reading of the law, politics or normative ideas, often leaves the reader of 
constitutions, human rights treaties, declarations and covenants with a set of normative 
concepts that obscure the hidden social relationships that reside within.   
What is key—in both the history that has been outlined above and the social 
scientific method for interrogating it—is to identify the social meanings that these 
concepts are given (and not allow the normative strength and universal aspects of the 
concepts to obscure the underlying social struggles).  For example, modern constitutions 
can scarcely escape reference to the principle of “equality.” But by itself, equality has 
little (or no) meaning.  The social relationship that was to be protected by the “separate 
but equal” notion of equality was of course very different than the social relationship that 
civil rights activists fought for under the same term.  Similarly, the type of equality 
fought for on either side of the affirmative action debates (outcome vs opportunity) 
relates to a completely different set of social relationships as well. To access the 
underlying social struggles in these cases, it is essential to understand all of the disparate 
social meanings of “equality” that are at stake. Human rights is similarly an empty 
concept—within which (and depending upon the social meaning granted) a certain set of 
social relationships can flourish, while competing social configurations falter. 
The disparate questions this project seeks to unite are now moving closer to one 
another.  Identifying this human rights formation process leads to a social scientific 
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definition that integrates the “social” elements that have been relegated to the margins of 
other academic approaches to the center.  It creates a methodological orientation where 
causal mechanisms for human rights formation are found not just in the law, politics, or 
philosophy of human rights, but within the framework of this process of social struggle.  
It shows what effects the disparate strands of resistance had, and links them up in a way 
that, finally begins to point to a set of factors (and perhaps solutions) for reconnecting 
those socially dislocated populations with their actual human rights.  
So did the resistance actually have an impact on the International Bill of Human 
Rights? The short answer is, “Yes.”  But to avoid subverting the overall thematic goal of 
reconnecting the human rights concept with its social foundations, this research question 
will not be answered here simply through a textual analysis of the International Bill of 
Human Rights.  So as opposed to identifying the impact by simply reciting line by line 
the textual consequences of the opposition, this research question will be answered as it 
exists within a social theory of human rights formation.  This theory reveals the process 
through which the constitutive capacity of social struggles is realized.  
 
Rights Formation Process  
The first step is simply to recognize that the underlying social meaning of human 
rights is of paramount importance.  In the first chapter the point was made that the “price 
of admission” for the study of rights is to define what a human right is.  This is also very 
true at the level of social action.  As the intervening chapters have shown, for those 
fighting for human rights, defining human rights in terms of their meaning with respect to 
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a specific configuration of social relations is the “price of admission” for having any 
rights at all.   
This is what made the city editor of the New Orleans States newspaper, William 
Fitzpatrick, so notable.  He was one of the first individuals amongst the opposition who 
gave the language of international human rights law social meaning for the American 
public.  Part of the social meaning, meant connecting the proposed human rights in the 
Covenant with the segments of American society who would become the duty holders.  
Because the State Department and other members of the UN were largely silent on the 
issue of duties, people like Fitzpatrick filled in the details with their own (often bigoted) 
conjecture.  As the bearers of such duties, Americans would inevitably lose other 
freedoms.  He articulated explicitly what a binding human rights convention would mean 
in the private sphere of the American family, in the realm of public school education, and 
race relations, for example. These social meanings (quite terribly) inflamed passions, 
rallied the opposition and defined what human rights then were. 
The AMA did precisely the same thing—though the bulk of its campaign was 
focused on the meaning of national healthcare, the social meanings conjured in its 
campaign applied even more readily when it shifted its focus to international treaties.   At 
the United Nations, the smaller and non-Western states (with the substantial help of the 
communist bloc) also did this by associating the disdain for socioeconomic rights and the 






A Place to Define Human Rights as One’s Own 
Second (and a close correlate to number one) to actually define what a human 
right is—that is to give it the social meaning that makes the empty signifier into a social 
reality, it is necessary to have a social place from which to do the defining.  This is 
essential, for it is only by having a place where one’s actions count and opinions matter 
(to paraphrase Arendt) that any social meaning of one’s own can be imputed upon the 
concept.  The battle for access to this sphere, in fact, is where the most important battle 
for human rights occurs. 
In combination, Step 1 and Step 2 (which are not necessarily stages in a sequence 
as much as they are essential elements in a phenomenon) represent the most fundamental 
aspect of human rights formation.  Though it is often overlooked, many writers and 
advocates do acknowledge the primacy of this part of the process.  For Arendt, it is the 
“right to have rights”—the political membership necessary to have any rights at all.  For 
Gandhi, it is the duty of “global citizenship.”  Though not necessarily “global” in a literal 
sense, this represents a place that effaces the preexisting structural barriers—such as the 
boundaries of state or empire—that prevent the creation of a social location where, in 
Michelman’s (1996) words, the “social production of moral consciousness” can take 
place.  This is the lived process through which human rights emerge and become one’s 
own. 
Such battles transpired long before the Covenants were completed, and in places 
far away from the high-level diplomatic meetings that are typically the focus of such 
histories.  The AMA for example secured its lock on this sphere of relevance when it 
fought to keep the government out of what it saw as private business relationships. 
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Through enormous force of capital, the strength of its business associations, and extent of 
its political connections it actually acted out the terms of the very social relationship it 
was fighting for.   
 
The nation state is often given full credit for “creating” human rights through 
international treaty making.  But neither the state (nor its representatives) creates human 
rights from scratch.  They do however record them as best they can given the constraints 
imposed.  The Truman Administration, for example, certainly did not take the lead in 
defining its domestic Fair Deal policies as “communistic.”  This was a definition that was 
fought for and won against Truman’s will.  But once this social conception was created 
and became entrenched, it was a reality that had to be dealt with on its own terms.  
Similarly, the Truman Administration did not set out to define its opposition against 
socioeconomic rights at the UN as being fundamentally a “colonial” position.  But once it 
was defined as such, it created constraints that the State Department was forced to 
navigate.   
For smaller and non-Western states, institutionally, this sphere was represented by 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly.  Early on at the UN the smaller and non-
Western states were at a great disadvantage because the structures of the UN were 
designed largely for the larger, more powerful states.428 But by using the framework of 
the UN in a way in which was not originally intended, the smaller states were able to 
carve out a sphere for their own politics within the Third Committee of the General 
                                                 
428 The smaller states were underrepresented in the Trusteeship Council, the Security Council, and only the 
five permanent members of the Security Council had the veto power over binding resolutions, for example.     
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Assembly (much to the consternation of the larger states, whose own interests were at 
times subverted by the smaller states). 
The social struggle of the black advocacy groups in the US, however, represents 
the other side of this story.  One by one the spheres in which they could wage their 
struggles were shut down by their opponents.  Ultimately, they found themselves fighting 
for a set of human rights that were not their own.  For Gandhi, these were the human 
rights “hardly worth fighting for.”  But even Gandhi—in his radical inversion of the 
accepted liberal, state-centric, natural understanding of human rights—puts it far too 
mildly.  For as the present narrative reveals, when a people is removed from this sphere 
of social attachments and political relevance in which global citizenship can be lived, 
their fight for human rights can quickly devolve into a bitter fight for the rights of 
others—a twisted parody of the human rights they first set out to achieve.  Human 
rights—as in the International Bill of Human Rights—are a record of the outcomes of 
such social struggles.  And as written, embody the social connections and political 
attachments that are the very human rights being fought for.   
As just mentioned, once social meaning is given to the concept, the struggle in 
many ways takes on a life of its own. Once the communist bloc and the smaller and non-
Western states defined racial discrimination as being inseparable with colonialism, for 
example, the United States was forced to rethink both its domestic and international 
policy strategy.  Similarly, once the Southern white supremacists defined the Genocide 
Convention in terms of domestic race relations and lynching (as opposed to anything 
about World War II or the Holocaust), the historical trajectory of human rights treaties in 
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the United States was altered for decades.  Any subsequent US push for human rights 
treaties would necessarily be forced to contend with such associations.  
  
The Social Struggles are Recorded in Human Rights Law  
These social struggles are recorded in the International Bill of Human Rights —
though abstracted away from the particularities of the actual struggle and translated into 
the universalized language of the law.  On the surface of the written law, is recorded a 
winner’s history of the concepts that have gained such normative value and rhetorical 
strength that neither side of the social struggle is able to argue against them—and in fact 
must argue within their frames to achieve any success at all.  This is why Great Britain, 
almost comically (if it were not of such serious social consequence) had to argue that the 
colonial clause was about the freedom and autonomy of colonial inhabitants.   
If the International Bill of Rights is read from a strict political or legal 
perspective, the underlying social struggles over colonialism likely remain hidden.  And 
perhaps, because the conceptual winners often occupy a central place in the language of 
law (e.g. “autonomy,” “freedom,” “dignity,” etc.) a well-drafted limitations clause will 
sound quite virtuous and altruistic on its surface. But if read as the outcome of a social 
struggle over the appropriate way to organize social relations, the nobility of legal 
pronouncement  gives way to the particularities of the actual social struggle.  The federal 
state clause, for instance, represents a framework in which in which a social relationship 
defined by racial inequality could flourish while others social relationships—e.g. those 
embodying racial equality—would falter. The intensity of debate over the colonial clause 
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and the federal state clause reveal the underlying social battles that were fought through 
legal proxy. 
 
The Dual Imperative 
While states do not necessarily create human rights, they are the most important 
actors in recording the overall social struggles in international treaties.  Within the overall 
social struggles that have been focused on in this project, there exists a subsidiary causal 
mechanism that is exclusive to state action.  During the drafting of the International Bill 
of Human Rights, Great Britain and the United States were often forced to act upon two 
conflicting imperatives: the first imperative was to support certain human rights in the 
international sphere for the sake of geopolitical interests and friendly relations between 
states.  But as described throughout this project, the very human rights principles that 
fostered international unity, also threatened their domestic spheres with monumental 
upheaval.  As a result, the second imperative was to prevent human rights from having a 
strong impact in the fields where they were most threatening.  From the forces exerted by 
this dual imperative came lasting solutions that were integrated into the very foundation 
of the modern international system of human rights.  
One way that UN member states such as Great Britain and the United States 
responded to this dual imperative was through compromise. As shown above, throughout 
the drafting debates delegations sparred over the particular rights that would be included 
in the legal texts in an effort to locate a comfortable middle ground in which human 
rights could be named without endangering existing domestic practices.  This dynamic of 
compromise is of course a mainstay of virtually any collective drafting project.    
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There was however, a second drafting battle being waged—a concurrent struggle 
in which the stakes were higher and the terms of victory absolute.  Great Britain and the 
United States responded to the dual imperative to simultaneously confirm and contest 
human rights, through a campaign to develop a human rights framework that could flip 
back and forth between alternate, conflicting modes of social organization.  If 
“successful,” this had the power to not only neutralize the prerogatives of the human 
rights instrument, but through various legal mechanisms, to allow entirely contrary 
practices to flourish amidst a state’s apparent support for a human rights treaty.   
For instance, states often sign treaties with extensive lists of “Reservations, 
Understandings and Declarations” (RUDs).  These are legal footnotes that can limit, alter, 
or negate entire portions of the treaty’s text with respect to a particular signatory (but 
from a social reading, they also identify where the boundaries of the lost social struggles 
exist).  Though the matter of colonial application might have seemed long-settled in 1976 
when the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
was ratified by Great Britain, its application with respect to certain remaining British 
territories was still an issue. While no colonial clause appears in the actual body-text of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR, Great 
Britain ratified the instrument while slipping in the following declaration,  
“Lastly the Government of the United Kingdom declare that the provisions of the 
Covenant shall not apply to Southern Rhodesia unless and until they inform the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that they are in a position to ensure that 
the obligations imposed by the Covenant in respect of that territory can be fully 
implemented.” 
 
Like Great Britain with respect to the Colonial Clause, the US incorporated a 
series of RUDs to go along with its ratification.  One of which, that in substance is a 
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virtual carbon copy of the original federal state clause proposed on November 26, 1947, 
reads:  
“That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by 
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial 
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local 
governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction 
over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the 
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local 
governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.” 
Both solutions permitted Great Britain and the United States to maintain strong 
rhetorical support for human rights principles without being forced to implement the 
provisions that were dangerous to existing social configurations.  The use of such RUDs 
is quite common.  Viewed as evidence of an institutionalized social struggle, these RUDs 
reveal a great deal about the buried social struggles (and the shortcomings in legal 
process).   
 
The Social Divisions are Naturalized 
 These dual imperatives, as recorded within the International Bill of Human 
Rights, reflect the various social divisions that powerful states were responding to.  The 
social division between the East and the West, for instance, was most notably recorded 
within the International Bill of Human Rights through the decision to split it into two 
Covenants—each Covenant is representative of one side of the social struggle.  Similarly, 
such social divisions are recorded through the use of legal implementation mechanisms 
such as the colonial and federal state clauses.   
The social struggles (and the social divisions) that are recorded in the 
International Bill of Human Rights are the social struggles of an era that has been left 
behind—one of Jim Crow, The Cold War and colonialism. Once recorded into law, the 
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great problem is that these social divisions become naturalized—social fractures turn into 
accepted rifts.  Over time, it may be assumed that those who are not covered by a human 
rights treaty, should not be covered.  One of the greatest factors in splitting the Covenants 
into two, for example, was the Cold War.  What began as a social struggle between the 
West and the East, over time is assumed to be a natural difference.  Now over sixty years 
later, and two decades since the Cold War ended, the charge of “socialized medicine” is 
still hurled at US legislation to offer adequate and guaranteed healthcare to all.  
The Eisenhower Administration set a course that has since become the foundation 
of contemporary US human rights policy: America would champion human rights at the 
UN, but in no way would human rights influence domestic affairs. Today in international 
matters, the US government pursues a strong human rights agenda by imposing political 
pressure on foreign governments and placing conditions on foreign aid, but reserves no 
place in domestic law for human rights.  This is not the inevitable or natural state of 
affairs.  In the United States, the rejection of human rights has been naturalized.  As 
revealed within this study, it was the result of a confluence of various social struggles that 
caused the US to oppose human rights—the Cold War, Jim Crow, and decolonization.  
None of these social struggles is relevant in today’s foreign and domestic policies, yet in 
national politics government representatives rarely, if ever, even utter the term with 
respect to US citizens.  
So finally, how can researchers, advocates, and lawmakers reconnect human 
rights with the underlying social elements that are so often dislocated from the language 
of law, the practices of politics, and the abstractions of ideas?  Here the social process of 
rights formation is the theory, and the theory is the method. This process begins by first 
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shifting the analytic lens towards the social, to see human rights as statements of social 
relationships that are formed through social struggles.  By locating a place where social 
meaning can be given to the rights through lived experience, those human rights can be 
fought for and won.   
This process outlines the theory of the constitutive capacity of social struggles, in 
which the latter transcends its existence as a form of social action to become the very 
human rights being fought for—not merely in the sense of written law (though this is 
key), but as a lived reality in which a sphere of human inviolability first emerges.  This 
notion of human rights stands in marked contrast to the all too common situation in 
which people who apparently have human rights by virtue of their humanity, inherent 
dignity, or by international treaty, have their rights violated with impunity.  This 
“embodied” notion of human rights refers to having a robust set of social and political 
attachments that allow the lofty and noble sounding ideas defining “human rights” to 
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The International Bill of Rights Drafting Overview 
 
1945 -- United Nations Charter 
 The United Nations was created in 1945 at the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (UNCIO) in San Francisco.  The most important document to 
come out of this meeting was the UN Charter which outlines the procedures, rules, and 
structures and purposes of the new international organization.  Importantly, human rights 
are mentioned seven times in the charter—though at the time, the exact meaning and 
definition of the concept had yet to be determined.  Article 68 of the Charter calls for the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to establish commissions “for the promotion of 
human rights.” Thus, the Charter is the foundational text that gave life to the Commission 
on Human Rights which was established on February 15, 1946, and was largely 
responsible for the drafting of the UDHR and Covenants.   
   
1946 – 1948 -- UDHR429 
Nuclear Commission on Human Rights- Apr. 29 – May 21, 1946 
The Nuclear proposed the size, functions, and duties of the Commission on 
Human rights that would be responsible for drafting the UDHR.  The report of the 
Nuclear Commission (E/38/Rev.1) was presented to the Second Session of the 
Economic and Social Council. 
Second Session of the Economic and Social Council- May 25 – Jun. 21, 1946 
The Council adopted the Nuclear Commission’s report and established the 
Commission on Human Rights. 
First Session of the Commission on Human Rights- Jan.-Feb. 1947 
The Commission on Human Rights, which was responsible for drafting the 
UDHR and its Covenants, was a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), and was formed pursuant to Article 68 of the UN Charter.430  
With Eleanor Roosevelt as its chair, John Humphrey was asked to prepare an 
initial draft.  During this period the Drafting Committee enlarged from three 
executive representatives to eight 
First Session of the Drafting Committee (8-member) Jun. 9 – 25, 1947 
The Drafting Committee was a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human 
Rights, and was responsible for creating the main text of the documents.  During 
this phase it had four texts to consider: (1) Humphrey’s draft; (2) Annotated 
 
429 For detailed overviews of the UDHR drafting process see Morsink 1999; Waltz 2001; and 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/ (last accessed March 4, 2009).  
430 The Commission on Human Rights was dissolved in 2006 and was replaced by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council—a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.  
    
outline of Humphreys draft (400 pages); (3) Basic list of Humphrey’s rights; (4) 
United Kingdom Draft. 
Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights (18 member)-Dec. 1947  
This Session produced the “Geneva Draft” 
Second Session of the Drafting Committee (8 member) May 1948 
Here, the Committee mostly focused on whether it would create only a 
declaration, or a declaration along with a covenant.  
Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights- May- June 1948 
Here the focus was largely on reducing the size of the Geneva Draft 
Third (Social, Cultural, and Humanitarian) Committee of the General Assembly- 
Sept.– Dec. 1948 
The Commission on Human Rights worked with ECOSOC and the GA, 
transmitting drafts of the text back and forth for substantive input and engagement 
in broader debates surrounding the text of the IBR.  This forum provided nations 
that were not members of the smaller Commission on Human Rights an 
opportunity for input.  The third Committee adopted the Declaration 29-0 with 7 
abstentions.  
Plenary Session of the Third General Assembly Session 
The GA adopted the UDHR on December 10, 1948 (48 states in favor, none 
opposing, and eight abstentions). 
 
1947 – 1966 -- The Covenants 
 Discussions began at the first session of the Drafting Committee (a subsidiary 
body of the Commission on Human Rights) which met from June 9-25, 1947.  It 
comprised members from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, USSR, the United 
Kingdom and the US.  Work on the Covenant continued at the Second Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights (December 2-14, 1947).431  Next, the Second Session of 
the Drafting Committee (May 3-21, 1948) met and created an updated draft of the 
Covenant (E/800, Annex).  
 Based on this draft, the primary drafting phase was initiated—this phase began 
with the Commission on Human Rights’ fifth session (May-June 1949) and ended with 
its tenth session (February-April 1954).  During the drafting process, the Commission on 
Human Rights did not act alone—ECOSOC and the General Assembly were also very 
much a part of the process.   
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were 
originally intended to exist as a single covenant.  In February of 1952 the General 
Assembly passed Resolution 543(VI) which reversed the earlier resolution calling for a 
single Covenant.  From this Resolution the Commission on Human Rights was charged 
with drafting the two Covenants that became the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  The Human 
Rights Commission completed its task in 1954, but it would be another 12 years before 
the General Assembly would unanimously adopt the two Covenants and open them for 
signature.  They both entered force into international law in 1976 upon attaining the 
required number of state ratifications.   
 
                                                 
431 See the Commission’s report (E/600).  
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Resolution 37, adopted by the Legislature of the State of North Carolina, relating to a 
world federal government with limited powers adequate to assure peace.  Printed in the 




Resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States concerning certain 
proposed constitutional amendments authorizing the United States to negotiate 
with other nations relating to a world federal government with limited powers 
adequate to assure peace 
 
Whereas war is now a threat to the very existence of our civilization, because 
modern science has produced weapons of war which are overwhelmingly destructive and 
against which there is no sure defense; and 
 
Whereas the effective maintenance of world peace is the proper concern and 
responsibility of every American citizen; and 
 
Whereas the people of the State of North Carolina, while now enjoying domestic 
peace and security under the laws of their local State and Federal Government, deeply 
desire the guaranty of world peace; and 
 
Whereas all history shows that peace is the product of law and order, and that law 
and order are the product of government; and 
 
Whereas the United Nations as presently constituted, although accomplishing great 
good in many fields, lacks authority to enact, interpret, or enforce world law, and under 
its present charter is incapable of restraining any major nations which may foster or 
foment war; and 
 
Whereas the Charter of the United Nations expressly provides, in articles 108 and 
109, a procedure for reviewing and altering the charter; and 
 
Whereas in 1941 North Carolina was the first of many States to memorialize 
Congress, through resolutions by their State legislature or in referenda by their voters, to 
initiate steps toward the creation of a world federal government; and 
 
Whereas several nations have recently adopted constitutional provisions to facilitate 
their entry into a world federal government by authorizing a delegation to such a world 
federal government of a portion of their sovereignty sufficient to endow it with power 
adequate to prevent war: Now, therefore, be it 
 
Resolved by the house of representatives (the senate concurring): 
 
SECTION 1. That application is hereby made to the Congress of the United States, 
pursuant to article V of the Constitution of the United States, to call a convenion [sic] for 
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the sole purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution which are appropriate to 
authorize the United States to negotiate with other nations, subject to later ratification, a 
constitution of a world federal government, open to all nations, with limited powers 
adequate to assure peace, or amendments to the constitution which are appropriate to 
ratify any world constitution which is presented to the United States by the United 




SEC. 2. That the Secretary of state is hereby directed to transmit copies of this 
application to the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress, to the 
Members of the said Senate and House of Representatives from this State, and to the 
presiding officers of each of the legislatures in the several States, requesting their 
cooperation. 
 
SEC. 3. That this resolution be in full force and effect from and after its ratification. 
 
In the general assembly read three times and ratified this the 20th day of April 
1949. 
 
H. P. TAYLOR, 
President of the Senate. 
 
KERR CRAIGE RAMSEY, 
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